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The main topic of this thesis is the e¤ect of aging on pension systems. As the population of many Western-
European countries ages, this topic has gained wide attention in the popular press, the policy debate and
the academic literature. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 analyze the e¤ect of aging on intergenerational risk sharing,
public pension expenditure, and the asset allocation of pension funds respectively. Chapter 5 shows how a
pension fund can improve participantswelfare of by facilitating nancial transactions between generations.
Chapter 6 is more general and focuses on the politics of reforms of welfare programs, including pension
reforms. Finally, the seventh chapter is unrelated to pensions; it analyzes the association between media
coverage and consumer condence.
Before discussing the content of the chapters, it is useful to rst discuss the two central concepts of
the title of this thesis, aging and pensions.
Pensions
The rst concept that is central in this thesis is pension systems. A useful and often used ideal-type
of how pension systems are organized is given by the three pillar system, see World Bank (1994). The
three-pillar system also provides a good description of the Dutch pension system. The rst pillar consists of
a state-pension that provides a minimal pension for each citizen, such as the AOW in the Netherlands. The
rst pillar aims to avoid old age poverty and is usually nanced by a Pay-As-You-Go system (PAYG). In a
PAYG-system current benets are nanced by current contributions.
The second pillar consists of supplementary, occupational pensions, aimed at safeguarding the stan-
dard of living after retirement. It is organized by employers and unions and is typically carried out by
pension funds. Most pension funds are nanced by full funding, like the approximately 500 occupational
pension funds in the Netherlands. When a pension-arrangement is fully funded, each participant saves for
his or her own retirement.
Participation in the rst and second pillar is often mandatory. This contrasts with the third pillar,
which consists of private, voluntarily saving and retirement plans, usually provided by insurance companies.
This thesis focuses on the rst (Chapters 2 and 3) and second pillar (Chapters 4 and 5).
The three-pillar system is a useful ideal-type of pension systems, but in reality hybrid systems exist.
For example, wage-related pension-schemes may be organized by the state and nanced with PAYG, as is
the case in Germany.
Aging
The second concept that is central in this thesis is aging. Aging is a generic term that refers to the
population of a country or a society getting older. While aging is an unambiguous concept at the individual
level, it is not a straightforward concept when applied to a group of people. Aging is determined by several
factors. The two most important factors are life expectancy and the fertility rate. A higher life expectancy
and a lower fertility rate are both associated with the aging of a society. A third factor that may inuence
aging of a society is migration, depending on the age of immigrants and emigrants.
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The most widely used operationalization of aging is the dependency ratio, which is dened as the
number of people that have reached the retirement age (usually the age of 65) relative to the number
of people of working age. The dependency ratio thus indicates how many retired people are supported
by the working age-population. The higher this ratio, the more a population is aging. The dependency
ratio gures prominently in the policy debate and in the academic literature. (It is used here as the main
operationalization of aging in Chapters 2 and 5.)
Table 1: dependency ratio in the Netherlands
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Dependency ratio (%) 14.0 16.8 18.8 20.1 20.8 21.9 25.1
Year (continued) 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Dependency ratio (%), (projected) 33.9 43.2 49.3 46.7 46.0
Aging in the Netherlands can be illustrated with the development of the dependency ratio. Table 11
shows for the Netherlands the (projected) dependency ratio, dened as 100 times the number of people who
are 65 years or older divided by the number of people between 19 and 65 years of age. As can be seen, ever
since 1950 the dependency ratio has been increasing in the Netherlands. In 1950 the dependency ratio was
equal to 14, so 100 people of working age supported14 retirees. In 1980 the dependency ratio was 20.1 and
in 2010 the dependency further increased to 25.1. It is projected to increase to 49.3 in 2040 (while decreasing
somewhat to 46 in 2060). If the projections turn out to be accurate, in 2040 two people of working age will
support almost one retiree.
Other operationalizations of aging may be useful as well. The literature on the political economy
of Social Security for example stresses the importance of the age of the median voter. Theoretically, the
median voter is pivotal in a democratic society as its support gives a policy proposal a majority. The older
the median voter is, the more a government may be expected to spend on pension benets. (Chapter 3
o¤ers an empirical analysis of the political e¤ect of aging and uses the age of the median voter as the main
operationalization of aging.)
Aging is obviously a good development, as it means that people on average live longer. However,
there are also worries that aging may negatively impact the economy in general and pension arrangements
in particular. This thesis mainly focuses on the e¤ect of aging on pensions.
Aging is rst and foremost problematic for pension arrangements that are nanced by PAYG, as
is typical in the rst pillar. If the dependency ratio increases, the number of people contributing decreases
relative to the number of people receiving benets. This may put pressure on the nancial sustainability
of PAYG-nanced pension arrangements. In the Netherlands for example, the level of the contributions is
xed and any remaining gap between pension expenditures and contributions is nanced out of general tax
revenues. Van Ewijk et al. (2006) state that if current budgetary arrangements are maintained, as a result
of aging the "gap between government expenditures and revenues is projected to increase by more than 3%
of GDP between 2006 and 2040". An increase in productivity can mitigate the e¤ect of aging if benets are
not linked to GDP, but with a steady decline of people of working age relative to the number of retirees, at
a certain point either contributions need to increase or benets need to decrease, or both.
Aging is however also problematic for a pension system that is nanced by full funding, as is often
the case in the second pillar. This holds true in particular for Dened-Benet plans but also for Dened-
Contribution plans. In a Dened-Benet plan (DB), participants receive a guaranteed pension, based on the
number of years during which participants contributed and on their wage during that period. In a DB plan
the investment risk is thus borne by the pension fund (the sponsoring company and active participants).
If the value of assets of the pension fund falls short of the value of liabilities, contributions -paid by the
sponsoring company or active participants- need to be raised. (Conversely, contributions may be reduced if
solvency of the pension fund increases.) This introduces a PAYG-element in a DB arrangement, which is
therefore vulnerable to aging. If the investment return is low, contributions in an aging pension fund need
to be raised by a large amount to restore solvency. This is all the more relevant since aging may negatively
a¤ect the return on capital. As there are fewer working people relative to the total number of people, the
1Source: data-base Statline from Statistics Netherlands ( Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, www.statline.cbs.nl).
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capital-labor ratio may decrease, in turn depressing both capital returns and the level of production; see
Adema et al. (2009).
In a DB plan risks are shared between participants and the sponsoring company and between gener-
ations, in a DC plan this is not the case. In Dened-Contribution plans the level of the contributions is xed,
and investment risks are therefore borne by the participants. Investment losses are thus not problematic from
the perspective of the pension fund (though they are problematic for individual participants). The longevity
risk is usually borne by the pension fund, as is also the case in DB plans. Sharing idiosyncratic longevity
risk is indeed among the primary tasks of a pension fund. If there are enough participants, a pension fund
can perform this task well by pooling the risks. Some participants will live longer than expected and receive
benets during a longer period, but other participants will live shorter than expected. An increase in the
average longevity of participants is not problematic if it is anticipated and has been taken into account in
determining the level of contributions. However, if there is an unexpected increase in the average longevity
of participants, aging has a negative impact on the solvency of pension funds. Then, both in DB and DC
plans, aging increases the period over which pension funds need to pay benets to retired participants.
The distinction between DC and DB plans is a useful typology, but hybrid systems exist. In the
Netherlands for example, many pension funds have a DB arrangement though indexation of the accrued
rights depends on the nancial condition of the pension fund, thus introducing a DC element.
There is now much political discussion and policy debate about how pension arrangements, both in
the rst pillar and the second pillar, should be reformed to meet the challenges of aging. In the rst pillar,
the three main options for reform are to lower benets, increase contributions or extend the retirement
age. In the second pillar these options are discussed as well to improve solvency of pension funds. Another
important issue in the second pillar is how (investment) risks should be shared between the sponsoring
company, retirees and active participants. Introducing more DC elements makes pension funds more robust
to aging, but it does away with the advantages of risk sharing. Related issues are how much investment
risk a pension fund should take and how changes in pension arrangements should be reected in changes in
pension fund governance to ensure the pension arrangement is carried out adequately.
The policy debate about pension reforms will be present for the foreseeable future and it cannot be
predicted what the outcome of the political debate will be. This thesis seeks to contribute to the academic
literature, but will hopefully also be informative for the policy debate on pension reforms. The chapters of
the thesis are now discussed in more detail.
Chapter 2, entitled Political economy of intergenerational risk sharing, analyzes the political limits to
intergenerational risk sharing.
It is well established that intergenerational risk sharing can be e¢ cient from an ex-ante perspective,
see for example Gordon and Varian (1988). Intergenerational risk sharing between non-overlapping genera-
tions can however not be implemented by markets. The reason is that ex-ante e¢ cient risk sharing may lead
to transfers that are disadvantageous for some generations ex post. In particular, a young generation might
not voluntarily participate in risk sharing if that is not in their interest ex post because they have to bail out
older generations. Just as it is di¢ cult to insure a burning house, young participants do not want to insure
an economic bust that has already taken place. The market cannot force future generations to participate
and is thereby incomplete and ine¢ cient from an ex ante point of view.
A feasible risk-sharing mechanism requires mandatory participation, which can only be enforced by
the government. That is, only the government can pre-commit unborn generations to participate in a pension
scheme that is ex-ante e¢ cient. Although the government can implement intergenerational risk sharing, it
is not a foregone conclusion that it actually will.
The objectives of a government are not (solely) determined by e¢ ciency considerations but by po-
litical pressure as well. In a democracy, political decisions depend on electoral support. Politicians therefore
have an incentive to redistribute towards cohorts that are both easier to inuence and more numerous; a
politician will receive more votes that way. Politicians therefore do not have the incentive to arrange ex ante
optimal risk sharing.
This chapter analyzes if or to what extent ex-ante e¢ cient risk sharing arises endogenously in a demo-
cratic political process. Using a probability voting model in the context of an overlapping-generations-model,
both the ex-ante e¢ cient transfers and the transfers resulting from the political process are characterized.
The main result is that the political process generally does not lead to ex-ante e¢ ciency. Source of the inef-
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ciency is that politicians have an electoral incentive to redistribute ex post to larger cohorts. The political
process may however still lead to some risk sharing which from an ex-ante perspective is preferable to no
risk sharing at all.
While there exists a well-established literature on the political economy of intergenerational transfers,
see Galasso (2002), it is a relatively new development to analyze the political economy of intergenerational
risk sharing. Notable exceptions are Rangel and Zeckhauser (1999) and DAmato and Galasso (2010).
The third chapter -entitled The greying of the median voter - tests how an aging electorate inuences
public pension expenditure, using data for 30 OECD-countries between 1980-2005. Theoretically, there are
two channels through which aging may positively inuence pension expenditure. The rst e¤ect is that there
are more retirees receiving benets. Aging thus leads to higher total pension expenditure relative to GDP.
A second, political e¤ect of aging is that there are relatively more older voters, who can therefore exert more
political inuence. Median voter models predict that an older median voter leads to an increase of benets
per retiree, see for example Browning (1975) and Galasso (2006). Aging will then not only lead to higher
expenditure relative to GDP but also relative to the number of retirees.
There is empirical support for the hypothesis that aging leads to more public pension expenditure
relative to GDP. The dependency ratio (the number of retirees relative to the number of people in working
age, 15-64) has a positive and signicant e¤ect on expenditure relative to GDP. This indicates that the
popular concern that aging will lead to higher public pension expenditure and -ceteris paribus- to higher
government decits is justied. It may be added that an increase in expenditure is almost unavoidable as
there are more people on the receiving end of Social Security and an increase could only be avoided by
a relatively large decrease in benets. Whether benets should decrease or whether contributions should
increase (or whether other public spending should be decreased), is a political decision. This chapter shows
that the decision itself cannot be avoided, however. There is no empirical support for the stronger hypothesis
made by median voter models. In fact the opposite is the case: an increase in the age of the median voter
(proxied with the median age of the population) has a negative impact on benets per retiree.
Some other studies investigated the relationship between aging and pension expenditure as well,
reaching similar conclusions; for example Breyer and Craig (1997) and Tepe and Vanhuysse (2010). The
novel contribution to this literature is that health care costs are evaluated as well. Older voters can be
expected to press as much for higher health care spending as for higher pension benets, because they make
use of health care more often than younger voters do. A complete analysis thus considers both factors.
A second contribution is that this chapter considers more recent data, more observations and an extended
model-specication.
The fourth chapter, entitled Demographic composition and risk of pension funds, documents the e¤ect
of the demographic structure of Dutch pension funds on their strategic asset allocation, using a unique data
set of pension fund investment plans for 2007. The main result is that an increase of the average age of
active participants by one year is associated with a decrease in the equity exposure of pension funds equal
to 0.5 percentage points. As equity is generally a risky asset class, older pension funds thus tend to decrease
the risk level of their investment portfolio.
The negative relation between age and equity allocation is in line with an important outcome of the
literature on optimal saving and investment over the life cycle, see Bovenberg et al. (2007). The proportion
of nancial capital invested in risky assets as stocks should decrease over the life-cycle, thereby increasing
the fraction invested in safer bonds. The reason is that younger workers have more human capital than
older workers. A young worker can diversify investment risk with his or her human capital. The optimal
negative relationship between age and equity exposure is derived under the assumption that human capital
is risk-free. This assumption is not realistic and an important question in the literature is whether and how
that matters. If capital returns and wages are cointegrated, as Benzoni et al. (2007) proposes, it may be
the case that young workers should take less rather than more equity risk than older workers. Whether the
negative age-dependence of the equity allocation of Dutch pension funds is optimal, therefore remains an
open question. The contribution of this chapter is the empirical observation that older pension funds take
less equity risk. This is in line with other studies, see for example Alestalo and Puttonen (2006) and Gerber
and Weber (2007). Other factors that have a positive e¤ect on the equity exposure of pension funds are
pension fund size, funding ratio, and average pension wealth of participants. Pension plan type and pension
fund type have no signicant impact.
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The results of this chapter are furthermore relevant for the policy debate because of the nature of
the Dutch pension contract. Dutch pension funds typically guarantee pension benets to retirees in nominal
terms with the ambition to index nominal pensions to ination or wages. Indexation is conditional on the
nancial position of the pension fund, as indicated by the funding ratio. The funding ratio of a pension
fund gives the value of the assets divided by the nominal liabilities. If the funding ratio exceeds 125, the
pension fund indexes pension benets of retirees and accrued pension rights of active participants. The best
a retired or near-retired participant can hope for is an indexed pension. If the funding ratio is high, a retiree
will prefer that the pension fund does not take further investment risk, as this may decrease the funding
ratio, while retirees do not benet when the funding ratio increases. Young participants may on the other
hand benet when the pension fund takes investment risk, as this may decrease future contributions if the
funding ratio increases further.
In 2007, the year of the study, the funding ratio of many pension funds exceeded 125; this chapter
shows that if the age of their active participants increases, Dutch pension funds indeed take less risk, in
line with preferences of older participants, induced by the pension contract. Whether pension funds should
optimally adapt their investment risk more (or less), can again not be answered by this chapter. It does
however show that pension funds adapt their investment strategy at least partly according to the interests
of their participants.
The fth chapter, entitled Can pension funds improve welfare by lifting borrowing constraints?, develops
conditions under which a pension fund can improve the welfare of young, borrowing-constrained participants
by letting them borrow from older participants. It further discusses the consequences that lifting participants
borrowing constraints has for the investment strategy, contribution policy and governance structure of the
pension fund.
As mentioned before, the literature on optimal saving and investment over an individuals life cycle
suggests that young workers should invest more in stock than older workers because of their larger human
capital, again see Bovenberg et al. (2007). The optimal investment strategy of young workers may involve
that they go short in bonds, that is, that they optimally borrow in order to invest in stock. This strategy is
however unfeasible if the young are borrowing-constrained.
This chapter shows how in this case a pension fund may be able to improve the welfare of borrowing-
constrained participants by letting them borrow from older participants who want to lend. The pension fund
as a whole subsequently increases its stock exposure. It may even be optimal that the young borrow against
human capital. In that case the pension fund needs to levy contributions ex post on younger participants to
repay older participants in case stock return is low. The risk level of the pension fund ex-ante can therefore
not be separated from the contribution policy ex post.
The pension fund is in a unique position to facilitate optimal borrowing against human capital when
participation in a pension fund is mandatory. The young essentially face a commitment problem; they want
to borrow against their human capital, promising to repay via contributions to the pension fund in case
stock return is low. However, when the young indeed need to repay, they have an incentive to renege on
their promise. Therefore insurance companies without mandatory participation cannot facilitate borrowing
against human capital. A pension fund with mandatory participation may enforce the promise of the young
to repay the old, when necessary, out of human capital. Mandatory participation thus acts as a commitment
device for the young to repay their debt when they borrow against human capital.
If contributions cannot be raised automatically, however, for example due to resistance of young
participants ex post, intergenerational conicts may arise. Then the optimal investment policy can only
be implemented by a proper governance structure. For example, if the board of the pension fund has
discretionary power to decide over contributions, the old will want to be represented on the board to ensure
that they are repaid in full. However, the young want to avoid that the old abuse their position to increase
contributions arbitrarily, so the young will need to be represented adequately as well.
If governance cannot solve the commitment problem, the optimal solution cannot be implemented.
A second-best solution is that the risk level is scaled back to a level such that the young do not borrow
against human capital. With a risk immunization policy, the young can still borrow but only with their
nancial capital as collateral. While this risk immunization policy is second-best, it is welfare-enhancing
compared to strictly separated accounts.
There is now much debate in the Netherlands whether benets should be decreased and whether
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contributions can further increase, see Goudzwaard et al. (2009). There is also discussion whether pension
funds should decrease their investment risks and whether young and old participants should be represented
(explicitly) in the pension fund board, see Frijns et al. (2009). This chapter shows that these issues are
intrinsically intertwined and should be considered simultaneously; for example, if a pension fund cannot
increase contributions, this a¤ects the optimal investment risk.
The sixth chapter, entitled Voters commitment problem and reforms in welfare programs, gives a
theoretical explanation for why and when vote-seeking governments pursue unpopular welfare reforms that
are likely to cost it votes.
Public opinion research shows that the cards are very much stacked in favor of the welfare state
status quo. A majority of voters, including the median voter holding the median policy preference, value
welfare programs such as public pensions and unemployment benets and prefer to uphold the status quo
rather than cutting back these programs, see Boeri et al. (2002). Consequently, vote-seeking political parties
have the best chance of attaining their goal if they refrain from reforming these programs in the direction
that the median voter dislikes.
Many governments in advanced democracies have however pursued reforms that are unpopular, such
as increasing the pension age or cutting back benets. When and why will a vote-seeking government pursue
unpopular welfare reforms that are likely to cost votes? This question has arrived at the forefront of the
comparative literature on the welfare state, but hasnt yet been answered satisfactorily; see Vis (2010). This
chapter contributes to this scholarly debate by proposing a mechanism that simultaneously explains the
occurrence and timing of welfare program reforms that are unpopular with the median voter.
Using a novel game-theoretical model, it is shown that a government enacts reforms that are un-
popular with the median voter during bad economic times, but generally not during good ones. The key
reason is that voters cannot commit to re-elect a government that does not reform during bad times. This
voterscommitment problem stems from economic voting, that is voterstendency to punish the government
for a poor economic situation. The voterscommitment problem means that a vote-seeking government will
consider reforms only if it will likely be voted out of o¢ ce anyway because of economic hardship. A poor
socio-economic state thus enables a government to act according to its own economic ideas or interests.
The central empirical implication of the model is that unpopular reforms are generally initiated
during recessions, which is in line with the ndings of for example Høj et al. (2006). This means that given
the current credit-crisis, pension reforms may be expected the coming years. In the Netherlands for example,
the minority government of Christian Democrats (CDA) and liberals (VVD) indeed plans to increase the
retirement age from 65 years to 66 years in 2020 and to 67 year in 2025.
The seventh and last chapter, entitled News and consumer condence, is not related to pensions.
It addresses the question whether economic news coverage a¤ects consumer condence. Using a Vector
AutoRegression-model (VAR), the empirical relationship between the real economy, consumer condence
and economic news coverage in national newspapers is studied for the Netherlands during the period 1990-
2009. The main nding is that in this period, more negative news coverage (operationalized as the number
of times terms like unemployment and ination are mentioned in newspaper articles) signicantly decreases
consumer condence.
This chapter contributes to the academic literature on the determinants of consumer condence.
Consumer condence is rst and foremost determined by real economic factors such as unemployment,
economic growth, and the stock market. However, a second important factor identied by several authors is
media coverage. This study conrms the importance of media coverage for consumer condence. Moreover,
by using computer-assisted content analysis of news-papers, a time series that is both longer and more recent
than time series in most studies can be considered. This enables an analysis of whether there are structural
breaks in the relationship between consumer condence and media coverage.
There indeed seem to be structural breaks in the e¤ect of media coverage on consumer condence. In
the period 1990-1999 (representing a full business-cycle) there is a substantial and signicant e¤ect. The last
two years of the study, 2008-2009, also show a sizeable e¤ect. In the intermediate period 2000-2007 there
is however no e¤ect. A possible explanation for the di¤erences is that the dotcom-era was characterized
more by debt-nanced demand and asset and house bubbles, with positive media coverage stimulating both.
During the credit-crisis this dynamic was reversed. This contrasts with the intermediate period that was
more inuenced by real world events as the discovery of accounting fraud and the attack of 9/11.
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While this hypothesis about the causes of the structural breaks should be further developed and
tested, the sizable e¤ect in the most recent years does suggest that during the current credit crisis, news
coverage inuences consumer condence to a considerable extent. Consumer condence is in turn important
for consumer spending and, thereby, for economic growth; see for example Acemoglu and Scott (1994).
Journalists should therefore be aware of the consequences of overreporting negative economic developments,
and a realistic but moderate tone in economic news coverage seems called for.
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Political economy of intergenerational
risk sharing
2.1 Introduction
1It is by now well established that intergenerational risk sharing can be e¢ cient from an ex-ante perspec-
tive. This is discussed in Gordon and Varian (1988), Bohn (2003), Ball and Mankiw (2007), Beetsma and
Bovenberg (2007), Matsen and Thogerson (2004) and Gollier (2008). However, intergenerational risk sharing
between non-overlapping generations cannot be implemented by markets, see Rangel and Zeckhauser (1999).
The reason is that ex-ante e¢ cient risk sharing leads to transfers that may be disadvantageous for some
generations ex post. In particular, a young generation might not voluntarily participate in risk sharing if
it is not in their interest to have to bail outthe older generations. The market cannot force future gen-
erations to participate and is therefor incomplete and ine¢ cient from an ex-ante point of view. A feasible
risk-sharing mechanism requires mandatory participation, which can only be enforced by the government.
That is, only the government can pre-commit unborn generations to participate in a pension scheme that is
ex-ante e¢ cient.
While the government is in a position to implement intergenerational risk sharing, it is not guaranteed
that it actually will. This chapters central observation is that the objectives of a government are not
determined by e¢ ciency considerations but by political pressure. In a democracy, political decisions depend
on electoral support of voters. The central question of this chapter is whether ex-ante e¢ cient risk sharing
arises endogenously in a democratic society where a policy proposal needs the support of a majority of voters.
This question is analyzed with a probabilistic voting model in the context of an overlapping generations
model. The economic environment of the model is straightforward. Individuals live for two periods. In the
rst period, individuals work and receive a xed wage. A xed part of this wage is saved and invested in
the capital market. In the second period, agents are retired and consume the accrued savings. The capital
market consists of a risky asset and this introduces risk in this economy. As generations face unique and
uncorrelated risks, risk sharing is welfare-enhancing. The government has a simple tax instrument available:
it can tax the young when capital return is low and redistribute the proceeds to the retired generation in
the form of pension benets. This instrument is enough to share risks between generations.
This chapter determines the ex-ante e¢ cient tax policy, that is, the tax policy a social planner
would choose so as to maximize ex-ante utility of a steady state generation. It compares the ex-ante e¢ cient
taxation with taxation that results from the political process. The political environment is modeled with the
probability voting model. Elections with two electoral candidates take place each period. Candidates are
o¢ ce-seeking and propose the tax rate that maximizes their chance of being elected. Voters base their vote
on two things. First, voters take the tax policies of the candidates into account. Second, voters base their
vote on the ideology of the candidate. This second aspect -ideology- di¤ers between candidates. Ideology is
1A previous version was published as CentER discussion paper 2010-102 and Netspar discussion paper 01/2009-011.
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a permanent feature of the candidate and cannot be changed. The importance that voters attach to ideology
has a random element; this random element of the probability model results in a continuous mapping from
candidatestax proposals to the probability of being elected. This contrasts with a common approach of the
median voter model which typically leads to a discontinuous mapping. As a result, the probability voting
model is suited to analyze gradual policy responses to changes in the political-economic environment, such
as aging. This chapter determines the tax rates that arise in the setting of probability voting and compares
them with the e¢ cient tax rates.
The main result is that the political process generally does not result in ex-ante e¢ cient risk sharing.
The ex-ante e¢ cient tax rate and the tax rate that candidates propose generally di¤er. As the government
is the only institution that may implement risk sharing, the message of this paper is that risk sharing is a
good idea but that that it cannot be fully implemented due to innate and unavoidable political biases. The
political process is biased because electoral candidates have an incentive to redistribute from smaller to larger
cohorts and from ideological voters to non-ideological voters who are more easily persuaded to change their
vote. Essentially, politicians are motivated by redistribution (to receive political support), not by e¢ ciency.
Thus, the institution that is in a position to implement insurance is likewise motivated by redistribution
rather than e¢ ciency. Aging typically increases the discrepancy between the e¢ cient tax level and the tax
level determined by electoral candidates. The reason is that aging increases the political clout of retirees,
thereby motivating candidates to redistribute to this group at the expense of younger cohorts. The same
applies to a scenario where the young form a large majority. However, some risk sharing may still arise in
the political process. The reason is that politicians redistribute from voters with a high income to voters
with a low income, as the latter are easier to convince. An ex-ante e¢ cient tax policy also transfers from
cohorts with a relatively high income to cohorts with a lower income. While the two tax policies di¤er due
to the innate political biases, some risk sharing thus still arises.
This chapter focuses on the political sustainability of intergenerational risk sharing. In doing so, it
abstracts from possible distortions of the risk-sharing mechanism. For example, if a young generation has to
bail out the elderly, this may distort their labor supply decisions, see Sánchez-Marcos and Sánchez-Martin
(2006) and Kruger and Kubler (2006). However, the aim of this chapter is not to determine the optimal tax
as such, but to provide an analytical framework to assess whether whatever is optimal arises endogenously
in the political process.
This chapter relates to the literature on the political economy of social security. Traditionally this
literature has focused on the political sustainability of intergenerational transfers. Recently, some scholars
expanded this literature by focusing on intergenerational risk sharing. This chapter adds to this latter
development by applying the probability voting model in the context of intergenerational risk sharing. This
chapter is among the rst to do so, and gives a novel analysis of the inuence of aging on the political
sustainability of intergenerational risk sharing.
There is a well-developed and substantial literature on the political economy of social security, see
Breyer (1994), Verbon (1993) and in particular Galasso and Profeta (2002) for overviews of the political
economy of social security. A central question in the literature is how to understand the existence of pay-
as-you-go nanced social security. Social security involves intergenerational transfers; how can these be
rationalized, as contributing working generations generally outnumber the benetting retired generations?
If intergenerational transfers do not inuence future transfers, a majority of workers would vote against
social security.
The literature explains social security in di¤erent ways. Four dominant approaches are discussed
here. A seminal contribution to the rst approach is Browning (1975), who applies a median voter model in
the context of overlapping generations. Browning considers a three-period overlapping generations model,
where people work in the rst two periods and are retired in the third period. Working generations pay
contributions, which are transferred to the retired generation in the form of pension benets. Voting on
social security takes place once. The elected government commits to the voted-upon pension policy which
remains in e¤ect forever after; there is thus full commitment.
Browning shows why a democracy may overspend on social security. When the median voter is
middle-aged, (s)he will regard past contributions as sunk while all benets still lie ahead. The median voter
thus prefers an ine¢ ciently high level of pension expenditure. By contrast, a young voter internalizes all
benets and all costs and prefers the e¢ cient level of retirement contributions. Letting only the young vote
would thus result in the e¢ cient outcome. This is however not the case and overspending is the result.
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This voting failureoccurs because younger voters anticipate getting older while older voters know
they will never be young again. Several authors have further developed this argument; Persson and Tabellini
(2000) introduces income as a second source of heterogeneity, Townley (1981) considers an arbitrary number
of generations and Galasso (2006) analyzes a computational OLG-model. Other important contributions
include Conesa and Krueger (1999), Cooley and Soares (1999), and Cooley and Soares (1996) who analyze
social security in more realistic settings. This stream of the literature highlights the importance of the
median voters age for the size of Social Security. The central message is that an older median voter
increases retirement spending beyond what is e¢ cient.
A second stream of the literature considers social security in the presence of repeated voting, see Sjoblom
(1985) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000). Elections take place each period and the political process is again
characterized by the median voter model. Intergenerational transfers are sustainable also when young voters
form a majority. The motivation to contribute to retirees is that future generations will also contribute
if (and only if) current working generations contributed to current retirees. This may be seen as a social
contract between generations that continues as long as all generations participate but that breaks down once
one generation stops participating. This shows the importance of trust in the system for the continuation
of the system.
A third approach is given by Breyer and Stolte (2001), which postulates that (near) retireed gen-
erations form a majority, holding all political power. Young generations respond to taxation by adjusting
their labor supply. The retired generation therefore does not set a contribution rate of 100% but maximizes
instead a La¤er curve that gives total tax revenues as a function of the tax rate. Breyer and Stolte predict
that the burdenof aging is shared between retirees and working generations, that is, aging leads to both
higher contributions and lower individual benets. A fourth mechanism in the literature is altruism, with
young generations voluntarily contributing to the old, see Hansson and Stuart (1989), Veall (1986) and
Tabellini (2000).
A relatively new development in the political literature is to analyze the political sustainability of
intergenerational risk sharing. Part of the recent political literature focuses on the question whether political
institutions can support intergenerational risk sharing. Rangel and Zeckhauser (1999) and Demange (2005)
analyze political support for intergenerational risk sharing using a median voter model. A limitation of
the median voter model is that there is typically a discontinuous mapping from model parameters to policy
outcomes, leading to somewhat unsatisfying results; a simple OLG-model may for example predict a taxation
of 100% if the median voter belongs to the retired generation. And when the median voter model is applied
in the context of repeated elections, generally a wide range of equilibria can be rationalized, hindering a
precise prediction of the tax rate.
This chapter proposes that a probabilistic voting model is better suited to analyze the political limits
of risk sharing and the e¤ect of aging upon that. There are several applications of the probability voting
model to analyze social security, see Meijdam and Verbon (1996) and Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2007).
These studies do not however consider risk sharing. To my knowledge, there is just one other paper that uses
a similar approach and is thus closest to this one, namely DAmato and Galasso (2010) who also analyze
intergenerational risk sharing with a probability voting model in the context of a two-period OLG-model.
However, aside from several modeling di¤erences, there are two important di¤erences between this study and
DAmato and Galasso. First, they use a di¤erent welfare concept. Here the focus is on ex-ante e¢ ciency, in
line with the literature on risk sharing. The question is to what extent a political process skewed towards
redistribution still generates ex-ante e¢ ciency. DAmato and Galasso instead use a Social Welfare Function
(SWF) as the normative benchmark. Their SWF includes utility of the rst generation that receives a
windfall gain when the system is rst introduced. Ex-ante utility does not consider the welfare gain for
the rst retired generation. Although this is a real gain for the rst generation, the welfare criterion of a
maximized SWF combines risk sharing and redistribution to the rst generation. Their normative benchmark
then includes redistribution, whereas this type of redistribution is viewed here as an ine¢ ciency.
The second di¤erence is that in DAmato and Galasso (2010), the government is a Stackelberg leader
vis-à-vis future governments, exploiting that future governments will bail outthe currently young generation
if they have lower savings. This gives an opportunity to increase taxation for the younger generation,
without losing electoral support. Higher taxes reduce savings of the young, but the young anticipate that
lower savings will be partly compensated by higher future benets, provided by future politicians. Their
source of ine¢ ciency is this exploitingbehavior of current governments, while in this chapter the source
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of the political ine¢ ciency lies in the tendency of politicians to redistribute to larger cohorts for electoral
reasons. This di¤erence a¤ects the prediction of the e¤ect of aging on Social Security. DAmato and Galasso
predict that aging makes politicians less likely to overspend on Social Security, as a lower rate of return
on intergenerational transfers decreases the scope to exploit future generations. This study instead argues
that aging makes politicians generally more likely to increase the tax level beyond what is e¢ cient, as aging
increases the political dominance of the elderly.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The second section introduces the model, determines
and compares the e¢ cient taxation and the politically determined tax levels, and relates the model to the
median voter model. The third section considers an extension with endogenous savings, while the fourth
section concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Set-up of the model
Consider an overlapping generations model of a small, open economy. In each period there are two
generations, a young generation and an old generation. Each generation lives for two periods. In the rst
period a generation works and is referred to as young. In the second period a generation is retired and is
referred to as old. There is constant geometric population growth n: Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1, where Nt is the
number of young agents in period t and n >  1. The young can save on a capital market. Savings are xed
(the next section considers an extension with endogenous savings). Capital return is the only risk factor
in this economy and it is assumed exogenous which is a reasonable assumption for a small, open economy.
There are two states of the economy, one state (state L) in which gross capital return is low, and another
state (state H) in which it is high.2 There is a government that in state L can levy a lump-sum tax on
the young and redistribute the proceeds to the older generation. This simple tax instrument is enough to
enable intergenerational risk sharing. Before characterizing rst-best and second-best taxation, the model is
described in more detail.
The capital market
The capital market consists of one risky asset. The gross return of this asset at time t is denoted rt. The
gross return of the asset is Bernoulli distributed. With probability  gross return is equal to rL and with
complementary probability 1   the return is equal to rH , where 0 <  < 1. The returns are uncorrelated
across time. Note that it is ruled out that one of the two states occurs with probability zero, as this would
eliminate the risk element in the model. The following relation holds: 0 < rL < 1 < rH . Introducing
notation, the state of the economy at time t is denoted !t, with !t 2 
 = fL;Hg. When rt = rL the
economy is in state L: !t = L. When rt = rH the economy is in state H: !t = H. Denote one particular
element of 
 by ! and denote the successor of ! by !+.
A simple tax instrument
There is a government that can levy a non-negative lump-sum wage tax, denoted as t = 0. The proceeds
of taxation in the low state are redistributed as pension benets to the old. The government runs a balanced
budget, so taxes of the young are used to nance benets for the old. Total taxation equals Ntt, while there
are Nt 1 retirees. Retirees at time t receive from the government (1+n)t. No government debt is possible.
Institutional arrangements are assumed such that when the economy is in state H taxation is zero, that
is, t = 0 if !t = H. This assumption implies that no transfer -either from or to the retired generation-
is made when capital return is high. The tax instrument is thus only used to compensate or bail outthe
2Alternatively, state H could be interpreted as the normal state of a¤airs and state L as a state in which a disaster (World
War; credit-crisis) occurs, resulting in a period with low capital return.
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elderly when they are unlucky. The tax instrument is however not used to redistribute capital gains of the
old to the young.
This assumption allows focusing on risk sharing in the simplest way possible, as this assumption does
not rule out the possibility of intergenerational risk sharing. The risk that capital return is low remains.
This risk is uncorrelated across periods. Therefore intergenerational risk sharing can be welfare-enhancing.
Risk is shared when the young transfer to the old when capital return is indeed low; the young in turn
receive a transfer when the return on their investment is low as well. The essence is that the tax-instrument
-understood as a quasi-asset- is not available on the capital market. The pay-o¤s of the tax instrument (only
e¤ective in state L) and asset return are negatively correlated. Therefore, the tax instrument is welfare-
enhancing by diversifying risk. It is however important to note that what is called rst-best in the remainder
is second-best from a more general perspective, which would consider less restrictive forms of taxation.
Individuals
Individuals of each generation live for two periods: youth (rst period) and old age (second period). The
young inelastically supply one unit of labor, for which they receive a strictly positive, constant wage w > 0.
Consumption in the rst period (young) of an agent born at time t is denoted by cyt ; consumption in the
second period (old) of an agent born at time t is denoted by cot .
It is assumed that young generations have xed savings equal to s = 0. These savings are invested
on the capital market. Fixed savings can be understood as mandatory contributions to a pension fund.
Consumption by the generation young at time t is given by: cyt = w  t   s, that is, wages are divided into
taxes, young-aged consumption and savings. Savings are strictly smaller than wages: s < w. This ensures
that without taxation, consumption by the young is strictly positive; in all cases with taxation, consumption
of agents is strictly positive as well.
Older generations leave no bequests, so second-period consumption of an agent born at time t is given
by: cot = srt+1 + (1 + n)t+1.
Agents born at time t have a time-separable life-time utility function with felicity functions exhibiting
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):
V (cyt ; c
o
t ) = u(c
y









1  if  > 0 and  6= 1
ln(cyt ) + ln(c
o
t ) if  = 1
(2.1)
Both in the rst and in the second period, consumption is essentially determined by the tax level, as
savings are xed. Life-time utility of an agent born at time t can therefore alternatively be given as a function
of the tax levels at time t and time t+ 1. This alternative expression will indeed turn out to be convenient.
First, dene the following functions which give rst-period and second period consumption respectively as a
function of the relevant tax-level: cy(t)  w  t  s and co(t+1)  srt+(1+n)t+1. By substituting these
functions in V (cyt ; c
o
t ), life-time utility of an agent born at time t is also given by the following function:
eV (t; t+1)  u(cy(t)) + u(co(t+1))  ( (w t s)1 1  + (srt+(1+n)t+1)1 1  if  > 0 and  6= 1
ln(w   t   s) + ln(srt + (1 + n)t+1) if  = 1
The functions V (cyt ; c
o
t ) and eV (t; t+1) are equivalent in the sense that for any pair of tax-levels t and
t+1, the two functions give exactly the same utility.
2.2.2 First-best taxation: optimal intergenerational risk sharing
Each generation faces unique and uncorrelated investment risk. Therefore intergenerational risk sharing can
improve welfare. When capital return is low, the younger generation supports the older generation. When
the young are old themselves they receive benets when the return on their investment is low. Such risk
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sharing can be achieved by the simple tax instrument of levying taxes on the young in case of state L. What
would be an e¢ cient tax policy here?3
It is important to be precise about what e¢ ciency refers to here. Unless stated otherwise, ex-ante
e¢ ciency is used as the welfare concept. Ex-ante e¢ ciency evaluates expected utility of individuals prior
to birth, when individuals do not know in what state of nature they are born. A policy may a¤ect utility
positively in one state of nature but negatively in another one. A tax policy is dened to be ex-ante e¢ cient
if it maximizes the expected utility of an unborn individual. But how to determine expected utility of an
unborn?
Now, an individual born at time t can encounter two states of the economy (!t = H or !t = L) in the
rst period and again two states of the economy in the second period (!t+1 = H or !t+1 = L). This gives
four possible states of nature that an individual can be born into. In state L, the social planner can levy a
tax on the young, denoted by L. The tax policy used by the social planner then takes the following form:
t =

L if !t = L
0 if !t = H
(2.2)
Table 1 shows the four possible states of nature an individual can be born into, the probabilities of
occurrence and the life-time utility of an individual born into that state of nature.
Table 1
!t !t+1 P [!t = !; !t+1 = !
+] eV (t; t+1)
L L 2 u(w   s  L) + u(srL + (1 + n)L)
L H (1  ) u(w   s  L) + u(srH)
H L (1  ) u(w   s) + u(srL + (1 + n)L)
H H (1  )2 u(w   s) + u(srH)
Here the function u(:) is as dened in 2.1. Ex-ante utility of an individual is equal to the expected
life-time utility at birth. Life-time utility of a steady-state generation is denoted by bV and its expectation by
E[bV ]. Suppressing time-subscripts and using the expressions in table 1 and expression 2.2, expected life-time
utility is now given by:
E[bV (L)] = 2[u(w   s  L) + u(srL + (1 + n)L)] + (1  )[u(w   s  L) + u(srH)]+ (2.3)
(1  )[u(w   s) + u(srL + (1 + n)L)] + (1  )2[u(w   s) + u(srH)]
The social planner chooses the tax-rate L, so as to maximize expected life-time utility, given by E[bV (L)].
This gives the rst-best tax level in state L, which will be denoted by fb. The rst order condition (FOC)
3This would not be the case in a risk-free environment. In the current model the rate of return on intergenerational transfers
equals 1 + n. In a risk-free environment 1 + n should be compared with the risk-free interest rate, denoted by, say, r. When
r > (<)1 + n, the economy is dynamically (in)e¢ cient. When the economy is dynamically e¢ cient a social planner should
implement a funded system; otherwise it should implement a Pay-as-you-go system. This is the so called Aaron condition.
When there is investment risk, the Aaron condition cannot be applied. If the expected capital return exceeds population
growth, intergenerational transfers may still be welfare-enhancing. The argument for intergenerational risk sharing does not
depend on dynamic e¢ ciency. What is essential is that the tax instrument, understood as a quasi-asset, is not spanned by
the market portfolio and can therefore be welfare-improving by a usual diversication argument. Here, the pay-o¤s of the tax












expression for u(:) given by 2.1, the FOC becomes:
(w   s  L)  = (1 + n)(srL + (1 + n)L) 
Solving this equation5 gives the rst-best taxation:
L =
w   s[1 + (1 + n)  1 rL]




What is the intuition for this expression? The rst-best tax level increases when wages increase or
when savings or capital return in the low state decrease. Higher income for young and a lower income for
retirees increase the ability and the need respectively to insure retirees against low capital return. The
e¤ect of population growth is ambiguous; if there are relatively many young workers, this increases the rate
of returnon intergenerational transfers. However, the same income can be ensured to the old by a lower
contribution of the young, which will consume the remaining. This income e¤ect and risk-sharing e¤ect work
in opposite directions and the net e¤ect on the rst-best taxation depends on the particular values of the
parameters involved.
The expression for fb can be negative if for example (xed) savings and capital return in the low
state are very high. A negative value of fb implies that when the retired generation is hurt by low return on
its savings, it is e¢ cient to implement backward transfers from the old generation to the young generation.
Such a situation is neither empirically relevant nor theoretically interesting and is not the situation this
paper seeks to investigate. It is ruled out here by imposing the following condition:
rL 5 (1 + n) 1 w ss
This condition ensures that the nominator in expression 2.4 is non-negative. That is, the capital return
in the low state is su¢ ciently low to render intergenerational transfers potentially welfare enhancing.
2.2.3 Second-best taxation: political redistribution
Politicians are not social planners o¤ering risk sharing with the goal of maximizing ex-ante utility of voters.
Instead, this chapter assumes that politicians redistribute from one generation to another to increase their
electoral prospects. The consequences for risk sharing are analyzed in this section. What tax rate would




To solve the FOC, it is convenient to simplify the maximand in several ways. First, all (additive) parts in the maximand are





[2[u(w   s  L) + u(srL + (1 + n)L)] + (1  )u(w   s  L) + (1  )u(srL + (1 + n)L)] = 0
, @
@L
[u(w   s  L) + u(srL + (1 + n)L)] = 0.







5 (w   s  L)  = (1 + n)(srL + (1 + n)L)  ) w   s  L = (1 + n) 
1
 (srL + (1 + n)L))
w   s  (1 + n) 
1
 srL = (1 + n)
 1
 L + L ) w   s[1 + (1 + n) 
1











politicians set and are these e¢ cient? This depends on the preferences of politicians and voters and the
institutions that map those preferences in policy outcomes. So, it depends on the political process.
The political process is characterized here with a probabilistic voting model. In the model two
candidates run for o¢ ce in majoritarian elections. Elections take place each period. Before the election
both candidates announce a tax policy. This announced tax policy is binding and cannot be withdrawn by
the winning candidate. The candidate who gains the most votes, wins the election. The winning candidate
forms the government and his announced policy is implemented.
In their role as voters individuals base their voting decision on two things. First, voters consider
the tax policies of the candidates, as the tax rate directly inuences their consumption and thereby their
utility. Voters also consider a second aspect, called ideology. This second aspect ideology- di¤ers between
candidates. Ideology is a permanent feature of the candidate and cannot be changed. What is crucial is
that voters di¤er in how important ideology is for them. Non-ideological voters will only consider the tax
policy, while ideological voters will vote for a certain candidate irrespective of the tax policy he proposes.
This gives candidates the incentive to cater their policy towards non-ideological voters, who are more easily
swayed.
Now, elections take place after the state of the economy (L or H) is revealed. Remember that it
is assumed that the government cannot levy a tax in state H. If state H occurs, taxation is zero and the
candidates have no policy to announce (formally, it is assumed that both have a probability of 12 of being
elected in this case). If state L occurs, the candidates announce their tax policies. As state L is the interesting
case, this case is analyzed further.
It is shown in the appendix (based on Persson and Tabellini (2000)) that in equilibrium, both
candidates announce exactly the same policy and that this policy is the tax rate that maximizes the following
function:
W (t) = (1 + n)W
y(t) +W
o(t) (2.5)
Here W y(:) and W o(:) are dened as:
W y(t)  u(cy(t)) = u(w   s  t) (2.6)
W o(t)  u(co(t)) = u(srL + (1 + n)t) (2.7)
The functions W y(:) and W o(:) denote utility of the young and the old respectively in time-period t as a
function of the tax level at time t. The parameter  captures the inclination of young voters to vote ideolog-
ically. A value  > 1 indicates that young voters are relatively less inclined to vote ideologically. Therefore
they are more responsive to policy changes than older voters and thus more important to politicians.
The function W (:) is called the political target function and it is derived formally in the appendix. The
political target function takes utility of both the young and older generation into account. The function
however also shows a demographic bias and an ideological bias in the political process. Electoral candidates
bias their announced tax policy towards the policy that is preferred by the group that is larger, as this group
simply has more voters. For example, when the old outnumber the young (n < 0), the policy is biased
towards the interests of the old in the sense that their utility weighs more than that of young voters. This
is the demographic bias in the political process. Electoral candidates also bias their announced tax policy
towards the policy that is preferred by the group that votes less ideologically. For example, if  > 1 young
voters are on average less ideological than older voters. Then, the tax policy is biased in their favor, in the
sense that their utility carries greater weight than that of the old in the political target function. The reason
is that the young are easier to persuade by a policy change to vote for another candidate.
It remains to solve for the equilibrium policy, that is, the policy that results from the political process.




W () = (1 + n)W y() +W o()
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@ = 0. Using the equations in 2.6 the FOC is equal to
(1+n)@u(w s )@ =  
@u(srL+(1+n))
@ . Further using the expression for u(:) given by 2.1, the FOC becomes:
(1 + n)(w   s  )  = (1 + n)(srL + (1 + n)) 
Solving this equation6 gives the following solution:
 =
w   s[ 1 rL + 1]

1
 (1 + n) + 1
:=  sb (2.8)
This expression gives the tax policy announced by the two candidates and implemented by the winning
candidate. This tax policy is the second-best tax level and is denoted by  sb. It increases when wages
increase or when savings decrease, as poorer voters are more easily swayed by a transfer. The net e¤ect of
population growth is unambiguously negative. An increase in n leads to more political clout for the young.
This e¤ect dominates the lower rate of return, given by 1 + n, of transfers from young to old.
This expression for  sb can be negative if, for example, (xed) savings and capital return in the low
state are very high. A negative value of  sb implies that when the retired generation is hurt by a low return
on their savings, it is politically opportune to implement backward transfers from the old generation to the
young generation. Such a situation is again not the situation this paper seeks to investigate, though it could
in principle be allowed. It is however ruled out here by the imposing the following condition:
rL 5   1 w ss
This condition ensures that the nominator in expression 2.8 is non-negative. That is, the capital return
in the low state is su¢ ciently low to avoid that candidates redistribute from older voters to younger voters
in case capital return is low.
Is the second-best tax rate,  sb, preferable from an ex-ante perspective to no risk sharing at all?
This is the case i¤ E[bV ( sb)] > E[bV (0)]. Using expression 2.2 it readily follows that E[bV ( sb)] > E[bV (0)] is
equivalent to the following relation:
u(w   s   sb) + u(srL + (1 + n) sb) > u(w   s) + u(srL) (2.9a)
Whether condition 2.9a is met, depends on the particular parameter values. It is possible that the second-
best tax rate is preferable to the third-best tax rate, but it is also possible that no risk sharing at all, that
is zero taxation in state L and in state H, is preferable from an ex-ante perspective.
6(1 + n)(w   s  )  = (1 + n)(srL + (1 + n))  )
 
1
 (w   s  ) = (srL + (1 + n)))  
1
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The ex-ante e¢ cient transfers and the transfers that result in the political process are illustrated in Graph
1. The graph gives transfers as a function of 1 + n (the relative size of the group of young voters) for the
parameter values given in Table 2. These values are not calibrated and are for illustrative purposes only.
The graph shows that rst-best and second-best taxation coincide in the special case when n = 0 and both
groups are of equal size. Otherwise the rst-best and second best taxation di¤er and the di¤erence increases
when population growth (n) moves away from 0.
For the parameter values in Table 2, condition 2.9a is met for all  0:5 5 n 5 0:5. This illustrates
that from an ex-ante perspective, second-best taxation may be preferable to no taxation (and thus no risk
sharing) at all.
Table 2: parameter values in base-line scenario
Wage w 100
Fixed savings s 50
Capital return in state L rL 0.5
Capital return in state H rH 2
Probability of state L  0.5
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  4
Relative ideological bias of the young  1



















2.2.5 Comparison between the rst-best and second-best tax
The rst-best and second-best transfers generally di¤er, as illustrated in Graph 1. However, they coincide
in a special but meaningful case when  = 11+n . The equivalence was illustrated above and it follows when






















What is the intuition for this? Electoral candidates bias their announced tax policy towards the
policy that is preferred by the group that is larger. For example, when the old outnumber the young
(n < 0), the second-best transfer is biased towards the interests of the old. This is the demographic bias
in the political process. Electoral candidates also bias their announced tax policy towards the policy that
is preferred by the group that votes less ideologically (and is thus easier to inuence). So, when the young
vote less ideologically than the old ( > 1), the second-best transfer is biased in favor of the young. This is
the ideological bias in the political process. As a result of the combined e¤ect of these biases, the political
process will generally be biased towards the interests of one of the two electoral groups (either old or young).
Therefore the second-best tax di¤ers from the rst-best tax. But when  = 11+n the demographic bias and
the ideological bias exactly cancel each other out. In that special case the rst-best and second-best transfers
are equal and the political process is e¢ cient.
Ex-ante e¢ ciency abstracts from the implementation of the tax policy. However, implementing the
ex-ante e¢ cient transfers would come with a windfall gain for either the young or the old generation. If
the economy is in state L at the time of implementation, the generation that is old at that time receives
a windfall gain. If the economy is in state H, the young generation receives a windfall gain, as the young
do not contribute but do receive a benet in the next period if state L occurs (a positive probability of a
positive transfer is a gain in utility terms for the young generation). This windfall gain is a real gain but it
is not considered by the ex-ante criterion.
Here the distinction with the concept of a Social Welfare Function (SWF) becomes relevant. Ex-ante
utility assesses utility of an individual prior to birth, assuming the tax policy is implemented. The tax policy
that maximizes expected life-time utility of an unborn individual is ex-ante e¢ cient. An SWF on the other
hand maximizes utility of current and future generations, thereby including the windfall gain in the rst
period. The welfare concept of an SWF then essentially combines risk sharing and redistribution to the
rst generation (for which good reasons may or may not exist). This chapter wishes to solely focus on risk
sharing. Under a reparameterization the political target function coincides with an SWF, so the di¤erence
between rst-best and second-best tax levels can alternatively be interpreted as the di¤erence between the
tax that is ex-ante e¢ cient and the tax that maximizes an SWF.7
2.2.6 Relation to the median voter model
The probability voting model can be seen as an extension of the median voter model. The probability voting
model reduces to the median voter model if all voters vote non-ideologically and only care about economic
interests.8 In that case all young voters nd zero taxation ( = 0) optimal. The reason is that current
taxation does not inuence future taxation, so young voters do not need to consider reputation. All old
voters nd full taxation, that is  = 1, optimal.
Which policy would the candidates announce? This now solely depends on whether the old voters form
a majority or whether the young voters form a majority. If n > 0, the young form a majority and both
7With the tax-level indicated by  and implementing a transfer scheme in state L, the SWF equals: u(srL + (1 + n)) +
(1 + n)fu(w   s  )
+u(srL + (1 + n)) + (1  )u(srH))g+
(1 + n)22fu(w   s  ) + (1  )u(w   s)+
+u(srL+ (1+n))+ (1 )u(srH))g+ :::. Here  is the discount rate with which the social planner weighs utility of future
generations. The maximand can be simplied without a¤ecting the outcome by omitting parts that do not contain  :
u(srL + (1 + n)) + (1 + n)u(w   s  )
+(1 + n)u(srL + (1 + n)) + (1 + n)22u(w   s  )
+(1 + n)22u(srL + (1 + n)) + :::
This function is maximized w.r.t. taxation  . Note that only a sequence of states L is considered. Taxes in state H equal
zero, so they need not be considered explicitly. If -after at least one state H- state L occurs, exactly the same maximization
problem occurs. If the risk sharing device is implemented in state H -instead of state L-, essentially also the same maximization
problem occurs, as only the transfer at the time of implementation given by u(srL + (1+ n)) + (1 + n)u(w  s  ) needs to
be omitted then, not altering the problem essentially.
With  =  the SWF exactly equals a sequence of political target functions. The di¤erence is that the political target
functions are maximized each period w.r.t.  . However, if the optimizing values of the social planner would be proposed, no
candidate could improve on that solution. Hence it is also the outcome of the political process.
8 In terms of the probability voting model as described in the appendix, this means that  = 0 and that ij = 0 for all voters
i in both groups j.
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candidates announce zero taxation. The probability that either candidate wins equals 12 . If for example
candidate A would announce another policy A > 0, he would lose the elections (given that candidate B
announces zero taxation B = 0). Although all old voters would vote for candidate A, all young voters, who
form a majority, would vote for candidate B. Candidate A would therefore lose the elections. As a similar
reasoning holds for candidate B, A = B = 0 forms an equilibrium. This equilibrium is also unique. To see
this, note that if, for example, candidate B announces a non-zero tax B > 0, a best reaction for candidate
A is to propose lower taxation, A < B , thereby assuring the support of all young voters. A best reaction
for candidate B in turn is to undercut A. This mutual undercutting leads to an equilibrium where both
candidates propose zero taxation.
With a complete analogous reasoning, both candidates will set a policy A = B = 1 if older voters form
a majority (n < 0). If n = 0, every combination of A and B forms an equilibrium. The candidate with
the lowest tax-policy will get all votes of young voters, whereas the candidate with the highest tax policy
will get all votes of older voters. This leads to a probability for both candidates to win the elections equal
to 12 . If A = B , both candidates again have a probability of winning the elections equal to
1
2 . Irrespective
of what policy the other candidate announces, the announcement of every policy leads to a probability of
winning equal to 12 . Therefore every tax policy is a best reaction to every tax policy and every combination
of A and B forms an equilibrium.
These outcomes demonstrate the drawback of the median voter model. A disadvantage of the median
voter model is that outcomes are sensitive to changes in the value of model parameters. That is, in a model
with two or three generations, a very small change in the demographic structure can lead to implausibly
large e¤ects on policy outcomes if it changes the cohort that the median voter belongs to. Here, the political
process results in one of two extreme equilibria (either  = 0 or  = 1), with a sharp and discontinuous shift
between these two when n = 0.
2.2.7 Is it e¢ cient to let only the young vote? The role of commitment and
reputation
As discussed in the introduction, an important and intuitively appealing result in the literature is that with
full commitment and in the absence of risk it is e¢ cient to let only young voters vote, see Browning (1975).
In the current set-up, this is not the case. If only young voters voted, zero taxation would result. The reason
is that in the model here, current taxation does not inuence future taxation. This assumption is strong but
not unreasonable as one time period represents 30 years. It also allows to focus in the simplest way possible
on the main issue of risk sharing. However, what would change if future taxation is inuenced by current
taxation? And would it then be e¢ cient to let only the young vote?
Full commitment
The most extreme way in which future taxation depends on current taxation is full commitment. With
full commitment, elections take place once and the chosen transfer policy remains in e¤ect forever after. In
this setting, older voters would still prefer full taxation. Young voters however no longer want zero taxation.
The reason is that the chosen policy not only negatively a¤ects their utility in the rst period in life, but
may positively a¤ect their utility in the second period of life if state L occurs.
Which tax policy would young voters prefer? This depends on the state of the economy in the period
that elections take place. If elections take place when the economy is in state H, young voters would want
full taxation, as they do not have to pay themselves (taxation is zero in state H) but do have a positive
probability of receiving benets in state L once they are old. Consider instead the more interesting case that
the economy is in state L. The preferred tax rate results from the following procedure:
max u(w   s  ) + u(srL + (1 + n)) + (1  )u(srH)
Omitting from the maximand the part which does not contain  , the following maximization procedure




u(w   s  ) + u(srL + (1 + n)) (2.10)
This expression resembles the expression that is maximized by the social planner, with however one
di¤erence, that is parameter . The young take into account that there is a probability of  that they will
receive a transfer in the low state, while they know with certainty that they have to pay taxes (as they are
in state L).
Why is the ex-ante e¢ cient utility di¤erent? A social planner takes into account that ex-ante the
probability that a generation pays a transfer also equals . Therefore the policy preferred by the young
di¤ers from the ex-ante e¢ cient policy. Intuitively, young voters do not internalize the interests of unborn
voters, as unborn voters do not know for sure that they have to pay taxes. The tax policy preferred by the
young, denoted by y, is the tax that solves maximization problem 2.10. It can be shown that the solution











By inspection it can be seen that y < fb. Since electoral candidates would announce the policy
preferred by the young (as only the young vote), y would be the equilibrium outcome. So, in this setting,
letting only young voters vote would not be ex-ante e¢ cient. The only exception would be when  = 1,
which is essentially the case described by Browning (1975). However, this case would rule out any risk and
would thus make risk sharing redundant.
While analytically useful, full commitment is a strong assumption. It is ipso facto incorrect, as
pension policies have been changed. An alternative and more realistic assumption is to have repeated
elections (as in the probability voting model here). In this environment reputation becomes relevant if
young voters can condition their vote on previous electoral outcomes. Such conditional voting calls for an
expansion of the action space of (young) voters, see Sjoblom (1985) and Boldrin and Rustichini (2000).
Generally a whole range of equilibria can be sustained by a proper set of reaction functions. Suppose that
in each time-period a representative agent of the young generation could decide on a transfer to the old, so
abstract from any political process for now. Consider for example the following strategy for the representative
agent, young at time t:
t =
 e if !t = L and i = e 8 i < t in which !i = L
0 otherwise
Here, young generations only contribute e if state L occurs and if all young generations to date did
likewise by contributing e when state L occured. If all other (young) generations have this strategy, is it a
best response for a generation young at time t? If it did not contribute e , it would receive 0 in the next
period in state L, irrespective of the height of the transfer. So if a young generation deviates it can best
deviate to a transfer of zero. This provides utility as if the generation operates in autarky, not transfering
anything and receiving nothing. So the strategy is a best-response i¤:
u(w   s  e) + u(srL + (1 + n)e) + (1  )u(srH) = u(w   s) + u(srL) + (1  )u(srH),
u(w   s  e) + u(srL + (1 + n)e) = u(w   s) + u(srL)
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Any e that meets this condition is sustainable as an equilibrium. In particular note that by construc-
tion y maximizes the left-hand expression and is thus sustainable as an equilibrium. Whether the ex-ante
e¢ cient transfer, fb, is sustainable depends on whether it meets the condition. Even if so, it is one possible
equilibrium among many and there is no reason a priori to assume it will be the equilibrium outcome. So
letting young voters vote would again be more e¢ cient than letting old voters vote (who want full taxation)
but the ex-ante e¢ cient tax will not typically result. This abstracts from the political process, but in a
median voter model set-up the electoral candidates would, as before, announce and implement exactly the
tax preferred by the young (given that only the young vote); see Sjoblom (1985) and Rangel and Zeckhauser
(1999) for a formal treatment.
2.3 Extension: endogenous savings
An important assumption in the previous section is that savings are xed. These xed savings can be
understood as mandatory contributions to a pension scheme that cannot be altered or supplemented by
individuals. The assumption is strong, but it is reasonable to abstract from saving decisions given that the
focus here is on intergenerational risk sharing. From a practical point of view, it allows for simple, analytical
solutions.
Nonetheless, the assumption of xed savings is restrictive and the question is whether the conclusions
are robust to changes in the way saving decisions are modelled. Fixed savings make it impossible for the
young to react to higher taxation by lowering their savings; with endogenous savings, higher taxation indeed
leads to lower savings. And because taxation a¤ects savings in this setting, tax policies spill over to future
periods. A high tax results in low savings, which induces a high transfer in the next period as the then old
are relatively poor. It then becomes relevant whether electoral candidates and voters take future taxation
as given (Nash assumption) or exploit their rst-mover advantage vis-à-vis future generations by increasing
taxation, anticipating that the disadvantaged young -who save less because of the higher tax- will be partly
compensated in the next period (Stackelberg assumption). Here, the Nash-approach is taken to model saving
decisions.
2.3.1 The model
This section considers an extension of the model. Savings are now no longer xed but are endogenous.
Individuals maximize their utility with respect to savings. This has several repercussions in particular for
the political process. Further behavioral assumptions have to be made about individuals and candidates.
First, it is assumed here that candidates and individuals take each others actions as given. Second, it is
assumed that both voters and candidates take taxation in the next period as given. These assumptions are
discussed in more detail below. Otherwise, the set-up of the model is similar to the set-up in the preceding
section. Before turning to the rst-best and second-best solution, the extended model is discussed.
Individuals
As before, individuals born at time t have a time-separable utility function with felicity functions ex-
hibiting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA):
V (cyt ; c
o
t ) = u(c
y
t ) + u(c
o
t )
Here, the expression for u(:) is given by 2.1. Consumption in the rst and second period of an agent born
at time t is denoted by cyt and c
o
t respectively. Savings at time t are denoted by st. The budget equations
are now:
24
cyt = w   st   t (2.11)
cot = strt+1 + t+1
As before, older generations leave no bequests.10 Substituting the budget constraints directly in V (cyt ; c
o
t ),
life-time utility can alternatively be dened as a function of savings and taxes. That is, given future taxation
t+1, the function W y(:) can be redened:
W y(st; t; t+1)  u(w   st   t) + u(strt+1 + (1 + n)t+1)
The young do not control taxation and take taxes in the current period (t) and in the next period (t+1)
as given. The young then maximize expected life-time utility, given by E[W y(st; t; t+1)], with respect to
savings, while taking taxes in the current period (t) as given and given their expectations of future taxation
(t+1). How these expectations are formed is addressed below. Note that maximizing the (expected) value
of V (cyt ; c
o




t , subject to equation 2.11, is equivalent to maximizing the (expected)
value of W y(st; t; t+1) with respect to savings st, in both cases taking taxes in the current period (t) as
given and given their expectations of future taxation (t+1).
2.3.2 First-best: optimal intergenerational risk sharing
A social planner maximizes ex-ante utility with respect to taxation and savings. The social planner should
now condition on the state in more periods. Why would this increase e¢ ciency compared to conditioning
on the state in the current period? Suppose that at time t   1 state L occurs, so that individuals young at
time t  1 have to transfer a tax to the old. Suppose that at time t again state L occurs, so the individuals
young at time t  1 and old at time t face low return on their savings. The generation born at time t  1 is
essentially hit twice by state L; rst in the rst period when they were young and had to transfer a tax, and
again when they are old. This risk could be shared by a higher transfer from young to old if the old faced
state L twice in their life. The tax may thus depend on both the state at time t and t   1. In fact, it may
depend on the entire history of the economy in current and previous periods. On how many periods does the
social planner optimally condition? In principle, it is optimal that the social planner conditions on both the
current and all previous periods. However, after a number of periods, the optimal tax-policy converges, that
is, ex-ante utility does not increase when more periods are considered. How to determine optimal taxation
and savings and the number of periods after which convergence occurs?
The solution procedure as described in Van Hemert (2005) is used. Let Zk denote the set of all possible
k-histories in k subsequent periods. As there are two possible states of the world in each period, there are
2k elements in Zk. Consider maximizing utility of a generation, conditioning on the last k periods only.
Denoting two particular k-histories by z and z+, ex-ante utility is maximized by maximizing V k, which gives






P [zt = z; zt+1 = z
+]
[u(w   (z)  s(z)) + u((1 + n)(z+) + s(z)R(z+))]
Here, R(z), s(z), and (z) denote the interest rate, savings and taxes respectively that occur in the
particular k-history z. Optimal taxes and savings follow from maximizing V k with respect to (z) and
10Note that individuals cannot o¤-set taxation (nor do they want to) by adjusting savings. Endogenous savings does not
make taxation redundant and is thus a real extension. The reason is that the pay-o¤s of the tax policy (which has a pay-o¤ in
state L and not in state H) cannot be replicated in the capital market. In fact, the pay-o¤s of the tax instrument and capital
returns are negatively correlated. The tax policy, understood as a quasi-asset, is not spanned by the market portfolio, which
consists of one risky asset. This is why the tax instrument can be welfare-enhancing by diversifying investment risk.
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s(z) for all z 2 Zk. The maximization procedure takes ever more periods into account until convergence.
Convergence occurs if V k  V k+1 and conditioning on more periods does not increase ex-ante utility and is
thus redundant.
As an example, consider taxes contingent on the state of the economy in the last two periods.
Introducing notation, dene the 2-period history at time t as follows: zt = (!t 1; !t) where as before
!t 1; !t 2 
 = fL;Hg. Let Z2 denote the set of all possible 2-histories, so Z2 = f(L;L), (L;H), (H;L),
(H;H)g, where the last entry denotes the last time period. Denote one particular element of Z2 by z and
its successor by z+.
An agent born at time t encounters one 2-period history in the rst period of life, denoted by zt,
and encounters a 2-period history in the second period, denoted by zt+1. Table 3 summarizes the eight
possibilities for zt and zt+1 and the resulting life-time utility. P [zt = z; zt+1 = z+] denotes the probability
that zt = z and zt+1 = z+.
Table 3
zt zt+1 P [zt = z; zt+1 = z
+] Life-time utility
(L;L) (L;L) 3 u(w   sLL   LL) + u(sLLrL + (1 + n)LL)
(L;L) (L;H) 2(1  ) u(w   sLL   LL) + u(sLLrH)
(L;H) (H;L) 2(1  ) u(w   sH) + u(sHrL + (1 + n)HL)
(L;H) (H;H) (1  )2 u(w   sH) + u(sHrH)
(H;L) (L;L) 2(1  ) u(w   sHL   HL) + u(sHLrL + (1 + n)HL)
(H;L) (L;H) (1  )2 u(w   sHL   HL) + u(sHLrH)
(H;H) (H;L) (1  )2 u(w   sH) + u(sHrL + (1 + n)HL)
(H;H) (H;H) (1  )3 u(w   sH) + u(sHrL)
Ex-ante utility of an agent is now equal to the expected life-time utility of an unborn agent. This is given
by multiplying the probabilities in column 3 with the appropriate life-time utilities, given in column 4, and
summing the results. This sum is maximized with respect to history-contingent transfers (LL and HL)
and history-contingent savings (sLL, sHL and sH).11 Note that savings of a young generation coincide when
zt = (L;H) and zt = (H;H). The reason is that each young generation in state H faces the same conditions,
irrespective of the previous states. This can be seen by inspection of Table 3. It also follows intuitively as
the contemporaneous taxation for both is equal (it is zero in state H) and taxation in the next period does
not depend on the states prior to the current state given that the current state is H. Every time state H
occurs, the tax-policy is e¤ectively reset.
Numerical illustration
An illustration for optimal savings and transfers is given in Graphs 2 and 3. Optimal savings and transfers
are solved numerically for exactly the same parameter values as in Table 2 with the obvious di¤erence that
the value of s does not enter here. Graph 2 shows the ex-ante e¢ cient transfers for di¤erent histories as a
function of population growth. Graph 3 does the same for savings. Both savings and taxation are given in
percentages of the wage.
11Note that the social planner conditions on one period in the case that savings are xed, discussed in sub-section 2.2.2.
Conditioning on more than one period is redundant, that is, all taxes in histories that end with state L are equal. This can be
seen by inspection when substituting xed savings s in Table 3. The intuition is that utility in the second period of life is not
a¤ected by history via savings (since savings are xed), but it is only determined by the state in that period. The optimal tax
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Graph 2
The graphs illustrate several features of the optimal solution. First, the size of the optimal transfer
depends on the number of times state L preceded. The tax rate increases when more states L preceded.
This implies that the loss of a low return on capital in state L is spread over the two living generations but
also over future generations. In case state L occurs, the young generation contributes to the old generation,
thereby the loss is spread over the two living generations. However, the young generation itself receives
a higher transfer in case the return on its own savings is also low when they are old, so the loss for the
living young generation is partly compensated by an extra contribution of the next young generation in case
state L occurs. Thereby, the original loss is also partly spread over unborn generations. This illustrates the
principle of optimal risk sharing to spread losses over current and future (unborn) generations, see Ball and
Mankiw (2007). However, contrary to the optimality result of Ball and Mankiw, here a loss (or gain) does
not translate into a proportional decrease (or increase) in consumption of all current and future generations.
A second feature is that taxation does not necessarily increase with population growth, possibly
counter-intuitively. On the one hand, a high implicit rate of return induces higher contributions; on the
other hand, the insurance for the elderly can be accomplished by lower contributions, exactly because of the
higher rate of return. This in turn leaves more scope in the rst period for consumption or for savings.
Third, note that even when population growth is extremely low, some risk sharing is e¢ cient. For
example, when 1 + n = 0:5 the rate of return of intergenerational transfers is extremely low compared with
the expected return on capital. The expected rate of return equals 1:25 as rL = 0:5, rH = 0:5 and  = 2
and E[rt] = rL + (1  )rH . The reason that risk sharing is e¢ cient is that agents are risk averse and the
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2.3.3 Second-best: political redistribution
As before, the political process involves both individuals in their role as voters and electoral candidates.
These are now discussed in turn.
Voters
The young maximize life-time utility with respect to savings. The young are assumed to take current tax-
ation, t, as given, whereas the electoral candidates take the savings rate of voters, that is young individuals,
as given. An alternative approach is to assume that either voters or candidates are the Stackelberg-leader.
For example, young voters move rst and choose their savings and the candidates move next by announcing
the tax rate given the savings decision of young voters. However, it can also be argued that the government
moves rst and voters decide on their saving decision next. As there is no natural Stackelberg leader here,
the Nash approach with both voters and candidates simultaneously deciding seems most appropriate.
The young also take future taxation as given, which is a reasonable assumption. Higher aggregate
savings lead to lower benets the next period, as the government does not take into account whether low
income of the old resulted from low returns on savings or from low savings itself. However individual savings
have a negligible e¤ect on aggregate savings, and without coordination individuals will therefore not take
into account the e¤ect of current savings on future benets.
What tax level do individuals expect in the next period? Individuals are assumed to have rational
expectations about the tax rate. If state H occurs the next period they know the tax level will be zero.
However, they have to form a conjecture about the tax level were state L to occur. The conjectured tax
level is equal to the actual tax level. As will turn out below, the tax level in state L depends on the number
of states L that occurred previously. Denote the consecutive number of states L at time t, including time t
itself, by lt. That is, if the economy is in state H at time t lt = 0; if the economy is in state L at time t but
was in state H at time t   1, then lt = 1. If the economy was in state L at time t and t   1 but in state H
at time t  2, then lt = 2. Formally the variable is dened as:
lt =

j if !i = L 8 t  j < i 5 t and !t j = H
0 if !t = H
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Individuals have knowledge of lt and take it into account when forming expectations. The expectation
at time t given lt about the tax level at time t+1 if the economy is in state L at time t+1 is denoted bt+1jlt .
Maximizing expected life-time utility taking t as given, a worker at time t solves the following problem:
max
st
E[W y(st; t; t+1)])
max
st
u(w   st   t) + u(strt+1 + (1 + n)bt+1jlt) + u(1  )(strH)
The political process
As before, the political process is characterized by the probability voting model. Also as before, electoral
candidates at time t maximize a political target function with respect to taxes t. Taking st (savings of the
young) as given, this target function is:
W (t; st) = (1 + n)E[W
y(st; t; t+1)] +W
o(t)
Here W o(t) gives the utility of the old given their previous savings and is dened as follows: W o(t) 
u(st 1rt+ t). Electoral candidates take st as given. Electoral candidates also take future taxation as given.
This Nash assumption is discussed below as well as the alternative Stackelberg assumption, where electoral
candidates recognize and exploit that a higher taxation at time t will -via lower savings by the young- result
in higher taxation at time t+ 1, which partly compensates the voters young at time t.
How to determine taxes (set by the candidates) and savings (decided by individuals) simultaneously?
Taxes and savings at time t can be determined by maximizing the political target function with respect to
both st and t simultaneously. That is:
max
t;st




(1 + n)fu(w   st   t) + u(strL + (1 + n)bt+1jlt)+
(1  )u(strH)g+ u(st 1rt + (1 + n)t)
To see this, note the following. Given the savings that result from this procedure, the electoral candidates
can do no better as the political target function is maximized. However, given the maximizing value of tax-
ation, t, maximizing the political target function coincides with maximizing expected life-time utility of the
younger cohort (since life-time utility of the young cohort enters additively in the political target function).
Solving maximization problem 2.12 gives both the equilibrium taxes and savings. The maximization problem
is solved numerically for di¤erent values of lt which represent di¤erent histories. The appendix discusses the
solution procedure.
Numerical illustration
An illustration for savings and tax-levels that result from the political process is considered in Graphs 2
and 3. These graphs result from solving the problem numerically for exactly the same parameter values as
in Table 2 with the obvious di¤erence that the value of s does not enter. Graph 4 shows the tax-levels in
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The graphs illustrate several features of the political process. First, taxation decreases in population
growth. This is the net result of two opposing e¤ects of population growth on contributions. Lower pop-
ulation growth decreases the rate of return of intergenerational transfers, thereby making it less attractive
to redistribute from the working generation to the older generation. However, lower population growth also
increases the political clout of the elderly, which has an upward e¤ect on taxation. The political e¤ect
dominates and lower population growth thus results in higher taxation.
Second, taxation increases in the number of previous periods that L occurred. In state L capital
return is low; this hurts the retirees whereas the working generation is not hit directly. As poorer voters
are more easily swayed, this results in redistribution from young to old in state L. Young generations save
less as a result. When state L occurs a second time in a row, workers have saved less and face low returns.
This makes them worse o¤ than the generation that was rst hit by low returns. This in turn induces an
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even higher transfer from the young generation that is working then. Together this leads to higher taxation
every time an extra period in state L occurs. This resembles the contingent optimal taxation that likewise
increases in the number of preceding market lows. While the direction of rst-best and second-best transfers
is the same, the sizes di¤er.
2.3.4 Discussion
An important assumption is that electoral candidates and voters do not take into account that current taxes
inuence future taxation. Candidates and voters instead take future taxes as given. This Nash assumption
is restrictive, as there is a connection between contemporaneous and future taxes. This link results from
the e¤ect of taxation on private savings. Savings are crowded out by taxes and workers therefore have
lower savings for retirement. This in turn induces the next government to redistribute to these retirees.
Higher current taxes thereby lead to higher future benets for current workers. Young voters are thus partly
compensated for high taxes by higher future benets.
An alternative for the Nash assumption is the Stackelberg approach considered by DAmato and
Galasso (2010). They propose that governments explicitly take the e¤ect of current taxes on future benets
into account. Politicians exploit their rst-mover advantage by increasing taxes at the expense of savings,
resulting in higher taxes in the future. DAmato and Galasso predict that aging decreases overspending on
intergenerational transfers, as a lower rate of return of intergenerational transfers decreases the scope to
exploit future generations. This chapter instead argues that aging may lead to higher taxation, due to the
increased political clout of the elderly. This political-demographic e¤ect dominates here and aging typically
increases the discrepancy between the optimal transfer and the politically feasible one. The assumption
about the behavior of candidates thus matters for the qualitative outcomes of the model.
The Nash assumption can be motivated by considering that one period represents 30 years. While
voters and electoral candidates hold rational expectations about future taxation, it is still di¢ cult to conceive
how changes in current tax policy will inuence future tax policies over such a long time period, as economic
circumstances, demographic developments and political coalitions change substantially, constantly and in
unpredictable ways. Which approach is more realistic, is in the end an empirical question. The Nash
assumption is restrictive as candidates do not consider the reaction of future governments whatsoever. The
Stackelberg approach is problematic as well, as the opposite extreme is assumed: governments know exactly
and take fully into account the behavior of future governments. As one period in a two-period OLG model
represents 30 years, this is a strong assumption. In reality it will probably be a mixed case.
An analytical advantage of the Nash assumption is that it allows to focus exclusively on the distor-
tionary e¤ect of aging on the political sustainability of intergenerational risk sharing, whereas the Stackelberg-
approach combines the ine¢ ciency resulting from aging with the ine¢ ciency resulting from the rst-mover
advantage of contemporaneous candidates (where the two partly cancel each other out).
2.4 Conclusion
Intergenerational risk sharing has the potential to improve welfare, but cannot be implemented by mar-
kets. The government is in a unique position to implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing by pre-
committing unborn generations. However, the government is not driven by e¢ ciency considerations but by
political motives. In a democracy, policies need electoral support to be implemented. This chapter has
investigated whether ex-ante e¢ cient intergenerational risk sharing can be generated by political institutions
if these are primarily driven by redistributional motives.
The message of this chapter is that politics generally does not lead to ex-ante e¢ cient risk sharing.
The political process has an innate tendency to redistribute towards larger cohorts or towards voters who
are easier to inuence. Due to these biases, politics cannot deliver e¢ cient outcomes. Aging may increase
the discrepancy between e¢ cient taxes and taxes determined in the political process. As Bovenberg (2008)
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states, "the danger facing aging societies is that older voters block the needed reforms. In that case, a
conict arises between the political power of older generations (who depend on public transfers and are
risk averse) and the economic power of the younger, working generations (who control the major resource
that fuel the modern knowledge-intensive economy -namely, human capital and entrepreneurship). In other
words, politics collides with economics." Indeed, concern is warranted, as aging may increase the di¤erence
between rst- and second-best outcomes. The good news, however, is that from an ex-ante perspective,
politics may still deliver better outcomes than a situation without any transfers.
Social Security in many countries developed in the 1930s-1950s; for example the USA implemented
PAYG-nanced social security in 1937 when many retirees su¤ered in the Depression, see also Perotti and
Schwienbacher (2008). The resulting decrease in retirement savings was an important motive for social
security. Although this chapter does not predict a specic moment when social security is implemented,
timing and motivation coincide with an implication of the model that intergenerational transfers are used
when retirees have su¤ered a severe nancial set-back.
The conclusions hold for a wide range of population growth rates and are robust to changes in risk
aversion (not shown here) and endogenous savings. The current set-up is nonetheless limited in several
ways. It does not address labor market distortions and general-equilibrium e¤ects, thereby overestimating
the gains of risk sharing. However, by modelling only two generations the potential gain from risk sharing
between more generations is underestimated. By abstracting from risk factors such as longevity, ination
and productivity, the gains from risk sharing are further underestimated. The model also does not take
economic growth into account, underestimating the return on intergenerational transfers.
These limitations are recognized but they are not essential for the central message. If politics
hinders risk-sharing in the relatively simple set-up here, then risk sharing in a more complex environment
can certainly not be taken for granted. The aim of this chapter is also not to calibrate the optimal tax level,
but to provide an analytical framework to consider whether whatever is optimal will arise endogenously in
the political process. The bad news is that democracy may not lead to e¢ ciency and aging may make things
worse. The good news is that political institutions have the potential to generate some risk sharing and are
thus preferable to a situation without intergenerational risk sharing.
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2.5 Appendix: Existence of a unique solution
2.5.1 Derivation of equation 2.5
Based on Persson and Tabellini (2000), this appendix shows that in the probability voting model, discussed
in sub-section 2.2.3., in equilibrium both candidates announce exactly the same policy and that this policy
is the tax rate that maximizes the following function:
W (t) = (1 + n)W
y(t) +W
o(t).
In order to derive this function, the players in the game are discussed in turn.
Electoral candidates
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There are two candidates running for o¢ ce, candidate A and candidate B. Before elections take place,
candidates A and B announce the tax rates A and B that they would implement after elections. This is a
binding promise, which cannot be withdrawn after elections. Both candidates are o¢ ce-seeking. They thus
set the tax rate that maximizes the probability of being elected. The candidate with the most votes wins.
Denote with A the vote share of candidate A where 0 5 A 5 1. Then the probability that candidate
A wins, denoted pA, equals: pA = P [A = 12 ]. The expressions for candidate B are dened completely
analogously, with the obvious relation pA + pB = 1. The probability that a candidate wins depends on the
tax he himself announces, the tax rate the other candidate announces, and the voting decision of voters.
These are now discussed in turn.
Voters
The electorate consists of two distinct groups, the young and the old. For ease of reference, index these
groups j = y; o. The share of young and old voters in the electorate is denoted by j . These shares equal
y = 1+n2+n and 
o = 12+n .
Voters base their voting decision on two considerations:
(1) The tax policy announced by the two candidates. This policy inuences the consumption of voters
directly and thereby their utility.
(2) A personal characteristic of the candidates, called ideology.
The second aspect ideology- di¤ers between candidates. Ideology is a permanent feature of the candidate
and cannot be changed. (The term ideology is used here, but the permanent characteristic could also be
thought of as party loyalty, habit formation of voters or the candidates charisma.) What is crucial is that
voters di¤er in how important ideology is for them. Non-ideological voters will only consider the tax policy,
while ideological voters will vote for a certain candidate irrespective of the tax policy he proposed. This gives
candidates the incentive to cater their policy towards non-ideological voters, who are easy to sway. Recall
thatW y(t) = u(cy(t)) andW o(t) = u(co(t)) and that cy(t)  w t s and co(t+1)  srt+(1+n)t+1.
The functions W y(:) and W o(:) denote utility of the young and the old respectively at time t as a function
of the tax-level at time t.
Now, voter i in group j prefers candidate A i¤:
W j(A) > W
j(B) + 
ij +  j = y; o
Here ij is a voter-specic parameter that can take on both positive and negative values. A positive
value implies that a voter has an ideological bias towards candidate B. A negative value on the other hand
implies that voters have an ideological preference for candidate A. Voters that are ideologically neutral have
a value equal to zero (ij = 0).
The parameter ij has a group-specic uniform distribution on the domain [  12j ;
1
2j ]. The density is
thus j and both groups (young and old) have members inherently biased towards both candidates.
The parameter  measures the average popularity of candidate B in the population as a whole. It can




Timing of events in elections is as follows:
(1) The two candidates simultaneously announce their policies. When doing so, they are aware of
the distribution of ij and , but not of their realizations.
(2) The value of  is realized.
(3) Elections are held, in which voters choose between the two candidates.
(4) The announced policy of the winning candidate is implemented.
Which policy will the candidates choose? To see this, consider the swing voterin group j. This is the
voter that, given his ideological bias and given the policies of the candidates, is indi¤erent between candidate
A and candidate B. Now dene:
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j W j(A) W j(B)  
All voters i in group j with ij < j vote for candidate A, whereas all voters with ij > j vote for
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j(j + 12j )












jj , the average density across groups. Candidate A maximizes pA with respect to A.
Equilibrium






yyW y(A) + 
ooW o(A)]    [
yyW y(B) + 
ooW o(B)]
Again, candidate A maximizes pA with respect to A. Disregarding the parts that cannot be inuenced
by A, maximizing pA is equivalent to maximizing cpA  yyW y(A) + ooW o(A) with respect to A.











pA with 2 + n and dening   
y
o leads to the function:
W (A)  (1 + n)W y(A) + u(srL + (1 + n)W o(A)
Maximizing the function W (A) and maximizing pA is completely equivalent for candidate A in the sense
that exactly the same optimizing value for A results. NowW (A) is called the political target function. But
which tax policy does candidate B announce? The unique equilibrium has both candidates converging on
the same tax policy. This follows from the observation that the two politicians face the same optimization
problem. This can be seen formally by interchanging subscripts A and B in the above. Intuitively both
candidates have similar preferences (they are both o¢ ce-seeking) and have the same technology to convert
tax money into (expected) votes" (Persson and Tabellini (2000)). Therefore, in equilibrium both candidates
maximize the same political target function. Note that  > 1 indicates that young voters vote less ideolog-
ically then older voters. A value  > 1 implies that y > o and that 1y <
1
o . This in turn means that the
density of iy has a smaller domain than io and that it is thus more concentrated around 0, which is the
value of non-ideological voters.
12To see this, note that P [ij 5 j ] = j(j + 1
2j





probability multiplied by the share of group j in the total population gives the number of votes for candidate A coming from
group j.









































jj(WJ (A) WJ (B)), where the last equality follows from the uniform
distribution of .
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2.5.2 Discussion of solution of equation 2.12
The objective is to solve the following maximization problem:
max
t;st




f(1 + n)[u(w   st   t) + u(strL + (1 + n)bt+1jlt)+
(1  )u(strH)1 ] + u(st 1rt + (1 + n)t)
A complicating point in solving this equation is that the optimal values of savings and taxation depend
on savings a period earlier, st 1, and on current (rational) expectations of taxes a period later, bt+1jlt , which
in turn coincides with actual taxes. In the beginning of each iteration the relevant state-contingent taxes
that result are used as the new values for bt+1jlt until convergence is reached; that is, until bt+1jlt , which
is the expected tax in the next period given that state L preceded lt times, is equal to the tax-level when
indeed state L preceded lt times.
Now, the optimization problem is solved numerically by the following procedure:
1a) In the rst iteration take some initial values for bt+1jlt
1b) Otherwise update bt+1jlt by taking as its value the tax level in the previous iteration when state L
preceded lt times, so bt+1jlt=l :=  l+1;  l+1 is as dened below.
2) Calculate st in state H (so when lt = 0) given bt+1jlt=0. Denote the maximizing value of st when lt = 0
by s0. Note that the value of st 1 here does not inuence the tax rate in state H (the tax rate is zero) and
therefore also does not inuence the savings rate of the generation young at time t.
3) Calculate st and t if state L occurs next (lt = 1), so given bt+1jlt=1 and given st 1 = s0. Denote the
maximizing value of st and t when lt = 1 by s1 and 1 respectively.
4) Repeat step 3) for increasing values of lt until convergence occurs, that is until 9 i such that  i   i+1
and si  si+1.
5) Denote for all l 5 i the di¤erence between the expected tax rate and the realized tax rate by dl bt+1jlt=l    l+1.
6) Repeat steps 1) through 5) until dl  0 for all l 5 i, that is, until expected tax levels are equal to the
realized values (ensuring that expectations are rational).
This procedure gives the equilibrium taxes and savings for di¤erent values of lt, that is, for a di¤erent
number of times state L preceded at time t. As lt summarizes all relevant information at time t, this
characterizes the political process in each relevant history.
Note that at each time t, st 1 and bt+1jlt are given and that there exists a unique solution at each time
t by the theorem of Weierstrass and strict concavity of the political target function.
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Chapter 3
The greying of the median voter
3.1 Introduction
1 Aging has called the sustainability of public nance into question. This has become more pressing with
decits of most countries ballooning after the nationalization of private bank debts. There are two distinct
ways in which aging may positively inuence pension expenditure.
The rst e¤ect is that there are more retirees on the receiving end of Social Security. As a result,
aging naturally leads to higher total pension expenditure relative to GDP. This upward e¤ect of aging on
pension expenditures relative to GDP can only be counterbalanced by a considerable decrease of benets
per retiree.
A second e¤ect of aging is that there are more older voters; retirees thus have more political clout.
Median voter models argue that this e¤ect is crucial and predict that an older median voter will successfully
push for increasing generosity of pensions, see Galasso (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2000). In this view,
aging not only leads to higher spending relative to GDP but also relative to the number of retirees. This
would lead to a substantial increase in pension expenditure.
This chapter assesses the empirical support for both propositions using OECD data from 30 countries
between 1980 and 2005. It evaluates the demographic impact on retirement spending relative to GDP and
relative to the number of retirees. Additionally the association between aging and health care costs is
considered. Aging is frequently assumed to be positively associated with health care costs, as elderly are
relatively often in need of health care.
Only public spending is taken into account here, disregarding savings via pension funds, insurance
companies and banks. The focus is solely on the presence or absence of political pressure to increase
pensions theorized to arise from an older electorate. As governments can inuence public spending directly,
public pension spending should be rst and foremost a¤ected if such political pressure exists. Demographic
composition of the electorate is operationalized by the median age of the population, while robustness checks
are carried out for the dependency ratio as an alternative operationalization.
There is some empirical support for the proposition that aging leads to more pension expenditure
as a share of GDP. In the baseline regression an increase of the median age does not lead to an increase
in pension expenditure as a share of GDP. However, aging has a positive and signicant e¤ect when time
e¤ects are discarded or when aging is operationalized with the dependency ratio instead of the age of the
median voter. There is no support for the stronger claim made by median voter models. In fact the exact
opposite is the case: aging inuences the generosity of individual benets negatively and signicantly in the
baseline regression. In some alternative specications the e¤ect is insignicant and still negative.
The impact of an older median voter on health care costs is comparable to the e¤ect on pension
expenditure. Generally no signicant e¤ect of aging is found. All estimates result from a xed e¤ect model
1This chapter was written with Ferry Koster. An earlier version appeared as AIAS Working paper No. 98 and Netspar
discussion paper 01/2001-003.
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controlling for several economic and political covariates, including unemployment, GDP per capita, union
density, the interest rate and type of government.
Together this suggests that the median voter approach to social security is incomplete. Two ap-
proaches are more in line with rising total expenditure yet decreasing generosity. Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt
(2007) propose a probability voting model. In such models, politicians choose the policy that maximizes
the weighted utility of all voters where the weights are determined by the degree to which voters can be
swayed by policies. The outcome is that aging leads to higher contributions and lower benets. This is also
the outcome of Chapter 2, which analyzed the interaction of probability voting and intergenerational risk
sharing.
The same conclusion is reached by Breyer and Stolte (2001) who analyze a two-period OLG-model in
which the retirees hold all political power and set contributions. The workers can react to contributions by
adjusting their labor supply. This prevents the elderly from setting a contribution level of 100%. The e¤ect
of aging in this set-up is burden-sharing by simultaneously increasing contributions and decreasing benets.
This chapter cannot discriminate between the probability voting approach and the endogenous labor supply
set-up.
Several earlier papers have investigated the relationship between aging and pension expenditure.
Breyer and Craig (1997) use OECD-data for 20 countries in 1960-1990 with 10-year intervals and nd that
benets as a fraction of GDP are positively and signicantly related to the median voter age. Depending
on the specication, an increase of one year of the latter increases spending relative to GDP by 0.4-0.6
percentage points. The median age is positively but not signicantly related to benets per pensioner.
Tepe and Vanhuysse (2010) reach similar conclusions based on an analysis of 18 countries between 1980
and 2000 using eight-year intervals. They operationalize aging with the dependency ratio instead of the
age of the median voter. Here both are considered. A controversial claim is made by Razin, Sadka and
Swagel (2002) stating that a higher dependency ratio is associated with lower pension contributions. This
has been challenged by Disney (2007) and Sanz and Velazquez (2007) who criticize both the (static) model
specication and the operationalization of the dependency ratio (including children) and social security
(which also includes unemployment benets). Shelton (2008) re-estimates the model of Razin et al.. The
most important change in this context is that he uses the number of people over 64 divided by the number of
people between 15-64 as the dependency ratio. In one specication a higher dependency ratio has a positive
and signicant e¤ect on per capita transfers while the dependency ratio is insignicant in a more elaborated
model. The di¤erence between Shelton and this study is rst that the latter considers benets per retiree
as the dependent variable (instead of transfers per capita). The second di¤erence is that Shelton does not
include time e¤ects, political control variables (union density and government features) or the interest rate
while the model here does not include openness of the economy (a variable that Shelton includes). Mulligan,
Gil and Sala-i-Martin (2002) have a somewhat di¤erent approach. They show that democracies do not
spend more on Social Security than undemocratic countries. They conclude that for, social security, much
more important are economic and demographic variables, such as the aging of the population and economic
growth.
The contribution to this literature is twofold. First, more recent data and relevant regressors not
used earlier are considered. Also more observations are used than is common in the literature. This study
has a minimum of 109 observations, whereas Breyer and Craig and Tepe and Vanhuysse have a maximum of
76 and 54 observations respectively. This elaborated, re-specied and updated approach generally conrms
earlier ndings, thereby strengthening previous conclusions. This is all the more relevant because aging is a
relatively recent phenomenon that by its nature increases gradually over time. The data here thus allow to
include observations with a median age higher than in earlier studies.
The second and novel contribution is that health care costs are evaluated as well. Health care costs
are not incorporated in the mentioned literature but are often argued to be related to aging as well. Older
voters are arguably as much interested in higher health care spending as in higher retirement benets. A full
analysis considers both factors, as Tepe and Vanhuysse state: Recent studies indicate that elderly voters
actually care less about the real value of their pensions than about health issues. Future research could
therefore usefully analyze the e¤ects of population aging on health care spending.This is exactly what is
done here.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the political-economic
literature on Social Security and in particular the predicted e¤ect of aging on contributions and benets.
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The third section discusses the data and the model. The fourth section shows the results, and the fth
section considers several extensions and robustness analyses.
3.2 Theoretical background and related literature
There is a well-developed and substantial literature on the political economy of social security, see Galasso
(2002) and Breyer (1994) for still up-to-date and relevant overviews. The focus here is on the theorized
inuence of aging on contributions and benets. An important and dominant approach in the literature uses
the median voter concept as the central analytical framework, see Browning (1975), Persson and Tabellini
(2000), Galasso (2006), Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Cooley and Soares (1999).
In median voter models, aging has two opposing e¤ects on the preferences of the decisive median
voter. A rst economic e¤ect is that the rate of return of a Pay-as-you-go system decreases, as the ratio
between workers and retirees decreases. This will make a PAYG-system less attractive for all voters, including
the median voter. A second political e¤ect is that the median voter will be older. He or she will thus be
more and more inclined to support more generous pension benets. If elections take place once and the
result remains in place forever after, this political e¤ect outweighs the economic e¤ect and an older median
voter leads to higher benets per retiree. This is the approach of Browning (1975) and Persson and Tabellini
(2000). In this setting an older median voter successfully pushes for higher benets, so that demographics is
the main driving force for pension spending. The crucial implication of median voter models is that benets
will be more generous. As Persson and Tabellini state A social planner, for example, would also spend more
on pensions with a larger number of elderly people. The model really predicts that pensions per retiree will
be higher, the higher the weight on old voters (..), as this shifts the median-voter equilibrium toward a more
generous pension system.
This result hinges on the stringent assumption that elections take place once and the outcome is
binding forever after. This assumption is clearly counter-factual as policies change over time.
Alternatively, Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Cooley and Soares (1999) understand PAYG arrange-
ments as an intergenerational game where elections take place each period, see also Sjoblom (1985). In
this case multiple equilibria arise. If voters expect that their own contribution will not inuence future
contributions made to them, an equilibrium with zero contributions results. If all other generations do not
contribute, it is best to do likewise. Positive transfers can however be supported by the threat that future
generations may withhold future contributions if current working generations do not contribute to current
retirees. In this case, current contributions do inuence future benets. Generations then contribute to
retirees because this results in future generations contributing to them. In this approach, each generation
takes into account the behavior of previous generations in a reaction function. This reaction function gives
the current contribution as a function of contributions of previous generations and it can be interpreted as a
social contract between generations (Sjoblom (1985), Boldrin and Rustichini (2000)). Any transfer scheme
that outperforms the default option of zero contributions and zero benets can result as a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
The e¤ect of aging is not clear a priori as multiple equilibria are possible. However, if an e¤ect
is predicted, the aforementioned median voter reasoning is applied with an older median voter leading to
increased pension contributions and benets. Galasso (2006) for example predicts a dramatic increase in
pension spending. Galasso predicts that Spain will increase its spending on Social Security from 21.3% of
wages to 45.5% in 2050 and the UK from 14.5% to 33.2%.
An alternative to higher benets per retiree is that aging simultaneously increases contributions and
decreases benets. The burden of agingis shared between working and retired generations. This is the main
outcome of an alternative model by Breyer and Stolte (2001). They postulate that (near) retired generations
form a majority, holding all political power. This does not lead to contributions of 100% because young
generations respond to taxation by adjusting labor supply. The older generations e¤ectively maximize a
La¤er curve that gives total tax revenues as a function of the tax rate. Breyer and Stolte predict that aging
leads to both higher contributions and lower individual benets. This prediction of higher contributions
but lower benets also results in probability voting models. In these models the incumbent party maximizes
39
political support by maximizing the sum of utility of di¤erent cohorts, weighing utility proportional to cohort-
size, see Gonzales-Eiras and Niepelt (2007) and the previous chapter. Probability voting models thereby
take the position that larger cohorts have more inuence but that minorities are not politically powerless. It
also allows for the possibility that pension policy is not the only factor that voters consider in their voting
decision.
Yet another view is given by Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) who propose that aging leads to the break-
down of social security altogether. Aging makes PAYG less and less attractive and at one point working
generations will stop contributing to social security. Key in their two-period OLG-model is that this moment
of break-down is uncertain because future demographic developments are uncertain. Each generation has
the choice to continue social security, facing ex-ante a positive probability but not the certainty that the next
generation will do the same. The last contributing generation will lose ex post, because older generations
are not compensated. In this approach aging leads to a denite breakdown of social security at an indenite
moment. As no social security system has been dismantled in an OECD-country, this prediction cannot be
conrmed though it cannot be ruled out that this scenario awaits.
3.3 Data and econometric model
All data are retrieved from publicly available sources at the OECD, the World Bank and the Comparative
Political Data Set. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics.
Table 1
Mean Standard dev. Minimum Maximum
Retirement spending / GDP 6.23 2.74 0.1 12.60
Benet / retiree 10020.84 4808.92 312.20 26221.99
Health / GDP 5.57 1.07 3.13 8.24
Health / inhabitant 1350.38 536.06 308.57 4186.19
Median age 34.20 4.89 17.43 43.10
Dependency 21.81 5.38 7.58 32.55
Unemployment 6.72 3.78 0.18 18.76
GDP per capita 21310.02 8401.05 4865.44 59888.22
Union density 39.99 20.62 8.01 86.62
Interest rate 8.72 4.45 1.35 29.03
Government ideology 2.48 1.55 1 5
Minority government 0.16 0.37 0 1
Single party government 0.29 0.46 0 1
The median age of the electorate is proxied by the median age of the whole population, as reported by
the World Bank. The latter does not coincide with the median age of the electorate which is the crucial
factor in many theoretical models. This data limitation need not be restrictive as both median ages are
driven by the same two factors, namely fertility rates and mortality rates. A second consideration is that
the age of the median voter of the electorate anyway does not coincide with the median age of actual voters,
since not everybody votes (and older voters tend to do so more).
In total four di¤erent dependent variables are considered. The rst measure of retirement spending
is total spending on retirements relative to GDP. This ranges between 0.1% and 12.1%. The following graph
gives the average retirement spending relative to GDP for the 21 countries for which this gure is available
each year.2 The graph also gives health care spending as a share of GDP for the same countries.
2The enitre sample of 30 countries consists of Australia*, Austria*, Belgium*, Canada*, Czech Republic, Denmark*, Fin-
land*, France*, Germany*, Greece*, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland*, Italy*, Japan*, Korea, Luxembourg*, Mexico, Netherlands*,
New Zealand*, Norway*, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain*, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Turkey, United Kingdom*, United
States*. For the 21 countries denoted * data are available for the entire period.
40










1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
year
Retirement benefits (%GDP) Health care (%GDP)
A second measure is benets per retiree. This gure is derived by dividing total expenditure by the
number of people older than 64. This is an approximation as it does not take account of di¤erences in the
retirement-age. The exact number of retirees in countries is however unavailable. The number of people over
64 is the best approximation available but it is a data limitation all the same. This indicator is also used
in other analyses of the e¤ects of aging. The next graph provides the development of individual benets for
the same 21 countries for which these numbers are available each year; 1980 is the baseline year, indexed
100. It also gives the development of health care costs per inhabitant.
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The third variable is health care costs relative to GDP, while the fourth dependent variable is health
care costs per inhabitant. Health care costs per retiree are not separately available and can thus not be
considered. Meara et al. (2004) nd for the USA that per person spending developed di¤erently over time.
In 1963-1987 spending per-person increased relatively faster for persons over 64 years; in 1987-2000 the costs
for this age group declined compared with the age group of 35-44 years. For other countries cohort-specic
health care spending is not available. The resulting limitation of using health care costs per inhabitant
is acknowledged. However this need not be problematic as health care spending is di¢ cult to target at a
specic group. If retirees successfully plead for higher healthcare spending, this will thus lead to more health
care available for all voters alike. Whether other age groups make use of increased health care possibilities
is another issue.
The regressors can be grouped in economic and political control variables. Unemployment and the
interest rate are economic control variables indicating the economic and nancial circumstances of a country
respectively. High unemployment arguably decreases the scope for social security while a high interest rate
hinders debt-nancing of retirement expenditure. The e¤ect of GDP per capita is less straightforward. If
pensions are indexed to GDP, GDP does not a¤ect retirement spending relative to GDP. If this is not the
case and benets increase less than GDP, higher GDP is associated with lower retirement spending as a share
of GDP. There may also be a political e¤ect, when higher GDP makes it politically easier to redistribute;
this would lead to higher pensions.
Political factors other than the age of the median voter are potentially important. The rst factor
considered is union density, ranging from 8% to 86%. A strong union may successfully press for higher benets
for their (former) members. A government of left-wing signature may likewise lead to higher benets. The
ideological signature of the government is indicated by the proportion of the government that is made up of
left-wing parties. There were 59 governments that were exclusively made up of right-wing parties whereas 26
governments consisted solely of left-wing parties. Dummy variables are included for two relevant features of
government composition. A rst dummy indicates whether the government consists of a single party. Such
a government may be either more e¤ective in pushing through its own agenda or may shy away from policy
changes, as blame cannot be shared with other parties. A second dummy indicates whether the government
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is a minority government or not. A government without a majority in parliament is arguably less e¤ective
in pushing through its own preferred policy. Finally, time e¤ects are considered by a dummy for each time
period where the rst time period (the year 1980) is the reference category.
The period 1980-2005 is chosen solely for practical considerations of data availability. Five-year
intervals are considered, the reason being that pension reforms need time to be developed, discussed and
implemented and reforms are thus not implemented yearly. A ve-year period is chosen because that covers a
political cycle in which one (or more) reform(s) can take place. There is also a practical reason to dismiss one-
year intervals. The median age hardly changes one year to the next and estimation results would therefore
not be robust.
The econometric model used is a panel data model with xed e¤ects, and the coe¢ cients are es-
timated with the within-estimator. Pooled regression leads to an inconsistent estimator whenever time-
invariant country-specic e¤ects (like habit formation, geography, culture, path-dependent policies) corre-
late with covariates. Exactly the same holds for the random e¤ects model. For non-experimental data xed
e¤ects are thus more reasonable that the random e¤ects. If the crucial assumption that xed e¤ects are un-
correlated with all regressors does hold, the xed-e¤ect estimator used here is still unbiased and consistent,
but less e¢ cient than the random e¤ects estimator.
Sanz and Velazquez (2007) consider a dynamic model with a lagged endogenous variable as one of the
covariates. A static approach is taken here instead. Lagged values of the median age are already considered
below and there is no theoretical reason to assume that reforms take more than a period of ve years to
react to demographic changes. A more pragmatic motivation is that, with a dynamic specication, the
observations of the rst period could not be used, which means losing a substantial part of the observations.
A dynamic specication is furthermore problematic because there are several missing values.
The base-line regression model is then given by the following equation:
yi;t = + 1Medianagei;t + 2Unempli;t + 3Interesti;t + 4 ln(GDP_cap)i;t+
5Ideo log ygovi;t + 6Minoritygovi;t + 7 Singlepartygovi;t+
5X
j=1
jIft=1980+5jg + "i;t i=1; 2; ::; 30; t=1980; 1985; ::; 2005
Here yi;t is one of the four dependent variables that were discussed. The period-dummies for 1985 until
2005 are given by indicator functions; the year 1980 is the reference category. For health care costs time
e¤ects can be interpreted as technological change that improves medical care but also increases medical
spending.
In principle the data cover 30 countries over 6 periods, leading to potentially 180 observations. A
considerable amount of observations are however missing, in particular from former Communist countries
prior to 1990. The base-line model is estimated using 109 observations. This leads to an (unavoidable) loss
in e¢ ciency of the estimators. There is no reason to assume that the missing observations are correlated
with the e¤ect of interest here.
3.4 Results
The median age of the population does not signicantly a¤ect spending as a share of GDP, as Table 2
indicates. The estimated e¤ect itself is positive and an increase of one year is associated with an increase
of 0.13 percentage point of GDP. The R2 equals 0.52; while this is reasonably high, not too much can be
inferred from it. There is no statistical theory underlying R2 and it increases when-ever more variables are
included, irrespective of their relevance.
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The median age negatively a¤ects the size of benets and this e¤ect is signicant; the associated
t-statistic equals -3.36. The R2 equals 0.81. This is again reasonably high but again not too much can be
made of that. The regression shows no evidence for the claim of median voter models that an older median
voter successfully presses for higher retirement spending. In fact, it shows quite the opposite.
Table 2
VARIABLES Retirement spending/GDP Benets / retiree




GDP per capita -1.113 0.761***
(1.329) (0.182)
Union density 0.043** 0.007***
(0.017) (0.002)
Government ideology -0.038 -0.007
(0.069) (0.009)
Minority government -0.663** -0.092**
(0.294) (0.040)
Single government 0.238 0.036
(0.304) (0.042)
Interest rate 0.010 0.004
(0.057) (0.008)
Year 1985 0.356 0.166***
(0.385) (0.053)
Year 1990 0.777 0.254***
(0.531) (0.073)
Year 1995 1.061 0.373***
(0.754) (0.103)
Year 2000 1.548 0.500***
(0.941) (0.129)






Number of countries 21 21
*Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The e¤ect of other covariates varies. Union density is positively and signicantly associated with
both generosity of pensions and retirement spending relative to GDP. This indicates that strong unions can
bargain for higher pensions for employees. The e¤ect is quite substantial; the di¤erence between no unions
(so membership of 0%) and full unionization (100%) is ve percentage points of GDP worth of pension
spending.
Unemployment a¤ects spending relative to GDP positively and signicantly. It has to be noted that
unemployment is potentially endogenous; this potential problem is addressed below by taking the lagged
value of unemployment. A minority government spends less on retirement spending as a share of GDP
whereas GDP per capita positively inuences the size of retirement benets. For the latter the coe¢ cient
of 0.76 is interesting; this indicates that if total production per inhabitant increases with 1%, benets of
retirees increases with 0.76%. Both regressions show a positive time trend in retirement spending -indicated
by the coe¢ cients of the time-dummies- though this is only signicant for benets per retiree.
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Table 3 provides regressions with health care costs as the dependent variable. The e¤ect of the
median age on health care costs relative to GDP is positive yet insignicant. The same holds for health
care costs per inhabitant. Considering the dependency ratio instead of the median age or considering both
demographic variables together leads to the same conclusion.
Table 3.
VARIABLES Health/GDP Health/inhabitant Health/GDP Health/inhabitant
Median age 0.054 0.006
(0.076) (0.014)
Dependency ratio 0.003 -0.001
(0.030) (0.005)
Unemployment -0.093*** -0.016*** -0.095*** -0.016***
(0.033) (0.006) (0.033) (0.006)
GDP per capita -3.353*** 0.381** -3.346*** 0.374**
(0.892) (0.160) (0.933) (0.167)
Union density -0.024** -0.005** -0.024** -0.005**
(0.011) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
Government ideology -0.020 -0.004 -0.021 -0.004
(0.047) (0.008) (0.047) (0.008)
Minority government -0.408** -0.071** -0.408** -0.073**
(0.197) (0.035) (0.203) (0.036)
Single government 0.011 0.014 -0.006 0.011
(0.204) (0.037) (0.204) (0.037)
Interest rate 0.090** 0.018** 0.090** 0.018**
(0.038) (0.007) (0.038) (0.007)
Year 1985 0.513* 0.107** 0.591** 0.115***
(0.258) (0.046) (0.235) (0.042)
Year 1990 0.976*** 0.197*** 1.117*** 0.214***
(0.356) (0.064) (0.304) (0.054)
Year 1995 1.817*** 0.363*** 2.022*** 0.387***
(0.506) (0.091) (0.423) (0.076)
Year 2000 2.184*** 0.447*** 2.454*** 0.480***
(0.631) (0.113) (0.522) (0.093)
Year 2005 3.269*** 0.641*** 3.605*** 0.683***
(0.756) (0.136) (0.613) (0.110)
Constant 36.910*** 3.000* 38.580*** 3.273*
(9.342) (1.677) (9.516) (1.704)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.622 0.918 0.620 0.918
Number of countries 21 21 21 21
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.5 Alternative specications and robustness checks
The models estimated so far rest on several assumptions and operationalizations for which there are sensible
and defensible alternatives. Therefore this section considers several alternatives for the baseline model to
assess whether results are robust to changes in the model set-up. The results are given in the appendix.
The median age of the population increases over time and thus correlates with the time e¤ects. The
resulting multicollinearity increases standard errors and may obscure a signicant e¤ect. When the baseline
regression is estimated without time dummies, the positive e¤ect of median age on retirement spending
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is indeed signicant while the negative e¤ect on benets per retiree becomes insignicant. The positive
relation between aging and retirement spending relative to GDP indicates that multicollinearity may have
been present. As long as time e¤ects are deemed relevant for explaining government spending they cannot
be omitted in the baseline regression, however; omitting relevant variables leads to biased estimators.
Thus far the median age of the population has been used as the operationalization of aging. The
median age is the crucial factor in the political-economic literature. There are however other notions of
aging in the broader pension literature, in particular the dependency ratio. This ratio gives the number
of retirees for each 100 persons of working age (15-64 year). This gure is prominent in many discussions
as it gives the proportion between the elderly and the working people supportingthem. The conclusions
for this alternative operationalization of aging indeed di¤er substantially, as table 4 indicates. Now the
demographic variable -here the dependency ratio- has a positive and signicant e¤ect on spending and an
insignicant e¤ect on generosity of benets. This underlines that the median age and the dependency ratios
are di¤erent entities. The latter is a better measure for the relative number of retirees, which explains
why it is positively associated with pension spending. When more people are eligible for pension benets,
total retirement spending will automatically increase. In median voter models, the median age is the crucial
political variable, as that captures the theorized political clout of elderly. To disentangle the two e¤ects, both
variables are jointly used as regressors. In this regression both variables have positive coe¢ cients in both
regressions, but only the e¤ect of the dependency ratio on total spending (relative to GDP) is signicant.
Policy changes may need some time to respond to the political inuence exercised by the median
voter. First a government is elected and installed and thereafter it usually takes a considerable time to
design, implement and actually execute a reform. For that reason a lagged value of the median voter is
considered. As can be seen, the sign of the estimated e¤ects remains the same but now the e¤ects in both
regressions are insignicant. One reason is that using lagged values diminishes the number of observations;
lagged values of the variables are not available for 1980. The number of observations decreases to 92, which
may be too low to estimate fourteen parameters.
The baseline regression itself is estimated with 109 observations. When fewer regressors are used,
more observations can be considered. When the omitted variables are relevant (as expected) this generally
leads to biased estimates. The estimation results are thus awed, but can be useful nonetheless as their
standard errors are smaller due to the increased number of observations. Regressions with 155 observations
but fewer covariates again lead to the same conclusions as the baseline regressions.
The base line regressions are also re-estimated using lagged values of unemployment instead of
contemporaneous unemployment. This specication addresses the possible endogeneity of unemployment.
Unemployment may not only a¤ect pension spending but may itself also be inuenced by it. Higher spending
on pensions may lead to either higher employment (as spending boosts aggregate demand) or to lower
employment (as higher taxes may discourage workers).
The overall conclusion is that aging does not lead to more generous pensions. If anything, it leads
to lower pensions. In the baseline model aging also does not lead to higher spending relative to GDP. There
is however a positive, signicant e¤ect when time e¤ects are omitted or if the dependency ratio is considered
as an alternative proxy for aging.
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter analyzed whether an older population and thus an older electorate leads to higher pension
expenditure. Pension expenditure as a share of GDP is not signicantly associated with an increase in
the age of the median voter. Spending is positively and signicantly associated with the dependency ratio.
This is in line with expectations as more people are entitled to pension benets (for which they contributed
earlier in life). It is also in line with preferences of a majority of the population. Boeri et al. (2002) report
that questionnaires in Italy and Germany indicate that a majority of citizens disapprove of pension-cutting
reforms. Considering health care spending instead of retirement expenditure leads to similar conclusions.
The stronger claim that a greying electorate successfully pushes for more pension benets per retiree,
predicted by median voter models, is not supported. If anything, the opposite is the case; aging leads to
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less generous pension benets. These results challenge the prominent role attributed to the median voter
in both explaining and predicting welfare state changes. The median voter model does not seem to fully
capture what determines pension benets.
Apparently other factors, o¤setting the increased potential political clout of retirees, are important.
Two approaches that can explain rising total expenditure and decreasing generosity are probability voting
and endogenous labor supply. The results also indicate that the role of unions have a signicant e¤ect
on political outcomes. Other potential factors include lobbying of insurance companies and the lack of
commitment of government parties. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, many reforms are carried through
between elections with little regard for party programs or the preferences of the majority of voters. This study
cannot discriminate between the alternative explanations for the development of pension expenditure, but
the empirical ndings of this chapter suggests that ignoring these factors leads to an incomplete discussion
about the sustainability of public nance.
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Table 4: Retirement spending.
VARIABLES %GDP per retiree %GDP per retiree %GDP per retiree
Median age 0.258*** -0.013 0.217* 0.022
(0.082) (0.012) (0.117) (0.017)
Unemployment 0.151*** 0.021*** 0.108** 0.010 0.061 0.0022
(0.036) (0.005) (0.043) (0.007) (0.073) (0.011)
GDP per capita 0.152 1.174*** 0.568 0.737*** -0.697 0.834***
(1.037) (0.153) (1.206) (0.203) (1.385) (0.200)
Union density 0.039** 0.005** 0.036** 0.007*** -0.014 -0.002
(0.016) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002)
Government ideology -0.026 -0.003 -0.060 -0.006 0.284** 0.042**
(0.067) (0.010) (0.061) (0.010) (0.130) (0.019)
Minority government -0.672** -0.103** -0.372 -0.095** -0.365 -0.058
(0.284) (0.0418) (0.263) (0.044) (0.467) (0.067)
Single government 0.314 0.059 0.295 0.051 -0.887** -0.116**
(0.293) (0.043) (0.263) (0.044) (0.400) (0.058)
Interest rate -0.018 -0.005 0.013 0.004 0.072 0.015
(0.047) (0.007) (0.050) (0.008) (0.104) (0.015)
Median age (lag)
Dependency ratio 0.200*** -0.005 0.306*** 0.015
(0.039) (0.007) (0.075) (0.011)
Unemployment (lag)
Year 1985 0.461 0.092* 0.040 0.022
(0.304) (0.051) (0.702) (0.101)
Year 1990 0.573 0.126* -0.209 -0.032
(0.393) (0.066) (0.756) (0.109)
Year 1995 0.860 0.186** -0.135 -0.005
(0.548) (0.092) (0.932) (0.135)
Year 2000 1.075 0.256** -0.389 -0.041
(0.674) (0.113) (1.057) (0.153)
Year 2005 1.158 0.287** -0.305 -0.024
(0.793) (0.133) (1.193) (0.172)
Constant -6.429 -2.371* -6.689 1.437 -1.858 -0.378
(9.453) (1.392) (12.310) (2.067) (14.020) (2.023)
Observations 109 109 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.499 0.765 0.635 0.778 0.527 0.512
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 21
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.(continued)
%GDP per retiree %GDP per retiree %GDP per retiree
Median age 0.217** -0.011 0.115 -0.051***
(0.105) (0.019) (0.113) (0.015)
Unemployment 0.096* 0.013 0.148*** 0.0170**
(0.057) (0.008) (0.041) (0.007)
GDP per capita -0.865 0.855*** -0.630 1.067*** -2.910** 0.608***
(1.665) (0.242) (1.042) (0.186) (1.129) (0.149)
Union density 0.042* 0.004 0.053*** 0.007***
(0.024) (0.004) (0.017) (0.002)
Government ideology -0.047 0.005 -0.027 -0.005
(0.080) (0.012) (0.069) (0.009)
Minority government -0.498 -0.095* -0.577* -0.087**
(0.329) (0.048) (0.297) (0.039)
Single government -0.034 0.037 0.088 0.030
(0.375) (0.055) (0.307) (0.041)
Interest rate 0.0138 0.005 0.0134 0.001
(0.074) (0.011) (0.059) (0.008)
Median age (lag) 0.017 -0.004
(0.026) (0.004)
Dependency ratio
Unemployment (lag) 0.022 -0.005
(0.039) (0.005)
Year 1985 -0.006 0.045 0.729** 0.214***
(0.348) (0.062) (0.352) (0.046)
Year 1990 0.517* 0.014 0.459 0.078 1.222** 0.321***
(0.304) (0.044) (0.454) (0.081) (0.512) (0.068)
Year 1995 1.027** 0.0516 0.459 0.103 1.983*** 0.459***
(0.493) (0.072) (0.605) (0.108) (0.608) (0.080)
Year 2000 1.500** 0.105 0.557 0.095 2.410*** 0.596***
(0.686) (0.010) (0.783) (0.140) (0.841) (0.111)
Year 2005 1.845** 0.132 0.555 0.115 2.889*** 0.682***
(0.851) (0.124) (0.957) (0.171) (0.972) (0.128)
Constant 11.830 0.473 3.579 -1.318 28.100** 4.335***
(16.880) (2.457) (10.630) (1.901) (11.830) (1.562)
Observations 92 92 155 155 112 112
R-squared 0.423 0.706 0.441 0.702 0.483 0.812
Number of countries 21 21 30 30 21 21
Standard errors in parentheses




Demographic composition and risk of
pension funds
4.1 Introduction
1 The aim of this chapter is to assess whether Dutch pension fundsstrategic investment policies depend on
the age of their participants. A pension funds strategic investment policy reects its objectives, while the
actual asset allocation may depart from the objective as a result of asset price shocks, since pension funds do
not continuously rebalance their portfolios (Bikker, Broeders and De Dreu, 2010). This study focuses on the
strategic allocation of equities and bonds as representing, respectively, risky and safe assets. The argument
for age-dependent equity allocation stems from optimal life-cycle saving and investing models (e.g. Bodie et
al., 1992; Campbell and Viceira, 2002; Cocco et al., 2005). An important outcome of these models is that
the proportion of nancial assets invested in equity should decrease over the life-cycle, thereby increasing the
proportion of the relatively safer bonds. The key argument is that young workers have more human capital
than older workers. Assuming no or low correlation between labour income and stock market returns, a
young worker may better diversify equity risk with its large holding of human capital. Benzoni et al. [2007]
however postulate that in the long-run wages and capital return are cointegrated. Therefore young workers
need to take less, not more equity risk. This paper does not take a position in this theoretical debate, but
instead assesses whether Dutch pension funds have an age-dependent asset allocation and if so, in what way.
For pension fundsstrategic asset allocation in 2007, it is found that a rise in participantsaverage
age reduces equity holdings signicantly. A (cross-sectional) increase of active participants average age
by one year leads to a signicant and robust drop in strategic equity exposure by around 0.5 percentage
point. It is also found that the equity-age relationship is stronger for active participants than for retired and
deferred participants.2 This is in line with the basic version of the life-cycle model where retirees should
hold a constant fraction of their wealth in equity, as they no longer possess any human capital. Other
factors that inuence equity exposure positively and signicantly include pension fund size, funding ratio,
and participantsaverage pension wealth. Pension plan type and pension fund type, however, do not have
signicant impact.
The negative equity-age relationship has been found in other studies as well. For pension funds in
Finland, Alestalo and Puttonen (2006) report that a one-year average age increase reduced equity exposure
in 2000 by as much as 1.7 percentage points. Likewise, for Switzerland in 2000 and 2002, Gerber and Weber
(2007) report a negative relation between equity exposure and both short-term liabilities and age. The
e¤ect they nd is smaller yet signicant, as equity decreases by 0.18 percentage point if the average active
1This chapter is a slightly revised version of Bikker, J. A., D.W. Broeders, D.A. Hollanders and E.P. Ponds-Pension funds
asset allocation and participant age: a test of the life cycle model (Journal of Risk and Insurance (2011)). This chapter was
partly written as a visiting researcher at the Dutch Central Bank (DNB).
2Deferred participants are former members who are entitled to future benets, but who are no longer in the service of the
employer.
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participants age increases by one year. For the US, Lucas and Zeldes (2009) did not observe a signicant
relationship between the equity share in pension assets and the relative share of active participants.
The set-up of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical relationship between the
participants age and equity investments, originating from the life-cycle saving and investing model. Section
3 describes pension funds in the Netherlands. Section 4 investigates the age-dependency of asset allocation
empirically using a unique dataset of 472 Dutch pension funds at end-2007. The next section presents a
number of variants of the model, which act as robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Life-cycle saving and investing
In the late 1960s Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) proposed that individuals should optimally maintain
constant portfolio weights throughout their lives. A restrictive assumption of these models is that investors
have no labour income (human capital). This assumption is clearly counterfactual. If labour income is
included in the portfolio choice model, the optimal allocation of nancial wealth of individuals changes over
their life cycle (for an overview, see Bovenberg et al., 2007).
The basic version of the life-cycle model with risk-free human capital, see Campbell and Viceira





Here H denotes human capital, that is, the total of current and discounted future wages, of an individual,
and F is the persons current nancial capital. The risk-premium of the stock market is given by    Rf ,
while  and 2 denote, respectively, the individuals constant relative risk aversion and the variance of stock
market returns. The optimal allocation to risky assets depends on total wealth, being the sum of nancial
wealth and human capital. As can be seen from the equation, more human capital leads to higher optimal
investment in stocks. Furthermore, it follows that retirees should invest a constant fraction of their nancial
wealth in equities, as their human capital is depleted. Teulings and De Vries (2006) calculate that young
workers should even go short in bonds equal to no less than 5.5 times their annual salary in order to invest
in stock. The negative age-dependency of asset holdings corresponds to the rule of thumb that an individual
should invest (100 age) % in stocks (see Malkiel, 2007).
The negative relationship between age and equity exposure in the portfolio is usually derived under
the assumption that human capital is close to risk-free, or at least is not correlated with capital return.
Benzoni et al. (2007) put forward that the short run correlation is low indeed, while in the longer run,
labour income and capital income are co-integrated, since the shares of wages and prots in national income
are fairly constant. This nding implies that the risk prole of young workerslabour income is equity-like
and that they should therefore hold their nancial wealth in the form of safe bonds to o¤set the high risk
exposure in their human capital. For that reason, Benzoni et al. (2007) suggest that the optimal equity
share in nancial assets is hump-shaped over the life cycle: co-integration between human capital and stock
returns dominates in the rst part of working life, whereas the decline in human capital accounts for the
negative age-dependency of optimal equity holdings later in life.
This study focuses on the investment behaviour of pension funds. One may ask whether the pension
fund should be responsible for optimal age-dependent equity allocation, as participants may adjust their
privately held investments so that their total assets, including those managed by the pension fund, reect
their optimal allocation. There are four arguments in favour of optimal investment behaviour by the pension
fund on behalf of its participants. First, not all participants have privately held assets permitting the required
adjustment where the pension fund is suboptimal. Second, most participants of course have neither su¢ cient
nancial literacy nor the willingness to carry out such an adjustment (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007; Van Rooij,
2008). For these reasons, most pension plans take care of investment decisions, often by default. Third,
insurance companies are a very cost-ine¢ cient alternative for private o¤setting of pension fundssuboptimal
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investment behaviour (Bikker and De Dreu, 2007). And fourth, pension funds are able to broaden the
risk-bearing basis by distributing risk across generations. This option is not available to individuals.
4.3 Description of Dutch pension funds
As in most developed countries, the institutional structure of the pension system in the Netherlands is
organized as a three-pillar system. The rst pillar comprises the public pension scheme nanced on a
pay-as-you-go base. It o¤ers a basic at-rate pension to all retirees (if they were a resident in the Nether-
lands). The benet level is linked to the statutory minimum wage. The second pillar is that of fully funded
supplementarypension schemes managed by pension funds. The third pillar comprises personal savings,
which individuals undertake on their own initiative. Personal savings are generally tax-deductible, which has
arguably led to oversaving. The Dutch pension system is fairly unique in that it combines a state run pay-as-
you-go scheme in the rst pillar with funded occupational plans in the second pillar. The rst pillar implies
that young individuals cede part of their human capital to older generations in exchange for a claim on part
of the human capital of future generations. Given the life-cycle hypothesis, this type of intergenerational
risk sharing reinforces the preference of younger people to invest in equity (Heeringa, 2008).
The supplementary or occupational pension system in the Netherlands is organized mainly in the
form of funded dened-benet (DB) plans. The benet entitlement is determined by years of service and a
reference wage, which may be nal pay or the average wage over the years of service. Most Dutch pension
plans are based on average wage. Because corporate sponsors have no legal obligation to cover any shortfall
in the pension funds, the residual risk is borne by the participants themselves. This type of plan may also be
labelled as hybrid, having characteristics of both dened benet and dened contribution plans. It is partly
DB by nature in that the yearly accrual of pension rights is specied in the same way as in a traditional
DB plan, and partly DC because the yearly indexation is linked to the nancial position of the fund and
therefore related to the investment returns (Ponds and Van Riel, 2009).3
The dened-benet formula takes the public scheme into account. The DB pension funds exhibit
some intergenerational risk sharing (Ponds and Van Riel, 2009). Shock-induced peaks and troughs in the
funding ratio are smoothed over time, thanks to the long-term nature of pension funds. Pension funds
typically adjust contributions and indexation of accrued benets as instruments to restore the funding ratio.
Whereas higher contributions weigh on active participants, lower indexation hurts older participants most.4
The less exible these instruments are, the longer it takes to adjust the funding level, and the more strongly
will shocks be shared with future (active) participants. Intergenerational risk sharing extends the risk
bearing basis in terms of human capital. Gollier (2008] proposes that intergenerational risk sharing within
pension funds should lead to more risk taking by pension funds compared to individual pension plans. Thus
Dutch pension funds, with their partial reliance on intergenerational risk sharing, may be expected to invest
relatively heavily in risky assets.
There are three types of pension funds in the Netherlands. The rst is the industry-wide pension
fund, organized for a specic sector of industry (e.g. construction, health care, transport). Participation
in an industry-wide pension fund is mandatory for all rms operating in the sector. A corporate can opt
out only if it establishes a corporate pension fund that o¤ers a better pension plan to its employees than
the industry-wide fund. Where a supplementary scheme exists, either as a corporate pension fund or as
an industry-wide pension fund, participation by workers is mandatory and governed by collective labour
agreements. The third type of pension fund is the professional group pension fund, organized for a specic
group of professionals such as physicians or notaries.
3 In recent years a few corporate pension plans where designed as Collective DC plans in which the pension promise is still
based on average wage but where the contribution rate is xed for an extended, typically a ve year, period. Although employers
can treat such schemes as DC for accounting purposes, from a legal and therefore regulatory point of view they are treated as
DB schemes. Our data do not allow the distinction between DB and CDC plans.
4 In an average wage dened benet scheme, the accrued pension rights of the active members are often also subject to
conditional indexation.
53
Table 1. Pension funds in the Netherlands (end-2007)
# funds Assets Active members DBa DCa
In %
Corporate pension funds 85 27 12 90 10
Industry-wide pension funds 13 71 87 96 4
Professional group funds 2 3 1 83 17
In absolute numbers
Total 713 E 690 bln 5,559,677
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB).aFigures as per begin-2006.
The Dutch pension fund system is massive, covering 94% of the active labour force. But whereas
all employees are covered, the self-employed need to arrange their own retirement plans. As reported by
Table 1, the value of assets under management at the end of 2007 amounted to e 690 billion, or 120% of
Dutch gross domestic product (GDP). More than 85% of all pension funds are of the corporate pension fund
type. Of the remaining 15%, most are industry-wide funds, besides a small number of professional group
funds. The circa 95 industry-wide pension funds are the dominant players, both in terms of their relative
share in total active participants (> 85%) and in terms of assets under management (> 70%). Almost 600
corporate pension funds encompass over a quarter of the remaining assets, serving 12% of plan participants.
Professional group pension funds are small.
In the post-WW2 period, pension plans in the Netherlands were typically structured as nal-pay
dened benet plans with (de facto) unconditional indexation. After the turn of the century, pension funds
in the Netherlands, the US and the UK su¤ered a fall in funding ratios. In order to improve their solvency
risk management, many pension funds switched from the nal-pay plan structure to average-pay plans with
conditional indexation. In many cases, indexation is ruled by a so-called policy ladder, with indexation and
contribution tied one-to-one to the funding ratio (Ponds and Van Riel, 2009). Under an average-pay plan, a
pension fund is able to control its solvency position by changing the indexation rate.
Graph 1 documents that Dutch pension funds increased their exposure to equities over time. Between
1995 and 2007 the median equity exposure tripled from 10.8% to 31.8%. This increase over time is a combined
e¤ect of more pension funds choosing a positive equity exposure (see P10 and P25 indicating, respectively,
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4.4 Empirical results
The dataset provides information on pension fund investments and other characteristics for the year 2007.
The gures are taken from supervisory reports to De Nederlandsche Bank, the pension fundsprudential
supervisor. Pension funds in the process of liquidation that is, about to merge with another pension fund
or to reinsure their liabilities with an insurer  are exempt from reporting to DNB. The original dataset
covers 569 (reporting) pension funds, of which 472 (or 83%) invest on behalf of the pension fund beneciaries,
while the remainder are fully reinsured and do not control the investments themselves. Nineteen pension
funds do not report the average age of their participants and 54 do not report their strategic asset allocation.
Three pension funds with funding ratios above 250% were disregarded. These are typically special vehicles
designed to shelter savings from taxes and therefore not representative of the pension fund population that
is of interest here. Another three pension funds with assets worth over one million euros per participant were
excluded for the same reason, as these are typically special funds serving a small number of company board
members. These funds, as well as fteen others for which one or more explanatory model variables were
unavailable, were omitted from the regressions, so that the analysis is based on the remaining 378 pension
funds, including all large pension funds.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the dataset, with age and strategic equity allocation as
key variables. One possible age measure is the average age of all participants in a pension fund (including
active, deferred participants and retirees). This equals 50, ranging widely across pension funds between 35
and 79. An alternative operationalization of age is the average age of active participants, which equals 45,
varying across pension funds from 35 to 63. The proportion between retired and deferred participants also
varies strongly across pension funds. The share of equity in funds strategic asset allocation averages 32.9%,
but ranges from 0% to 91%. Actual equity allocation di¤ers from the strategic asset allocation due to free-
oating (meaning that asset allocation is not constantly rebalanced after stock-price changes), and averages
33.2%. Furthermore, Table 2 presents statistics on other pension fund characteristics, many of which act as
control variables in the regression (see below). The 10% and 90% percentiles show that these characteristics
tend to vary strongly. In the analysis a distinction is made between the age of active and the age of total
participants.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of our dataset including 378 pension fundsa
Variable Mean Median Other percentiles
10% 90%
Average age of active participants 45.2 44.6 39.9 50.1
Average age of all participants 50.2 49.7 41.7 59.6
Strategic equity exposure (% investments) 32.9 33.0 16.4 46.4
Actual equity allocation (in %) 33.2 33.6 17.6 46.9
Average assets of participants (Euro 1,000) 81.2 58.4 11.7 155.4
Share of retired (in %) 20.9 17.4 4.0 41.5
Share of deferred participants (in %) 42.3 40.8 23.3 65.7
Share of active participants (in %) 36.8 36.5 15.3 59.8
Funding ratio (in %) 139.4 135.4 120.2 163.9
Total assets (in million Euro) 1,791 150 20.3 2,153
Total number of participants (thousands) 42.3 2.5 0.4 43.3
Dened benet schemes (in %) 0.97 1 1 1
Dened contribution schemes (in %) 0.03 0 0 0
Industry-wide pension funds (in %) 0.20 0 0 1
Corporate pension funds (in %) 0.78 1 0 1
Professional group pension funds (in %) 0.02 0 0 0
aThe minimum number of pension funds included
Source: DNB calculations.
Average age of active participants
Most life-cycle theories suggest that the relationship between average age and equity allocation is negative
(Equation (1); see also Malkiel, 2007), while others postulate a hump-shaped relationship (Benzoni et al.,
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2007). Lucas and Zeldes (2009) investigate a relationship between the share of active participants and the
equity allocation, also assuming a non-linear age pattern: a (constant) e¤ect during the active years and zero
during the retirement years. Gerber and Weber (2007) regarded two indicators of average age: age of all
participants and age of active participants, where the latter implies a non-linear functional form of average
age, due to the truncation at retirement age. Instead of choosing one of the various specications found
in the literature, the theoretical life-cycle model expressed in Equation (1) is followed: equity investment
declining with the age of participants during their active years and remaining constant after retirement. In
Dutch regulation deferred participants are treated equal to retirees. Therefore it is fair to assume a constant
equity exposure. The baseline regression model reads:
Strategic_Asset_Allocationi = + 1Age_Activei + 2Share_retiredi+
3Share_deferredi + 4 log(size)i + 5funding_ratioi+
6DBi + 7PGPFi + 8IPF + ui
where i represents the pension fund and age active stands for the average age of each pension funds
active participants. Percentages of both retired and deferred participants (denoted by, respectively, share
retired and share deferred) incorporate the (di¤erent) constant e¤ect of each group on the equity allocation.
A control variable size is included as larger pension funds tend to invest more in equity (Bikker
and De Dreu, 2009; De Dreu and Bikker, 2009). The pension funds size is dened as its total number of
participants, where logarithms of size are taken to reduce possible heteroskedasticity. The funding ratio is
a determinant of equity allocation as a higher funding ratio provides a larger bu¤er against equity risk and
thus may encourage risk taking. A higher risk margin for equity is required under the Dutch supervisory
regime (Bikker and Vlaar, 2007). On the other hand, a high bu¤er ensures that all liabilities can be met,
reducing or even eliminating the need to take further risks if meeting liabilities is the objective of the fund.
Note that unlike the actual equity allocation strategic equity allocation is not a¤ected directly by
price shocks, although gradually, over time, it may be inuenced somewhat by trends in the stock market
(Bikker, Broeders and De Dreu, 2010). A set of dummy variables reects di¤erent types of pension plan
(DB versus DC) or pension fund (professional group pension funds (PGPF) and industry-wide pension funds
(IPF) versus corporate pension funds).5
The left-hand panel of Table 3 presents the estimation results of Equation (2), based on the average
age of active participants. A one-year increase in the average age of active participants is associated with a
drop in equity exposure of around 0.4 percentage point (rst column in Table 3).6 Unweighted estimation
attaches equal informational value to each observation of a pension fund, irrespective of whether it has ten
participants or 2.5 million. By contrast, a regression weighting each pension funds proportionally according
to its size (measured by numbers of participants), assigns equal importance to each participant. The negative
coe¢ cient of age increases to 0.5 in the weighted regression case, while its statistical signicance rises sharply.
This result conrms the negative relationship between age and risky, while it rejects the 100-agerule of
thumb, as the estimate of -0.5 is signicantly lower (in absolute terms) than -1. Results are similar in
direction but not in size to the ndings of Gerber and Weber (2007, for Switzerland) and Alestalo and
Puttonen (2006, for Finland), who nd active-agecoe¢ cients of, respectively, -0.18% and -1.73%.
5Willingness of the sponsor company to compensate investment losses could be a relevant explanatory variable also. In
practice however, we hardly observe this willingness, except for a few corporate pension funds. Industry wide pension funds
service multiple corporations and it is unlikely that losses can be fairly distributed amongst those corporations.
6The Goldfeld-Quandt test indicates that the models heteroskedasticity does not increase with pension fund size.
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Table 3. Impact of the average age of active participants on the strategic equity allocation
Equation (2) Incl. personal wealth
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat
Average age act. members -0.39 -2.50 -0.51 -5.54 -0.44 -2.88 -0.56 -6.20
Share retired participants 0.09 1.91 -0.06 -1.33 0.04 0.89 -0.12 -2.60
Share deferred participants 0.03 0.71 -0.25 -9.68 0.09 2.09 -0.17 -4.73
# participants (logs) 1.07 2.74 0.94 3.57 1.07 2.79 0.78 2.98
Funding ratio 0.20 6.86 0.28 9.51 0.20 6.89 0.27 9.46
Personal wealth (in logs) 4.03 5.21 2.23 3.74
Dummy DB plan 1.62 0.45 6.51 1.35 0.37 0.10 6.00 1.27
Dummy Professional fund 1.68 0.41 -1.17 -0.22 0.56 0.14 -0.95 -0.18
Dummy Industry-wide fund -4.14 -2.09 -0.74 -0.51 0.37 0.18 0.89 0.60
Constant 9.30 0.96 15.71 1.89 -5.02 -0.51 9.48 1.13
R2, adjusted 0.16 0.50 0.21 0.52
Number of observations 380 380 378 378
In Equation (2), the coe¢ cient of retirees is not signicant. Only in the weighted regression case
there is a small but statistically signicant reduction of the equity share for pension funds having relatively
many deferred participants. One percentage point more retirees implies a 0.25 percentage point reduction
in equity allocation. The absence of this e¤ect in the unweighted regression suggests that only the larger
pension funds take the optimal equity allocation associated with deferred participants into account. This is
conrmed when -as a robustness test- the two largest pension funds (30% of all participants) are dropped:
the two dependency ratios drop to near or total insignicance (results not shown here). Remarkably, in that
case, the absolute value of the age e¤ect increases further to 0.66.
Turning to the other determinants of the equity allocation in Table 3, one can observe that the e¤ect
of (the logarithm of) size is positive and sizeable (with values around 1) which conrms with the stylized
fact that large pension funds invest more in equity. The marginal e¤ect of size number of participants on
equity exposure is itself dependent on size, due to its logarithmic specication. An increase in the number
of participants from 10 thousand to 100 thousand is associated with an increase of equity allocation by 2.5
percentage points. The reason may be that the largest pension funds are too big to fail(major problems
cannot be ignored by the government) which leads to moral hazard. The measure of size is the total number
of participants. The variable total assets would be an alternative size measure but a drawback of total assets
might be that this measure cannot safely be regarded as exogenous, because high equity returns would for
pension funds with a high equity allocation enlarge both their size and their equity exposure. This is the
more important given that pension funds do not continuously rebalance their asset portfolios, see Bikker,
Broeders and De Dreu (2010). As a robustness check, the number of participants is replaced by total assets
as the size measure. The size coe¢ cient does not change much, and remains signicant (see Table A.1 in
Appendix I).
Pension funds with higher funding ratios invest more in equity. This is somewhat supported by
regulation, which requires that the probability of underfunding is smaller than 2.5% on a one year horizon,
see Broeders and Pröpper (2010). This permits better funded pension funds to take more risks. The
coe¢ cient of around 0.25 implies that an increase of the funding ratio by 1% translates into an increase
of the equity allocation by one quarter percentage point. Note that the funding ratio does not su¤er from
endogeneity problems, as the dependent variable is strategic not actual equity allocation. Indeed, the
actual equity exposure would be a¤ected, as high stock returns simultaneously increase both the funding
ratio and the equity allocation (at least under free-oating). Because the strategic equity allocation may
nevertheless have been adjusted to stock market developments, a lagged value of the funding ratio (that is,
2006 gures) is considered in the robustness analyses, see Section 5. As expected, the results hardly change.
The dummy variables for pension plan type or pension fund category do not have signicant coe¢ cients,
except the dummy indicating industry-wide pension funds, which points to less equity holdings. Over time,
the distinction between DB and DC pension plans is increasingly blurring, as DB plans often show also some
characteristics of DC plans (see Section 3). Furthermore, the number of DC plans is at 10% quite low while
strong a priori assumptions about equity allocation across plan types are absent.
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The goodness of t of basic equation (2), measured by the adjusted R2, rises from 0.16 for the
unweighted model to 0.50 for the weighted specication. However not too much can be made of that, as
weighting generally leads to a higher R2 since the regression is estimated as if more observations have exactly
the same relation.
In order to take the possible impact of changes in risk aversion into account, the average pension wealth
of the participants in a pension fund is added to the equity allocation model as an extra explanatory variable.
This variable is dened as total pension fund wealth per participant and reects both the average (intended)
level of the pension benets7 and the pension plans maturity. It is assumed that a similar average duration
of a participants relationship with their pension fund across all pension funds, the duration being the sum of
the endured employment contract and the endured retirement period, so that wealth reects the (intended)
level of a participants pension benets. Again logarithms of this variable are taken to reduce possible
heteroskedasticity.
The results are presented in the right-hand panel of Table 3. The coe¢ cient of (the logarithm of)
personal pension wealth is statistically signicant and varies from 4 (unweighted) to 2.2 (weighted). The
marginal e¤ect of an increase in personal wealth depends on its level, due to the logarithmic specication.
Starting from the average value of 81 thousand, an increase by one standard deviation of 78 thousand is
associated with an increase of equity allocation by 1.5 percentage points. These results indicate that pension
funds with higher wealth per participant invest relatively more in equity, thereby accepting more risk. The
active participantsage e¤ect is slightly stronger in this specication than in the model without the wealth
variable. Notably, the share of retirees now also has a signicant impact on the equity allocation. For retirees,
pension funds invest relatively less in equity and the same holds for deferred participants. The coe¢ cients
of size and funding ratio do not change after inclusion of the wealth variable. None of the dummy variables
for pension plan type or pension fund category have statistically signicant coe¢ cients. Apparently, no
systematic di¤erences remain across types of pension plan or pension fund after the incorporated model
variables have been taken into account. In fact, the alternative model including the wealth variable has a
slightly better goodness of t than equation (2).
Average age of all participants
So far, it was assumed that the average age of active participants is the key variable in explaining the
equity allocation ratio and that, as retirees no longer possess any human capital anymore, they hold a
constant fraction of their nancial wealth in equities. An alternative specication of the model involves
equal treatment of all participant categories, where the impact of age on equity allocation is concerned. This
model has been used by Malkiel (2007) and Gerber and Weber (2007). Therefore, the three age-related
variables in Equation (2) are replaced by one average age of all participants (age total), resulting in:
Strategic_Asset_Allocationi = + 1Age_Totali + 2 log(size)i+
3funding_ratioi + 4DBi + 5PGPFi + 6IPF + ui
Table 4 reports the estimation results of Equation (3). The age coe¢ cient of the average age of all
participants is now insignicant for both the unweighted and the weighted regressions (left-hand panel). If
personal wealth is added to Equation (3), the age coe¢ cient becomes signicant with a value of -0.17 and
-0.38 respectively for the unweighted and the weighted regression (right-hand panel). The all participants
average age plays a role but with smaller (negative) magnitudes and lower levels of signicance than the
active participantsaverage age in Table 3. All these outcomes point to a limited role for the all participants
average age compared to the active participantsaverage age. The results suggests that the age of active
participants is taken into account, while retirees contribute to the equity allocation with a constant, age-
independent share of equities, each of which is in line with the life-cycle hypothesis.
Other model coe¢ cients are roughly in line with what was observed before. The results of Table
3 are taken as the most convincing for three reasons. First, from an economic point of view, Equation (2)
reects a richer specication of the age-equity relationship, in line with the life-cycle hypothesis. Second,
if the average ages of both all participants and active participants are included in the models of Tables 3
and 4, the coe¢ cient of active age is larger than that of total age in all eight cases (in absolute terms),
7The average intended level of the pension benets is proportionally to the product of the participants average salary level
and its replacement rate.
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the coe¢ cient of active age is signicantly negative in all eight cases (as expected), and the coe¢ cient of
total age is never signicantly negative. Third, formal testing of Tables 3 and 4 against a general model
encompassing both Equations (2) and (3) provides evidence in favour of Table 3 (that is, Equation (2)), see
Appendix II.8 Therefore, Equation (3) is considered the most relevant estimates.
Table 4. Impact of average age of all participants on strategic equity allocation
Equation (3) Idem, including personal wealth
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat
Average age all members -0.04 -0.48 0.07 0.92 -0.17 -2.00 -0.38 -4.65
# participants (logs) 1.51 4.05 2.45 9.37 1.59 4.33 1.22 4.45
Funding ratio 0.21 7.10 0.33 9.89 0.20 6.83 0.29 9.55
Personal wealth ( logs) 3.67 5.02 3.79 8.93
Dummy DB plan 0.76 0.21 3.69 0.66 -0.60 -0.17 3.97 0.78
Dummy Professional fund 0.59 0.14 1.62 0.26 -1.81 -0.46 -0.57 -0.10
Dummy Industry-fund -5.22 -2.79 -7.11 -4.79 -0.12 -0.06 0.46 0.29
Constant -6.63 -0.92 -41.67 -5.00 -13.21 -1.86 -18.50 -2.31
R2, adjusted 0.15 0.33 0.20 0.45
Number of observations 385 385 383 383
4.5 Robustness Analysis
The specication in the previous section rests on several assumptions regarding relevant covariates, variable
denition and functional form. This section considers various departures from the assumptions underlying
Equation (2), using weighted regression.
Table 5. Alternative specications of the weighted regression model as robustness tests
Strategic equity allocation Tobit Actual equity
Incl.age2 Funding rat. lag regressiona allocation
coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-value
Average age act. members -0.51 -5.56 -0.39 -2.95 -0.50 -5.54 -0.44 -3.69
Ditto, squaredb 0.01 0.59
Share retired participants -0.05 -1.29 -0.13 -2.71 -0.06 -1.34 -0.14 -3.13
Share deferred participants -0.26 -9.39 -0.31 -10.19 -0.25 -9.71 -0.33 -12.02
# participants (in logs) 0.95 3.59 1.30 4.44 0.95 3.62 1.05 3.97
Funding ratio 0.28 9.37 0.28 9.54
Funding ratio, lag (2006) 0.19 5.65 0.16 5.15
Dummy DB plans 6.47 1.34 4.05 0.71 6.46 1.35 7.31 1.55
Dummy Professional funds -1.40 -0.26 -15.76 0.004 -1.12 -0.21 -14.01 -2.83
Dummy Industry-funds -0.77 -0.53 -2.13 0.183 -0.72 -0.50 -1.95 -1.36
Constant 16.46 1.95 26.61 0.013 15.57 1.88 34.24 3.61
R2, adjusted 0.50 0.41 0.07c 0.46
Number of observations 380 363 380 368
a There are four censored observations, that is, four observations with zero equity exposure;
b Expressed as the deviation from the average age of participants
c This is the so-called pseudo R2.
8The logarithms of model likelihood in Table 3 are substantially higher than those in Table 4. Likelihood ratio tests reject
the Equation (3) models (Table 4) in favour of the Equation (2) models (Table 3). he di¤erence in degrees of freedom is taken
into account as Equation (3) has two additional explanatory variables compared to Equation (2). The test is not a pure test
on restrictions, as one explanatory variable is di¤erent: average age of all participants versus average age of active participants.
For this test the additional ve observations in Table 3 (concerning pension funds without active participants) are excluded, so
that the same sample for both models is used.
59
As a rst approximation, it was thusfar assumed that the e¤ect of the average age of (active) participants
on the equity allocation is linear. However, Benzoni et al. (2007) suggest that the relation between age and
equity exposure may be hump-shaped rather than linear. They suggest that the age e¤ect should be positive
in the younger age cohorts, due to the positive long-term correlation between capital returns and return on
human capital (that is, the wage rate). Benzonis age-equity relation reaches a maximum around a certain
point (seven years before retirement), after which it is downward-sloping, as the long-term correlation of
wages and dividends loses relevance. A simple but e¤ective way to allow for a non-linear relationship is the
inclusion of a quadratic age term in the regression. The respective weighted regression model results show
that the age coe¢ cients are not in line with the assumption of Benzoni et al. (2007) about the investment
behaviour of pension funds (Table 5, rst column), as the squared term coe¢ cient is not signicant. Hence,
Benzonis recommendation does not apply to Dutch pension funds.
With regard to the dependent variable strategic equity allocation, several robustness checks may be
considered. First, shocks in equity prices a¤ect the funding ratio, but they may also have a certain impact on
a funds strategic equity allocation, which creates an endogeneity problem. For this reason we here lag the
funding ratio, see Table 5, second column. The results hardly change, especially in terms of signicance. The
magnitude of the (lagged) funding ratio coe¢ cient is slightly smaller here than in the unlagged specication.
Second, four pension funds have zero equity exposure. This is at odds with the OLS assumption
that the dependent variable is continuous. In practice, equity exposure is censored at 0% and 100%. One
may further argue that moving from zero equity allocation to a positive fraction requires an intrinsically
di¤erent decision than raising an already positive equity exposure. One way to address this is to omit zero
observations for equity, restricting attention to funds with positive equity allocations. This does not alter
the essence of the results (not shown here). A more elegant alternative approach is the Tobit model which
takes censoring into account. Table 5, third column, reports the Tobit outcomes. The e¤ect of age and the
other OLS results from Table 3 do not change substantially.
Third, where pension funds do not constantly rebalance their portfolio after stock price changes, the
actual equity exposure of pension funds may di¤er from their strategic equity allocation. Bikker, Broeders
and De Dreu (2010) document that pension funds assets are indeed partially free-oating. As strategic
asset allocation reects a funds actual decision, it is better suited for determining the decision-making and
conscious behaviour of pension funds. On the downside, however, this a¤ects comparability with other
studies, such as Alestalo and Puttonen (2006) and Gerber and Weber (2007). Also, while the strategic asset
allocation reects a funds intention, it does not give its actual behaviour. Table 5, right-hand columns,
documents regression results with the actual stock allocation. To avoid endogeneity, the funding ratio is
lagged by one year. Sign and size of the coe¢ cients hardly change, though the magnitude of the (lagged)
funding ratio coe¢ cient is slightly smaller than in the other regressions. Table A.2 in Appendix I repeats
Table 5 but with personal wealth as an extra explanatory variable. The results are quite similar, conrming
the robustness of the model.
Finally, the model is applied to strategic bond allocation instead of strategic equity allocation, where
a positive rather than a negative sign for age dependency is expected. The results (not shown here) deviate
slightly, as bonds are not the exact complement of equity, due to other investment categories. These estimates
conrm the age-bond relationship: the strategic bond exposure is signicantly higher when the average age
of active participants is higher.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter addresses the e¤ect of the average age of pension fundsparticipants on their strategic equity
allocation. The rst and main nding is that Dutch pension funds with older participants have signicantly
lower equity exposures than pension funds having younger participants. This negative age-dependent equity
allocation may be interpreted as an (implicit) application of the optimal life-cycle saving and investing theory.
The basic version of this theory assumes a low correlation between wage growth and stock returns. It predicts
that the vast amount of human capital of the young has a strong impact on asset allocation because of risk
diversication considerations, as human capital has a di¤erent risk prole than nancial capital.
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A second nding is that the average age of active participants has a much stronger impact on
investments than the average age of all participants. This is in line with the standard version of lifecycle
theory which suggests that retirees with depleted human capital should invest a constant fraction of their
nancial wealth in equities.
A third result is that the age e¤ect is stronger in larger pension funds than in smaller ones. Appar-
ently, larger fundsinvestment behaviour is more closely aligned with the age-dependency from the life-cycle
hypothesis. A non-linear age e¤ect allowing a hump-shaped pattern, as suggested by Benzoni et al. (2007),
could not be conrmed. However, other factors signicantly inuencing the strategic equity allocation are
pension funds size, funding ratio, and average personal pension wealth of participants, which all have positive
coe¢ cients.
This study shows that age inuences investment behavior. In itself that does not establish whether
asset allocation should depend on age and if so, in what way. If age is indeed an important factor, as this
study suggests pension funds do, cohort-specic investment policies could be considered. This would mean
that assets of an age-group are invested separately from the oter assets. This has been suggested by Teulings
and De Vries (2006) and Ponds (2008).
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4.7 Appendix Alternative estimations
This appendix tests an alternative specication of Equations (2) and (3). The left-hand panel of Table A.1
reports the impact of the average age of active participants on strategic equity allocation where the log of
total assets has been added as an explanatory variable. This variable replaces the number of participants as
a measure of size. Note that the coe¢ cient of total assets is highly signicant, implying that large pension
funds have higher equity exposures. The use of strategic equity allocation as the dependent variable reduces
possible endogeneity e¤ects. Similarly, the right-hand panel of Table A.1 shows the results for the model
with the age of all participants and total assets as size measure.
Table A.1. Impact of average age on the strategic equity allocation with total assets
Equation (2) Equation (3)
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat
Average age act. members -0.35 -2.39 -0.52 -5.84
Share retired participants 0.06 1.17 -0.08 -1.97
Share deferred participants 0.05 1.22 -0.20 -6.60
Average age all members -0.02 -0.28 -0.18 -2.72
Total assets (in logs) 1.62 4.68 1.07 4.75 1.62 4.89 2.14 12.74
Funding ratio 0.20 6.84 0.27 9.56 0.20 6.57 0.31 9.90
Dummy DB plans 1.03 0.29 6.05 1.27 -0.11 -0.03 3.54 0.69
Dummy Professional funds 0.75 0.19 -0.73 -0.14 -0.71 -0.17 0.74 0.13
Dummy Industry-funds -3.92 -2.27 -0.73 -0.58 -3.11 -1.95 -4.18 -3.60
Constant -2.09 -0.21 9.84 1.17 -12.46 -1.70 -31.76 -4.25
R2, adjusted 0.19 0.51 0.16 0.42
Number of observations 381 381 389 389
Table A.2 repeats the robustness tests of Table 5, but based on a model including personal wealth. The
conclusion remains that the analyses are robust for these kinds of changes in the specication.
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Table A.2. Alternative specications of the weighted regression model as robustness tests
Strategic equity allocation Tobit Actual equity
Incl.age2 Funding rat. lag regressiona allocation
coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-value coe¤. t-value
Average age act. members -0.58 -6.34 -0.38 -2.91 -0.56 -6.22 -0.42 -3.61
Ditto, squaredb 0.01 1.28
Share retired participants -0.12 -2.61 -0.19 -3.53 -0.12 -2.62 -0.21 -4.38
Share deferred participants -0.17 -4.85 -0.23 -5.17 -0.17 -4.75 -0.23 -5.79
# participants (logs) 0.78 3.00 1.18 4.03 0.79 3.03 0.88 3.37
Funding ratio 0.27 9.23 0.27 9.5
Funding rat, lag 0.19 5.72 0.16 5.31
Personal wealth (in logs) 2.35 3.91 1.86 2.64 2.22 3.76 2.37 3.84
Dummy DB plans 5.88 1.24 3.41 0.60 5.95 1.26 5.10 1.09
Dummy Professional fund -1.44 -0.27 -0.95 -0.18 -0.91 -0.17 -14.23 -2.93
Dummy Industry-fund 0.91 0.62 0.89 0.60 0.9 0.62 -0.11 -0.07
Constant 10.72 1.28 9.48 1.13 9.35 1.13 24.16 2.49
R2, adjusted 0.52 0.43. 0.08c 0.48
Number of observations 378 362 378 367
a There are four censored observations, that is, four observations with zero equity exposure;
b Expressed as the deviation from the average age of participants
c This is the pseudo R2.
Testing alternative model specications for the impact of demographic variables
Table A.3 presents estimation results for a more general model of the impact of demographic variables on
pension fundsstrategic equity allocation, which encompasses both Equations (2) and (3). This specication
allows testing of the models of these equations. Equation (2) results when the coe¢ cients of the average ages
of retired and deferred participants and the three interaction terms are jointly set to zero, while Equations (3)
is obtained when the coe¢ cients of the three average ages and the shares of retired and deferred participants
are all set to zero while at the same time, the coe¢ cients of the three interaction terms are assumed identical.
Note that Equations (2) and (3) are not nested, so that the two alternatives cannot be tested against each
other.
Table A.3. A general model for the impact of demographic variables on strategic equity allocation
General model Idem, including personal wealth
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted
coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat coe¤. t-stat
Average age active members -0.50 -1.92 -0.50 -2.70 -0.60 -2.38 -0.79 -4.02
Average age retired members 0.02 0.09 -0.20 -1.00 -0.10 -0.57 -0.61 -2.71
Average age deferred members 0.12 0.28 1.04 2.32 0.05 0.12 1.00 2.28
Share retired participants 1.96 3.21 0.72 0.87 0.78 1.21 -0.46 -0.53
Share deferred participants 0.00 0.01 -0.31 -0.76 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.30
Interaction age&share active 0.00 0.20 -0.01 -0.87 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.19
Interaction age&share retired -0.02 -2.56 -0.02 -1.29 -0.01 -0.81 0.00 0.34
Interaction age&share deferred 0.00 0.27 -0.01 -0.73 0.00 0.58 -0.01 -0.74
# participants (in logs) 0.96 2.43 1.21 4.51 1.00 2.60 1.11 0.27
Funding ratio 0.21 7.00 0.29 9.92 0.19 6.55 0.27 9.41
Personal wealth (in logs) 4.01 4.68 2.66 3.83
Dummy DB plan 1.82 0.49 5.51 1.12 1.77 0.49 7.08 1.47
Dummy Professional fund -1.23 -0.28 -4.53 -0.78 -2.07 -0.49 -4.20 -0.74
Dummy Industry-wide fund -3.15 -1.56 -2.44 -1.66 0.68 0.32 -0.27 -0.17
Constant -1.44 -0.05 7.61 0.26 -8.63 -0.31 4.63 0.16
R2, adjusted 0.17 0.53 0.22 0.55
Number of observations 377 377 377 377
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Using an F-test for restrictions, only one model, Equation (2) with personal wealth (unweighted), is
not rejected at the 5% signicance level, while a second model, Equation (2) without personal wealth
(unweighted), is not rejected at the 1% signicance level. All four Equation (3) models considered, with
and without personal wealth and weighted as well as unweighted, are rejected, even at the 1% signicance
level. For all four models, the F-test statistic is higher for Equation (3) than for Equation (2), reecting
that Equation (3) is rejected more strongly (in three cases) or rejected instead of not rejected (one case).
This conrms the empirical evidence and theoretical arguments in favour of Equation (2). Apart from the
restrictions, the coe¢ cients in Table A.3 are informative as well: the consistent and signicant coe¢ cient
of the average age of active participants, and the non- signicance of the other demographic coe¢ cients is
noteworthy and adds to the evidence favouring Equation (2) over Equation (3).
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Chapter 5
Can pension funds improve welfare by
lifting borrowing constraints?
5.1 Introduction
1 An important outcome of life-cycle saving and investing models is that the optimal investment strategy of
individuals depends on their age. The proportion of nancial assets invested in risky stock should decrease
over the life-cycle, thereby increasing the proportion of relatively safer bonds. The reason for the negative
age-dependence of investment risk is that the young have more human capital than older workers. This
means that a young worker can diversify stock risk with his or her human capital.
A pension fund may increase participants welfare by investing the nancial capital of di¤erent
generations according to generation-specic investment rules. A pension fund can do this with generational
accounts, see Teulings and de Vries (2006). With generational accounts the nancial capital of each generation
is completely separated from the nancial capital of other generations. The nancial capital of a generation
can subsequently be invested in line with the risk preferences of that generation. This may improve welfare
compared to a situation where the nancial capital of each generation is invested according to the same,
uniform investment rule. The possibility of an age-dependent investment strategy for each generation is a
rst feature of generational accounts.
A second feature of generational accounts is that it avoids intergenerational conicts over which
generation should bear nancial losses if the nancial position of a pension fund deteriorates (or conicts
over which generation is entitled to nancial gains of a pension fund). Intergenerational conicts can arise
if property rights of the assets of a pension fund are fuzzy, that is, if the pension contract is incomplete
and does not unambiguously assign property rights in all future contingencies. As it is di¢ cult to write
a complete contract, in particular over long time intervals, any deviation from generational accounts then
comes with the risk of intergenerational conicts. Such conicts typically arise if the pension fund is in a
di¢ cult nancial position and the pension fund has to take nancial losses.
Conicts over which generation should shoulder the losses can indeed be witnessed today in many
pension funds, now that the credit crisis has negatively impacted the nancial position of many pension
funds; see van Ewijk (2009) for a discussion of the situation in the Netherlands. To restore the nancial
position of the pension fund, young generations typically want the pension fund to decrease benets, whereas
older generations want to raise contributions. Related to this distributional conict over contributions and
benets is a discussion about the risk level. Older generations may feel that the pension fund is taking too
much risk, whereas younger generations want to increase risks as they are less risk-averse. This di¤erence
1This chapter is written with Mario Bersem. An earlier version was published as Netspar Discussion paper 10/2010-063 and
AIAS working paper no. 99.
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in risk-appetite is a direct consequence of the age-dependence of the optimal investment strategy. Again,
generational accounts with ring-fenced nancial capital avoid such conicts over the risk level.
Generational accounts may thus come with several advantageous features. However, with genera-
tional accounts some generations may not be able to implement their optimal investment strategy if they
are borrowing constrained, that is, if their optimal investment strategy is to borrow in order to invest in
stocks. For example, Teulings and De Vries (2006) calculate that young workers should go short in bonds
equal around 5.5 times their annual salary to invest in stock. In this case, the rst feature of generational
accounts, an age-dependent investment strategy, cannot be implemented optimally. The market is thus in-
complete and the market solution that is implemented by strictly separated generational accounts is therefore
ine¢ cient. The message of this chapter is that in this case a pension fund with mandatory participation
may overcome the market incompleteness and improve welfare. It can do this by facilitating that the young
borrow from the old. In this way the borrowing constraint of the young is lifted. A pension fund is in a
unique position to facilitate optimal borrowing against human capital because participation in a pension
fund is mandatory. When the young borrow against human capital, they have a commitment problem. They
want to borrow against their human capital, because this is optimal ex-ante, while promising to repay in
case stock return is low. However, when the young indeed need to repay, they have an incentive to renege
on their promise. Therefore insurance companies without mandatory participation cannot enable the young
to borrow against human capital. A pension fund with mandatory participation may be able to enforce the
promise of the young to repay the old out of human capital. Mandatory participation thereby acts as a
commitment device for the young to repay their debt if they borrow against human capital.
The model consists of a pension fund that has two types of participants, young and old. The pension
fund invests the nancial capital of both groups on the capital market, which consists of a risk-free bond and
risky stock. The young have more human capital than older workers and want to go short in bonds, that is,
they want to borrow. The young are assumed to be borrowing constrained and strictly separated generational
accounts are thus sub-optimal. It is shown that the pension fund can lift the borrowing constraint if the
pension fund has two additional features vis-à-vis generational accounts. First, it needs to be able to
determine the investment strategy at the pension fund level. Second, it needs to be able to give negative
benets to (young) participants. Negative benets are interpreted as contributions that the pension fund
levies on the young. With this extension of the possibilities of the pension fund, the optimal investment
strategy for both the old and the young can be implemented.
With the two additional features, the pension fund can improve welfare. The borrowing constraint
is essentially lifted by (implicitly) letting the young borrow from the old. The young can thereby invest more
in stock than they otherwise could. As a consequence the risk level of the pension fund as a whole increases.
The young need to repay the implicit debt to the old with their nancial capital and, if this does not su¢ ce
when stock return is low, with their human capital. In the case that young participants borrowed against
human capital, they pay contributions to the pension fund which redirects it to the old. This is why the
pension fund needs to be able to give negative benets, i.e. levy contributions.
The deviation from generational accounts may however introduce a generational conict if contri-
butions cannot be raised automatically, for example due to legal limits or resistance of young participants.
The young then essentially have a commitment problem; they want to borrow against their human capital,
promising to pay contributions in case stock return is low. However, if they need to repay via contributions,
they have an incentive to renege on their promise and such a promise may not be enforceable by the pension
fund. In that case, pension fund governance becomes important. If the board of the pension fund decides
about contributions, the old will want to be represented on the board to ensure that they are repaid in full.
However, the young wish to avoid seeing the old abuse their position to increase contributions beyond what
is e¢ cient ex-ante, so the young need to be represented adequately as well. The risk level of the pension fund
ex-ante thus can not be separated from the contribution policy ex post; good pension fund governance takes
this into account and considers both simultaneously through the adequate representation of both groups on
the board.
When governance cannot solve the commitment problem, the rst-best solution cannot be imple-
mented. A second-best solution is that the risk level is scaled back to a level such that the young never
borrow against human capital. This risk immunization policy is sub-optimal compared to the rst-best so-
lution, but is welfare-enhancing compared to strictly separated accounts. With a risk immunization policy,
the young can still borrow but only with their nancial capital as collateral.
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This chapter relates to the literature on life-cycle saving and investing models; for an overview, see
Bovenberg et al. (2007). This literature originated with Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969) who proposed
that individuals should optimally maintain a constant proportion invested in stocks throughout their lives.
A restrictive assumption of these models is that investors have no human capital. This assumption is clearly
problematic; if labor income is included in the life-cycle model, the optimal allocation of nancial capital of
individuals changes over their life-cycle, see Bodie et al. (1992). The central outcome of later models is that
the optimal proportion of nancial assets invested in stocks decreases with age, while the proportion invested
in relatively safer bonds increases. The reason is that young individuals have risk-free human capital and
can thereby increase their exposure to risky stocks, because they already implicitly hold a risk-free asset
with their human capital.
The negative relationship between age and stock exposure is usually derived under the assumption
that human capital is riskless. However, Benzoni et al. (2007) propose that the short run correlation is
indeed small, but that labor income and capital income are co-integrated in the longer run, as the shares of
wages and prots in national income are fairly constant. This nding implies that the risk prole of young
workershuman capital is more stock-like and that they should therefore hold their nancial capital in the
form of safe bonds to o¤set the high risk exposure in their human capital. Benzoni et al. suggest that the
optimal stock exposure of nancial capital is hump-shaped over the life cycle: co-integration between human
capital and stock returns dominates in the rst part of working life, whereas the decline in human capital
accounts for the negative age-dependency of optimal stock holdings later in life.
While the exact structure of the age-dependence of optimal stock exposure is clearly an important
issue, it is not pertinent to the message of this chapter. The aim of this chapter is not to determine the exact
optimal stock exposure over the life-cycle; rather it is to show that if a generation is borrowing constrained,
be it the young or the old, then the pension fund is in a position to improve welfare, but that lifting the
borrowing constraint has consequences for pension fund governance. This constitutes the contribution to
the literature on life-cycle saving and investing models. The literature typically abstracts from problems
arising from the collateralization of human capital and does not address how to lift the borrowing constraint.
Instead it is implicitly assumed that these can be lifted via markets. This may however be problematic
for at least three reasons. First and foremost, it is di¢ cult to borrow against (future) human capital from
insurance companies. Insurance companies cannot levy contributions ex post, whereas a pension fund with
mandatory participation can do so. Second, insurance companies are generally cost-ine¢ cient which may
o¤set investment gains; see Bikker and de Dreu (2009). Third, relatively few individuals are active on the
stock market and it would involve high xed costs to become active. The lifting of borrowing constraints
may indeed be an advantage of pension funds over insurance companies.
A strong assumption of the model is that a truly risk-free asset is available. This is a reasonable
assumption for a small pension fund. However, a large pension fund internalizes that buying a risk-free asset
implies that risk is shifted to the party underwriting the risk-free asset. That is, if retirees buy government
bonds -which come closest to a safe asset- it are ultimately the tax-payers -thus the workers- that take on the
risk of repaying the bonds in every contingency. Contrary to a small pension fund, a large pension fund will
have a non-negligible e¤ect on price and volume of bonds traded, and will thus internalize that the group
of tax-payers largely coincides with the group of young participants. This chapter considers a variation of
the model in which there is no riskless asset. Instead there is only risky stock available. In this case, it
is optimal that the young and the old swap risks, that is, that the young insure the old against low stock
return, in exchange for a larger claim on capital if the return is high. The reason that it is optimal for the
young to take more risks is that they, as before, are less risk-averse due to their human capital. The pension
fund can facilitate the exchange of risks between the young and the old by setting up an internal market on
which the young and old swap risks. So again, the pension fund is in a position to improve welfare. The
main di¤erence with the base-line model is that the old now also prot from the pension fund. It remains
possible that the young pledge human capital as collateral. In this case, they receive negative benets from
the pension fund, that is, they pay contributions. Therefore, pension fund governance remains important to
address the exchange of risks ex-ante and contributions ex post simultaneously.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a small pension fund
in the case of strictly separated generational accounts; it then shows how the pension fund can alleviate
borrowing constraints by adjusting its investment strategy, and contribution policy and nally it discusses the
consequences for pension fund governance. The third section considers the situation without the availability
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of a riskless asset, while the last section concludes.
5.2 A small pension fund
The model considers a pension fund with mandatory participation. The pension fund consists of two groups
that di¤er in one respect and one respect only, namely the size of human capital relative to nancial capital.
There is a group with relatively large human capital and this group is referred to as young (y). The other
group does not have human capital and is referred to as old (o). The young are endowed with two types of
capital: (i) human capital, denoted by H > 0, and (ii) nancial capital, denoted by Fy > 0. One may think
of H as the present discounted value of future wages. The old are retired and have only nancial capital
Fo > 0. The number of young is denoted by Ny > 0 and the number of old by No > 0. The relative size of
the young is given by n  NyNo .
The pension fund invests the nancial capital of participants on their behalf on the capital market.
The capital market consists of a riskless asset (bond) and a risky asset (stock). The riskless asset yields a
(gross) return of r. The stock return, denoted rs, is Bernoulli distributed where 0 < p < 1:
rs =

r with probability p
r with probability 1  p
The following relation holds:
r > r > r > 0 (5.1)
There is a nonnegative stock premium  > 0, where
  pr + (1  p)r   r (5.2)
The pension arrangement can be interpreted as a Dened-Contribution plan. That is, the pension fund
invests the assets on behalf of the participants without guaranteeing a certain benet. The pension fund
is small in the sense that from the perspective of the fund: (i) asset prices are exogenous, and (ii) there is
a risk-free bond available. The availability of a riskless bond here means that the pension fund does not
internalize that macro-risk exists and that this has to be borne by some party. That is, if one group owns a
riskless bond -for example government bonds-, this means that some other party -the tax-payer- will bear the
underlying risk that comes with underwriting the bond in every contingency. A small pension fund can buy
bonds with negligible e¤ects for tax-payers and thus for its own participants. However, a large pension fund
should consider that the group of tax-payers largely coincides with the group of its own (young) participants
or more generally, that there is no such thing as a riskless bond from a macro-perspective. The next section
considers an extension in which there is no riskless bond available.
Members of both groups are risk averse and derive utility over total wealth. Utility of the old is then
given by:
Uo  u( bPo) (5.3)
where u is a standard felicity function (u0 > 0 and u00 < 0) and bPo denotes the nancial pay-outs from the
pension fund to the old. How pay-outs to participants relate to their nancial capital and the investment
policy of the pension fund, is addressed below. Utility of young agents is analogously given by:
Uy  u( bPy +H) (5.4)
Here bPy denotes the nancial pay-outs from the pension fund to the young. Unless stated otherwise, a
log felicity function u(x) = ln(x) is used.
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5.2.1 Separated generational accounts
The rst situation that is considered is a situation with generational accounts that are strictly separated.
Financial capital of both groups is completely ring-fenced. The pension fund invests the nancial capital of
a generation (young or old) on behalf of that generation and according to a generation-specic investment
rule. Here there are two generations -the young and the old- and the pension fund invests the nancial
capital of these two groups separately. Alternatively, this situation can be thought of as a situation in which
each participant has an individual account, and his or her nancial capital is invested by the pension fund
on his or her behalf.
The pension fund then has two decisions to make: (i) how to invest the nancial capital of the young,
(ii) how to invest the nancial capital of the old. The pay-outs ( bPy and bPo) follow directly from the stock
exposure of the young and old; the pension fund is not allowed to withhold any of the post-return nancial
capital invested on behalf of participants and is also not able to increase pay-outs, as the pension fund does
not have a capital bu¤er of its own.
This sub-section derives the optimal investment strategy for participants of both groups. Participants
are assumed to be borrowing constrained, that is, they cannot borrow outside the pension fund. It is shown
that the optimal investment strategy may for that reason be unfeasible. The next subsection considers how
a pension fund can lift a binding borrowing constraint and the consequences for pension fund governance.
Now, consider rst the optimal stock exposure of the young. Maximizing utility, the young solve the
following maximization problem where y represents the fraction of nancial capital invested in stocks:
maxy p ln[Fy(yr + (1  y)r) +H] + (1  p) ln[Fy(yr + (1  y)r) +H]
Taking the derivative with respect to y the rst order condition (FOC) becomes:
p(r   r)
Fy(yr + (1  y)r) +H
+
(1  p)(r   r)
Fy(yr + (1  y)r) +H
= 0 (5.5)
The optimal stock exposure, denoted y, is the solution of equation 5.5:
y =
(H + Fyr)[p(r   r) + (1  p)(r   r)]
Fy(r   r)(r   r)
=
(H + Fyr)
Fy(r   r)(r   r)
:= y (5.6)
Note that y > 0, as the equity premium, given by , is strictly positive. Note further that it is possible
that y > 1. In that case the young want to go short in bonds, that is, they want to invest borrowed money
on the stock market.
Comparative statics are such that the optimal stock exposure increases when human capital holdings
increase and decreases if nancial capital increases.2 The intuition is that the young have implicit bond
exposure through their human capital, as both human capital and bonds are risk-free. This in turn renders
a higher stock exposure optimal if the young have relatively much human capital.
If the pension fund invests the nancial capital of the young according to equation 5.6, then the
young receive from the pension fund:
P y = Fy(

yr
s + (1  y)r) (5.7)





















] = p ln[Fy(

yr + (1  y)r) +H] + (1  p) ln[Fy(yr + (1  y)r) +H]
What is the optimal stock exposure for the old? The old essentially face the same type of maxi-




(r   r)(r   r) (5.8)
The expression for o follows by substituting H = 0 in equation 5.6. Also here, it is possible that
o > 1; in that case the old want to invest borrowed money in stocks. The optimal pay-out to the old,
denoted P o , is given by:
P o = Fo(

or
s + (1  o)r) (5.9)
The resulting expected utility in this case is given by:
Uo  E[u(P o )]






It follows that o is always smaller than 

y, irrespective of the value of nancial capital of the two groups.
That is, y > 

o 8 H; Fy; Fo > 0. The intuition is that the young already (implicitly) hold a riskless asset
with their human capital, thereby increasing the optimal stock exposure of their nancial capital.
There are now three possible congurations for the optimal stock exposure of the old and the young.
(i) o < 

y 5 1; in this case the optimal stock exposure for both the young and the old can be
implemented, because neither need to borrow. The resulting (expected) utility for the young and the old is
given by Uy and U

o respectively.
(ii) y > 

o > 1; in this case both groups want to go short in bonds, that is, both groups want to
borrow. It was however ruled out that participants can borrow outside the pension fund. Neither group can
then -via the pension fund- implement its preferred stock exposure. The best the pension fund can do is to
set y = o = 1 and pay out to both groups the post-return nancial capital that results from that stock
allocation.
(iii) y > 1 = o; in this case the old can -again, via the pension fund- implement their preferred stock
allocation. The young cannot, as they need to borrow and they are borrowing constrained. The borrowing
constraint strictly decreases welfare for the young as the stock allocation that maximizes their utility cannot
be implemented. Due to their borrowing constraint, the young alternatively invest all of their nancial
capital in stocks, that is, y = 1 instead of y > 1.
The overall stock exposure of the pension fund in case (iii) when the young are borrowing constrained








What is the utility of both groups in this case? Expected utility of the old is given by Uo . The young
do not receive expected utility Uy as they are borrowing constrained but instead receive:
U bcy  p ln[Fyr +H] + (1  p) ln[Fyr +H]
The remainder of this section exclusively focuses on case (iii): the situation that the old do not want to
borrow (and might want to lend) while the young do want to borrow.
From now on it is assumed then, that parameters are such that
y > 1 = o (5.11)
so that the young wish to borrow at the risk-free rate and invest the proceeds in the risky stock.
5.2.2 Lifting the borrowing constraint
Optimal investment decisions for the young and the old were derived in the previous subsection. If 5.11 holds,
the optimal investment strategy cannot be implemented with strictly separated generational accounts, as
the young are borrowing constrained. Could welfare be improved by the pension fund relaxing the strict
separation of the two accounts? The pension fund may indeed be able to lift the borrowing constraint -and
thereby improve welfare- by setting up an internal market on which the young borrow from the old. The
pension fund consists of a group -the young- that wants to borrow and a group -the old- that might want to
lend. There is thus a potential gain from trade which the pension fund can exploit.
This subsection considers this possibility. Now, the pension fund still invests the nancial capital of
both groups on their behalf, but the pension fund has the following two features:
(a) It does not need to take separate investment decisions for both groups. Instead it can directly decide
how to allocate the total nancial capital of the pension fund -given by F  NyFy +NoFo- over stocks and
bonds. The pension fund as a whole remains borrowing constrained.
(b) Pay-outs to young participants are allowed to be negative. That is, after capital return has mate-
rialized, the young may have to pay the pension fund. The pension fund then levies a contribution on the
young, which has to be paid out of human capital. The contributions are redistributed to the old. Formally,
the pension fund can set a contribution 0 5 h 5 1 which results in a transfer equal to hH from a young
participant to the pension fund, which redistributes it to older workers.
The pension fund further needs to meet the following condition:
(c) The pay-outs to both groups need to be such that the participants are not worse o¤ than in the
situation with strictly separated generational accounts, as described in the previous subsection. That is,
expected utility resulting from the pay-outs of the pension fund needs to be at least U bcy for the young and
Uo for the old.
The pension fund now has to decide on (i) the overall investment strategy, (ii) pay-outs to the young
and the old. Suppose the pension fund wants to implement the optimal stock exposure and the resulting
pay-outs for both the young and the old, given by equations 5.7 and 5.9.
If the optimal stock exposure for both groups is implemented, the overall stock exposure of the fund,








The pension fund thus invests fbF in stocks and (1 fb)F in bonds, resulting in total post return
nancial capital Frsfb + Fr(1  fb).
The optimal stock allocation of the fund is only feasible if fb 5 1, that is, if:
nyFy + 

oFo 5 nFy + Fo , Fo(1  o) = n(y   1)Fy (5.13)
This condition states that the total nancial capital that the old want to lend exceeds the total amount
the young want to borrow. If this condition is met, the pension fund can lift the entire borrowing constraint.
Note that if n decreases, which indicates that there are relatively more old participants, this condition is
more easily fullled. Unless stated otherwise, it is assumed that condition 5.13 holds, motivated by the
observation that the old generally have (much) more nancial capital than young workers. If this condition
is not met, there is still scope for the young to borrow from the old, but the young cannot borrow the optimal
amount.
Now, when capital return has materialized, the pension fund pays out P o to the old and P

y to
the young. The pension fund thus needs to pay out in total: NoP o + NyP

y . It is easy to show that this
is exactly equal to the post-return nancial capital of the fund, given by Frsfb + Fr(1   fb), that is:
Frsfb + Fr(1   fb) = NoP o + NyP y .3 This shows that if the pension fund invests its total nancial
capital F according to 5.12, it can exactly pay out the optimal amount P o and P

y to all young and old
participants.
Now, it is perfectly possible that P y < 0 if r = r. As can be seen from equation 5.7, this is the case
when:
yr < (1  y)r (5.14)
In that case, the young have a negative pay-out when stock return is low, that is, they then need to pay





The young pay hH to the pension fund, which pays it out to the old. While such a negative pay-out is
clearly welfare-decreasing for the young ex post, it is ex-ante welfare-increasing, as the pay-out maximizes
expected utility.





for the young and the old respectively. This is strictly welfare-improving for the young, whereas the welfare
of the old does not decrease. The relaxation of the strictly separated generational accounts thus leads to a
Pareto improvement.
How has the pension fund improved welfare? The pension fund has essentially lifted the borrowing
constraint of the young by allowing them to (implicitly) borrow from the old. That is, the pension fund has
implicitly set up an internal market on which the young can borrow from the old. The policy of the pension
fund, characterized by equations 5.12, 5.7 and 5.9, is equivalent to the old extending credit to the young.
To see this, consider again case (iii) in the previous subsection, where the young were borrowing
constrained. Suppose the pension fund enabled each young worker to borrow B from the old, where
B  (y   1)Fy
The young can then invest B + Fy = yFy in stocks, which is exactly their optimal investment
strategy. After stock return has been realized, the young need to repay, via the pension fund, rB. The
3Frsfb + Fr(1  fb) = (yNyFy + oNoFo)rs + r(NyFy +NoFo)  r(yNyFy + oNoFo) =
NyFy(yr
s + (1  y)r) +NoFo(ors + (1  o)r) = NoP o +NyP y
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young can invest according to investment strategy 5.6, resulting in pay-outs according to 5.7. For the old
it does not matter whether they lend to the young or on an anonymous capital market, therefore they can
continue to invest according to investment strategy 5.8, resulting in pay-outs according to equation 5.9. The
only restriction is that the maximum amount that all older participants are willing to lend to the young is
enough to allow each young worker to borrow B. That is, the optimal stock exposure for both groups is
feasible if:
Fo(1  o) = nB (5.16)
Condition 5.16 is equivalent to condition 5.13. It states that the maximum amount that old participants
are willing to lend exceeds the total amount the young want to borrow.
After the stock return has materialized, the young repay the old. Now, when the stock return is
low, the young may need to repay (partly) out of their human capital that -in that case- served as collateral.





This condition is equivalent to 5.14 and compares the amount that has to be paid back to the old, rB,
with the total post-return nancial capital of a young participant in case stock return is low. If the latter is
smaller than the rst, human capital is required to repay. That is, the young have borrowed against their
human capital. In the context of pension funds, this implies the pension fund levies pension contributions
on the young. Alleviating the borrowing constraint of the young thus results in a direct link between the
risk level ex-ante of a pension fund and the contribution policy ex post.





And this expression is equivalent to 5.15. The pension policy of the pension fund given by investment
strategy 5.12 and pay-outs to the young according to equation 5.7 and according to equation 5.9 to the old,
is thus equivalent to the old extending credit to the young. In this way the borrowing constraint of the young
is lifted, which strictly improves welfare of the young and does not decrease welfare of the old. The young
can go short in bonds, in line with their preferences, whereas the old lend, in line with their preferences.
This again shows the welfare-enhancing role of pension funds.
It is worth re-examining equation 5.12. When the optimal stock exposure is implemented, the overall












By lifting the borrowing constraint of the young, the overall stock exposure of the pension fund,
given by fb, has increased. This can be seen by comparing 5.10 to 5.19 and noting that y > 1. Lifting the
borrowing constraint for the young -which improves welfare- thus comes with higher stock exposure of the
pension fund as a whole. Indeed, lifting the borrowing constraint can be a justication to increase the risk
level of the pension fund -given by stock exposure- compared to a situation where each generation (or each
participant) has a separate account and the nancial capital on that account is invested without allowing
borrowing between generation.
Note that a decrease of n -which can be interpreted as aging- leads to a lower risk level. This is in line
with empirical ndings. The previous chapter documented that Dutch pension funds with older participants
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decrease their risk level. An increase in the average participantsage by one year is associated with a decrease
of half a percentage point of the stock exposure. Other studies nd this as well, see Alestalo and Puttonen
(2006) and Gerber and Weber (2007) for analyses of Finnish and Swiss pension funds respectively. Lucas
and Zeldes (2009) on the other hand do not nd a signicant relation between the proportion invested in
stocks by American pension funds and the share of active participants.4
5.2.3 A potential commitment problem: the role of pension fund governance
The preceding subsection has shown that a pension fund can improve welfare by alleviating the borrowing
constraint of the young. The pension fund can also enable the young to borrow against human capital if
this is optimal. This results in negative pay-outs to the young in case stock return is low. Negative pay-outs
are interpreted here as pension contributions that the pension fund levies on the young. A pension fund can
facilitate optimal borrowing against human capital because participation in a pension fund is mandatory. The
young essentially face a commitment problem; they want to borrow against their human capital, because this
is optimal ex-ante, while promising to repay via contributions to the pension fund ex post in case stock return
is low. However, once the young indeed need to repay, they have an incentive to renege on their promise.
Therefore insurance companies without mandatory participation cannot enable the young to borrow against
human capital. A pension fund with mandatory participation can in principle enforce the promise of the
young to repay the old, when necessary, out of human capital. Mandatory participation hence acts as a
commitment device for the young to repay their debt if they borrow against human capital.
However, if contributions cannot be raised automatically, for example due to resistance of young
participants ex post, intergenerational conicts may arise. That is, feature (b) of the pension fund could
prove impossible. Implementing the optimal investment strategy for both groups according to equations 5.6
and 5.8 is thus not feasible if condition 5.17 holds (optimally, the young borrow against human capital) and
if the young are not able or not willing to repay the implicit debt to the old that results from implementing
the optimal investment strategies. This shows that the investment strategy of the pension fund cannot be
divorced from the contribution policy.
As said, the pension fund allows the young to borrow from the old and negative pay-outs to the
young imply that the young have borrowed against their human capital. Now, in the most extreme case
the pension fund cannot levy any contributions. In that case the young repay ryFy instead of rB
. As
condition 5.17 holds, this means that the old are not repaid in full5 and therefore their utility decreases
vis-à-vis the situation that their nancial capital is invested separately by the pension fund according to
equation 5.8. Conversely, if the young do not use human capital to pay o¤ their debt, they essentially have
a form of limited liability, similar to shareholders of a company, see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Sharpe
(1976). That is, once all their nancial capital is lost when stock return is low, they do not face further
losses, irrespective of the size of the borrowed amount. The young would then become quasi-shareholders
who can reap the benets of investing B in stocks but do not bear (all) losses. The old then become
quasi-bondholders of the fund with a xed claim on the young (rB) but with downside (default) risk.
4 In this section the pension fund allows the young participants to (implicitly) borrow from the old participants. The interest
rate against which the young borrow from the old is the internal interest rate of the pension fund. This internal rate is assumed
to be equal to the return on risk-free bonds on the capital market; the return on risk-free bonds is the external interest rate.
The assumption that the internal interest rate is equal to the external interest rate simplies the analysis but is somewhat
restrictive. The external interest rate does provide a lower bound for the interest rate that the old will accept; that is, the old
will not voluntarily lend against an interest rate that is lower than the interest rate against which they can lend outside the
pension fund. However, there is no fundamental reason that the internal interest rate cannot exceed the external interest rate.
A direct consequence of this assumption is that the old do not prot from the implicit nancial transaction between young and
old participants. While the assumption that the internal and external interest rates are equal is in itself restrictive, the message
of this chapter does not depend on this assumption and also applies if the internal interest rate does not equal the external
interest rate. Once a subset of participants are borrowing constrained, a pension fund with mandatory participation is in a
unique position to improve welfare.
5Post-return nancial capital of the old equals (oFo+n

yFy)r+r[(1 o)Fo n(y 1)Fy ] instead of oFor+r(1 o)Fo.
The di¤erence between the rst and latter expression is: nyFyr   nr(y   1)Fy = yFyr   rB < 0, where the inequality
follows from condition 5.17.
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This indicates that negative pay-outs (resulting from borrowing against human capital) may come
with a commitment problem. The young essentially want to invest borrowed money in stocks, simultane-
ously promising to pay contributions in case the return on stocks is low. However, once low stock return
indeed materializes, the young have an incentive to break their promise, that is, such a promise may not
be enforceable by the pension fund. This commitment problem could be solved if the young voluntarily
relinquish their own power to resist higher contributions. Control over contribution could be handed over to
the pension fund, giving the fund discretionary power to determine both the risk level of the pension fund
and the contribution policy.
From the perspective of the old, a credible contribution policy would involve board representation
of the old. However, the old may abuse their control over contributions to transfer more than necessary,
redistributing from the young to the old through higher contributions. The commitment problem is then
replaced by a dictatorship game where the old are the dictatordictating their desired contribution level,
which is as high as possible.
There is thus a natural trade-o¤ when determining the composition of the board of the pension
fund. Borrowing against human capital by the young from the old introduces a commitment problem, that
can be solved by handing control over contribution policy to the pension fund board, in which the old are
represented. When doing so, too much control for the old board members may in turn lead to excessive
contributions. This suggests that control over contributions has to be shared in a balanced way between the
young and the old.
What a balanced representation would mean is not formally modeled here. If condition 5.17 is not
met, contributions do not need to be raised and the old do not need to be represented. If condition 5.17 is
met, human capital needs to be transferred from the young to the old. An e¢ cient board composition would
result in contributions -as a percentage of H- equal to h, given in equation 5.18. Now, the young prefer
h = 0 whereas the old prefer h = 1. If the pension fund board takes a weighted average of the contribution
preferred by its board members, then an e¢ cient weight for the old in the board would be h, that is, the
percentage of the board members representing the old should equal 100h.
5.2.4 Risk immunization policy
If the commitment problem cannot be solved and negative pay-outs are not possible, a second-best solution
is to limit the risk level ex-ante such that the young do not borrow against human capital and there are no
negative pay-outs to the young. It should be noted that an insurance company can in principle provide this
arrangement as well, as mandatory participation is no longer needed as a commitment device to enable the
young to borrow against human capital. The pension fund is still able to choose the investment strategy at
the level of the pension fund, according to feature (a). However, feature (b) that allows negative pay-outs
no longer applies. What investment strategy and pay-outs could the pension fund choose if it has to meet
condition (c) and wants to improve welfare for both groups as much as possible?
It is then useful to follow the interpretation that the young borrow from the old. Borrowing by the
young is now restricted to the maximum that they can repay with nancial capital as collateral. That is,
they do not need their human capital to repay and the pension fund does not need to levy a contribution.
This maximum restricted amount that the young can borrow, denoted by Br, results from the following
condition:
Brr = (Br + Fy)r ) Br(r   r) = Fyr ) Br = Fyrr r
This is the maximum total amount that can be borrowed without human capital serving as collateral and
therefore without negative pay-outs to the young. The expression for Br shows that the young can borrow
more when their nancial capital is higher, while a higher risk-free rate or lower r decreases the maximum
that can be borrowed.6
When the young borrow Br via the pension fund, their restricted stock exposure, denoted by r,
becomes:







r   r =
r
r   r (5.20)
Note that r > 1; the reason is that the young can always invest at least their own entire nancial capital
in stocks, resulting in a proportion invested in stocks at least equal to 1, and a strictly positive amount can
be borrowed as long as r > 0, which is the case under assumption 5.1. When r < y, the young can only
invest r instead of the optimal stock exposure y. When r = y, the optimal stock exposure can still be
implemented and the pension fund chooses -on behalf of the young- the optimal stock exposure y. When
borrowing by the young is limited, the proportion of nancial capital of the young invested in stocks thus
equals min(r; y). Again a feasibility condition is that the old are able to lend:
Fo(1  o) = nBr (5.21)






The pay-outs from the pension fund to the old are given by equation 5.9, whereas the pay-out to the
young in this case is equal to Fy(rrs + (1   y)r). While the optimal pay-out may now be out of reach,
this pay-out still improves welfare for the young compared to the situation where the pension fund invests
the nancial capital of both groups separately. And as the old are not worse o¤, condition (c) is still met.
5.3 A variation: a large pension fund
This section considers a variation on the model of the previous section. Thus far the pension fund was small
in the sense that (i) asset prices were exogenous to the pension fund, (ii) a truly risk-free asset was available.
For large pension funds the assumption of a risk-free asset, which most resembles a government bond of
solvent countries, is problematic. That is, there exists considerable macro-risk and it has to be borne by
some party. If one group owns safeassets like government bonds, this means that some other party bears
the risk of underwriting the safe asset in all contingencies. For a small pension fund this is not an important
consideration, as it can buy bonds without inuencing prices or (traded) volume of bonds.
For a large pension fund this is not the case. Safeguarding one group, for example the old, means
increasing risks for another group, here the young in their role as tax-payer. Assuming a risk-free asset
then underestimates the risks that the young face, as they ultimately underwrite the risk-free assets in their
role as tax-payer (in the case of government bonds). A large pension fund internalizes the risks that young
participants have in their role as tax-payer.
This section considers the situation where a truly risk-free asset is absent; that is, the pension fund
internalizes that such an asset shifts risks to the underwriting party. The pension fund as a whole faces
macro-risk that it cannot avoid; the risk can only be shared between participants. The pension fund can
still improve welfare, now by allocating the macro-risk optimally. Comparable with Cui and Ponds (2010),
a pension fund can do this by setting up an internal market on which young and old participants swap risks.
Optimal risk allocation can however lead to a similar commitment problem as before, if the young pledge











governance considers the investment strategy and contribution policy jointly. An important di¤erence is that
the old now also prot from the pension fund, which was not the case thus far.
The model
Consider a nation-wide pension fund in a closed economy. The young, as before, have human capital,
denoted by H > 0. There is a xed capital stock denoted as K and it is owned jointly by the young and
the old. The group of the young have a claim equal to Ky = (1   )K and the old have a claim equal to
Ko = K, with 0 5  5 1. There are Ny young participants and No old participants. The relative size of
the younger cohort is again given by n  NyNo . Financial capital of a young participant equals Fy 
(1 )K
Ny
while nancial capital of an old participant equals Fo  KNo . The return on capital is Bernoulli distributed




K w.p. 1  p








The pension fund invests and administers the nancial capital of both groups. Expected utility
of the young is equal to p ln[H + F y] + (1   p) ln[H + F y], whereas expected utility of the old equals
p ln[F o] + (1   p) ln[F o]. It is assumed that the capital market does not o¤er instruments to hedge capital
return risk. Markets are thus incomplete and potentially ine¢ cient.
As the young hold a risk-free quasi-asset with their human capital, they prefer to take on more risk
than the elderly, exactly as in the previous section. Both generations can thus gain from exchanging risk.
Optimally, the young prot more when capital return is high while the old are hurt relatively less when
capital return is low; the young and old participants exchange wage-risk (that is human capital risk, which
is zero here as human capital is risk-free) for capital-risk such that the old are also exposed to wage-risk and
the young have more capital-risk. The pension fund can again step in to complete markets and so improve
welfare. It could do this by allowing risk exchange by letting the young and old trade a swap-instrument,
denoted by Z. This asset pays out br in case K = K and pays out  1 in case K = K. Demand by the young
and the old for this derivative depends on br, which follows from a market clearing condition.
First, consider the demand by the young for Z, given br. Maximizing utility, the young solve the
following maximization problem, where Zy denotes the amount of Z that the young hold:
maxZy p ln[H + F y + brZy] + (1  p) ln[H + F y   Zy]
Taking the derivative with respect to Zy, the FOC is:
pbr
H + F y + brZy = 1  pH + F y   Zy (5.22)
Solving equation 5.22 gives the optimal value of Zy. The optimal value depends on br and is denoted by
Zy (br):
Zy =
[H + F y]pbr   (1  p)[H + F y]br := Zy (br) (5.23)
Now, consider the demand by the old for Z, given br. Maximizing utility the old solve the following




p ln[F o + brZo] + (1  p) ln[F o   Zo] (5.24)
For the old the optimal amount, denoted as Zo (br), is the solution to maximization problem 5.24:
Zo =
F opbr (1 p)F obr := Zo (br)
The expression for Zo (br) follows by substituting H = 0 and interchanging subscripts y and o in expression
5.23.
Now, the internal market only clears when one group (the young) is in demand for the swap-
instrument Z, while the other group (the old) is willing to supply it. The internal market for the swap-
instrument Z clears if the price, implied by br, is such that demand by the young equals supply by the old.
This market clearing return is denoted br, and it follows from the condition:
nZy (br) =  Zo (br)
The market-clearing return resulting from this condition is:
br = (1 p)[n(Fy+H)+F o]p[n(Fy+H)+F o]
The young pay Zy (br) per person to the old in case K = K, whereas the elderly pay brZo (br) to the
young in case K = K. Ex-ante these transactions are strictly welfare improving vis-à-vis the situation
without transactions.
The transactions can however lead to the same problems as before if the young cannot pay Zy out
of their nancial capital; in this case human capital serves as collateral in the swap-transaction. This is the
case when Zy (br) > F y. As an example, if  = 1) Fy = 0 and the condition would follow for any positive
amount of Zy . In this case, there is again a commitment problem and mandatory participation can act as a
commitment device for the young to credibly commit to paying the old in case capital return is low. If the
pension fund cannot levy contributions on the young to repay the old, again an appropriate pension fund
governance structure could be considered or the swap-transaction could be limited such that the young only
use nancial capital as collateral.
A special case arises when H = 0; then no transactions take place because both groups have exactly
the same risk preferences. There is thus no br for which there is simultaneously positive supply and positive
demand; either both groups are in positive or both have negative demand for the swap-instrument.7
5.4 Conclusion
The literature on life-cycle saving and investing models suggests that young workers should invest more in
stock than older workers because of their larger human capital. The optimal investment strategy of young
workers may then be to go short in bonds to invest in stock; this strategy is however unfeasible if the young
are borrowing constrained. In this case, a pension fund with strictly separated generational accounts is





For this value of br demand and supply equals zero, that is: Zy = Zo = 0.
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suboptimal. This chapter has analyzed how a pension fund can improve welfare by lifting the borrowing
constraint of young participants. It can do this by letting the young participants borrow from the old
participants who want to lend. Lifting the borrowing constraint of participants has consequences for the
pension funds investment strategy and contribution policy. First, the investment risk at the pension fund
level will increase. Second, if young participants borrow against their human capital, the young may need
to repay out of their human capital; that is, the pension fund may give a negative pay-out to the young.
A pension fund with mandatory participation is in a unique position to facilitate optimal borrowing
against human capital. The young essentially face a commitment problem when they borrow against their
human capital. They want to commit credibly to repaying the old in case stock return is low. However, once
young participants indeed need to repay, they have an incentive to resist repayment. Therefore insurance
companies without mandatory participation cannot facilitate borrowing against human capital. A pension
fund with mandatory participation can in principle enforce the promise of the young to repay the old, when
necessary, out of human capital. Mandatory participation thereby acts as a commitment device for the young
to repay their debt.
If contributions cannot be raised automatically however, then intergenerational conicts may arise.
Then the optimal investment policy can only be implemented by a proper governance structure, that considers
the ex ante risk level and the contribution policy ex post jointly. If good governance cannot be organized,
a risk immunization policy is a second-best solution. In that case only nancial capital can be used as
collateral, which limits the risk at the pension fund level.
The model used in this chapter is rich enough to show why participants are borrowing constrained
and how this can be resolved by the pension fund. However, a richer model could, for example, include labor
market distortions, a exible retirement age, more generations, intra-generational heterogeneity, a more real-
istic capital market or a more general utility function. And while this chapter focuses on a potential conict
between participants, there may also be conicting interests between participants and the sponsoring com-
pany, see Besley and Prat (2003) and Lavigne and Nze-Obame (2010). These limitations are acknowledged,
but they do not a¤ect the main message. If participants are borrowing constrained, then the pension fund
may be able to improve welfare but this may result in conicts between participants which good governance
should address.
The most important drawback of the model is that it considers only one period. This hinders the
analysis of dynamic e¤ects, for example the possibility that old participants benetted from lifting the
borrowing constraint when they were young. A related issue is that the model does not include ination
risk; including ination risk would also make that older generations also prot from the pension fund if the
fund arranges intergenerational risk sharing.
These drawbacks are partly addressed by a variation on the base line model, where no riskless bond
is available. This is in particular relevant for large pension funds, which internalize that a government bond,
which best approximates a risk-free asset, is ultimately underwritten by tax-payers and that this group
coincides with young participants. The pension fund can still improve welfare by setting up an internal
market on which generations can swap risks. As human capital of the young may serve as collateral for the
swap-transaction, the possibility of intergenerational conicts and the need for good governance therefore
remain.
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Chapter 6
Voterscommitment problem and the
Timing of Welfare-Program Reforms
6.1 Introduction
1 Public opinion research shows that the cards are very much stacked in favor of the welfare state status
quo. A majority of the voters, including the crucial median voter who holds the median policy preference,
cherishes core welfare programs such as public pensions and unemployment benets and prefers to uphold
the status quo rather than cutting back these programs (Boeri et al., 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003;
Becker, 2005; Brooks and Manza, 2006; Van Groezen et al., 2009; Schumacher et al., 2010). Consequently,
vote-seeking political parties have the best chance of attaining their vote-seeking goal when they refrain from
reforming these programs in the direction that the median voter dislikes, that is to say, by retrenching them.
This (political) obstacle to reform is one of the central explanations in the comparative literature on welfare
states for why welfare states remain remarkably stable despite mounting pressures for change, such as ageing
populations and globalization (e.g. Pierson, 2001; Brooks and Manza, 2007).
Notwithstanding the serious political obstacles to reform, many governments in advanced democ-
racies have pursued reforms that are unpopular according to public opinion data, for example increasing
retirement age or cutting back benets. When do governments do so? When are they willing to accept the
electoral risk involved and pursue unpopular reforms of welfare programs? These are questions that have
arrived at the forefront in the comparative welfare state literature (see e.g. Starke, 2006; Vis, 2010), but
which are not answered satisfactorily yet. Most studies simply assume that when governments get the chance
to reform, for instance because the institutions allow it, they will do so. When this involves reforms that
are unpopular among most voters, hence including the median voter, the government will turn to so-called
blame avoidance strategies to try to divert the blame attached to the reform (Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 1994;
Vis and Van Kersbergen, 2007). A possible blame avoidance strategy is to nd a scapegoat, like blaming the
European Union (EU) for the measures taken. Another is to include the opposition into the reform plans, so
as to o¤er the voter no other party to turn to. While providing useful insights into how reforms unpopular
by the median voter can be implemented, this literature leaves unexplained why some governments do enact
such reform and turn to blame avoidance strategies while other governments do not.
This study adds to the comparative welfare state literature by proposing a mechanism that simulta-
neously explains the occurrence and the timing of reforms in welfare programs that are unpopular among the
median voter. Whereas there exists much political-economic literature about the commitment problem of
politicians, the mechanism here, dubbed voterscommitment problem, instead derives from the commitment
problem faced by voters. This chapter presents a simple game-theoretical model that formalizes how eco-
nomic voting makes voters unable to commit to re-elect a government that will not reform during economic
hardship. If voters vote economically, they correctly or not at least partly blame their government for
1This chapter was written with Barbara Vis. It is accepted for publication in Public Choice.
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weak economic performance (Tufte, 1978; Hibbs, 1979; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000). The commitment
problem of voters makes that vote-seeking governments are only willing to consider reform when they know
they will likely be voted out of o¢ ce anyway amidst economic hardship. Consequently, an electorate that
opposes reform and a government implementing unpopular reform are reconcilable. The central empirical
implication of our model is that reforms take place during economic downturns only. This implication tallies
with the work of for instance Høj et al. (2006). Focusing on 21 OECD-countries between 1975-2003, Høj and
colleagues nd that economic crises, operationalized as output gaps larger than 4 per cent, are associated
with more reform in the labor market and in the product market (see also Pitlik and With, 2003; Vis, 2010).
There is a prominent alternative explanation for the coexistence of economic lows and reforms. It
may also result from a sense of urgency on the side of both voters and politicians. Reforms are easier accepted
when the (perceived) need for it increases. Awareness and perceptions are indeed important factors which
reinforce the mechanism put forward here. This study however takes the position that political outcomes are
ultimately determined by preferences and incentives. This study shows that reforms, vote-seeking politicians
and reform-hostile voters are reconcilable within a rational agent approach. This in itself does not show that
this approach is the most suitable; it does show that the puzzle how and why vote-seeking politicians pursue
reforms that voters dont want, need not be a puzzle.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, the comparative welfare state and political-economic
literature on welfare reforms is discussed. It is argued that this literature does not adequately account for
the occurrence and, especially, the timing of reforms unpopular with the median voter. Next, we introduce
the game-theoretical model, whereby we begin by discussing three central assumptions of the model. Then,
we turn to elaborating a special case of the model that provides some intuition on how the model works and
subsequently elaborate the general, more realistic model. We end with some concluding remarks.
6.2 Related literature
When does reform of welfare programs that is unpopular among the median voter occur?2 The answers put
forward in the comparative welfare state literature and the political-economic literature on reform do not
fully explain reforms timing, as we show below.
Comparative welfare state research
A rst body of comparative literature on reforms of welfare programs that the median voter dislikes,
argues that the main cause for pressure on the welfare state and thereby for reform is socio-economic
change and the ensuing problem load (Rodrik, 1997; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2001;
Pierson, 2001; Iversen, 2005). Theoretically, this argument makes sense. For example, if population ageing
is projected to lead to budgetary problems, it is likely that the government will take measures to try to
deal with the issue. However, the socio-economic account provides little theoretical footing as regards when
exactly such measures are taken. When do governments pursue cutbacks that may be necessary, but which
are also electorally risky? Why do some objectiveproblems lead to reform yet others do not?
A second perspective on retrenchment of welfare programs focuses on political struggles, sometimes
integrating socio-economic variables too. The argument is that the variation in the degree and type of
reform is inuenced by the partisan complexion of the government (e.g. Ross, 2000; Korpi and Palme, 2003;
Allan and Scruggs, 2004) or by the dynamics of party competition (e.g. Kitschelt, 2001; Green-Pedersen,
2002). While o¤ering useful insights into some of the factors that hinder or facilitate reform, this account
cannot explain when governments engage in electorally risky activities. Why, for example, have unpopular
measures been taken by some right-wing and by some left-wing governments in Germany, Denmark, and the
Netherlands, but not by others (see Vis, 2009)?
A third body of comparative literature on unpopular reforms of welfare programs focuses on the
inuence of institutions. The usual argument is that countries with the least institutional hurdles, and
therefore the highest degree of power concentration, should display the highest degree of reform. Conse-
quently, reform should be higher in Westminster countries (such as the United Kingdom) than in political
systems with a high level of power fragmentation (like Switzerland and the United States). Several empir-
ical studies support this hypothesis (e.g. Bonoli, 2001; Swank, 2001). However, some authors note that
2This section draws heavily on Vis (2009).
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the reverse relationship is also plausible (see Ross, 1997). Political systems concentrating political power
also concentrate political accountability. As a result, (. . . ) voters know very well who they may blame
for unpopular cutbacks (Starke, 2006: 109). In political systems where power is fragmented, conversely,
avoiding blame for unpopular measures is easier (Weaver, 1986; Pierson, 1994), which may result in more
cutbacks. The institutionalist approach has been helpful for explaining the cross-national variation in welfare
reform. However, it cannot explain the when of reform as governments in the same country face the same
institutional constraints and opportunities (Armingeon et al., 2005), yet display various degrees of reform.
A nal strand of literature proposes that ideas matter for retrenchment of welfare programs. The
argument here is that by invoking a specic discourse or imperative, governments may overcome the hin-
drances to unpopular reform and successfully implement it (Cox, 2001; Schmidt, 2002; Stiller, 2010; see
Campbell, 2002; Lieberman, 2002). Studies focusing on the importance of ideas have added to the knowl-
edge of the process of unpopular welfare reform. However, this literature o¤ers little theoretical foothold as
regards when ideas matter (see Lieberman, 2002). Klitgaard (2007) o¤ers a partial solution to the question
of when retrenchment of welfare programs occurs by arguing that Social Democratic parties in universal
(Social Democratic) welfare states pursue market-oriented reforms when the party elite considers the policy
problems to be a threat to the welfare states legitimacy. However, this explanation cannot be generalized to
other type of parties or types of welfare regimes, as it premises on the assumption that the universal welfare
state is a power resource for Social Democratic parties.
Political economy of reform of welfare programs
Next we discuss political-economic literature on reforms of welfare programs that are unpopular among
the median voter. The studies we focus on deal with pension reforms but the arguments they present
are not necessarily limited to the retrenchment of pension programs. Many pension reforms, in particular
the increase of the retirement age, are taken during recessions. As these reforms hit virtually the whole
population, they qualify as unpopular reforms that a¤ect the median voter negatively. This is certainly not
to deny that small incremental changes in pension entitlements may matter as well, but the model does not
focus on these latter reforms.
Selén and Ståhlberg (2007) posit that the pension reform in Sweden, which gradually transformed
the public dened-benet pension system into a so called notional dened contribution one, could be imple-
mented successfully because the reform would benet a majority of the voters. Adopting a political-economic
perspective, they argue that the winners who would vote in favor of the reform outnumber the losers who
would vote against it, accounting for the reform. The underlying assumption that voters know ex ante,
and with a fair amount of certainty, if they are a winner or loser of the reform is problematic. For most
voters, pension systems are complex to say the least. Calculating the present value of expected pension
benets and expected contributions in the old and the proposed new system is something that surely goes
well beyond the capacities of the averagevoter (see Boeri et al. 2002).
In a recent political-economic contribution, Kemmerling and Neugart (2009) propose that countries
in which nancial markets are politically powerful measured by among other things the degree of assets
held by institutional investors as a share of GDP , are more likely to pursue pension reform that increases
the private savings component. The reason is that nancial markets have an interest in such reforms, as
they typically manage dened-contribution schemes. Although this argument is plausible, it fails to account
for the large-scale pension reform that included a shift toward dened-contribution in, for example, Sweden
(Selén and Ståhlberg, 2007), as the nancial market of that country is comparatively weak (BIS, 2007).
6.3 The model
This chapter proposes a new mechanism, labelled voterscommitment problem, to account for the timing
of reforms of welfare programs in democratic systems that are unpopular among the median voter. The
thrust of the argument is that due to economic voting voters cannot commit to re-elect a government that
will refrain from reform when the economy is in a poor state. Due to this commitment problem, reforms
of welfare programs take place during economic lows only.3 Elections come with a pre-election commitment
3This mechanism di¤ers from political-economic explanations that focus on the absence of reform. This body of literature
has often assigned the absence of reform to the nonneutrality in the distribution of gains and losses in society. Reform is
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problem on the part of politicians, as they cannot commit themselves to implement the plans they propagate
during elections. When in o¢ ce, they may use their power to break the election promise with the voters.
The crucial aspects of elections, the ability to throw the rascals out at the next election, partly solves
this commitment problem. There is however a similar commitment problem between elections on the side
of the voters. This problem results from economic voting. Voters generally oust a government during an
economic recession because they blame politicians, at least partly, for poor economic performance. Due to
the omnipresence of economic voting (see below), the promise to do otherwise in the absence of reform is not
credible. The pledge of the median voter before the election to re-elect the government if it refrains from an
unpopular reform is not believable and certainly not enforceable. Consequently a vote-seeking government
might reform during a recession, as reform of one or more welfare programs will hardly inuence the prospect
of re-election.
To formalize the argument, a tractable game is proposed that captures economic voting and the
commitment problem that comes with it in a simple way. First, the players and their preferences (section
3.1) are discussed and then the assumptions of the model (section 3.2). Then, the set-up of the model
(sections 3.3) is discussed, followed by a special case of the model that provides insight and intuition about
how elections can discipline politicians (section 3.4). Finally, the most general version is presented (sections
3.5 and 3.6).
A game-theoretical model allows formalizing the argument and thereby ensuring its internal con-
sistency. The logic of the model may also lead to results not easily thought of otherwise. For example,
in the model political parties may face a coordination problem between two equilibria (one reforming, the
other not). This shows that postulating the voters commitment problem does not just mechanically lead to
presence of reforms during recessions but reveals a more subtle potential problem in democratic processes.
The logic of economic voting leads to the possibility of parties colluding or coordinating on reforms. It would
subsequently be interesting to operationalize this collusion empirically or think about ways the democratic
process could address this.
Players and preferences
First the preferences of the players in the game are discussed. There are three players: two politicians
and one voter (the median one). Focusing on one voter only may seem too strict an assumption and one
that does away too easily with voterspossible heterogeneous preferences regarding reform. Although it is
not dismiss that the voterspreferences may very well vary, from the perspective of the governing party (or
parties in a coalition government), the median voters preferences are key. There is an extensive body of
literature that shows that mainstream parties, which typically make up the government, cater to precisely
this median voter (e.g. Adams et al., 2004, Adams et al., 2006, Adams et al., 2009; Ezrow et al., 2010).
If the median voter opposes reform of one or more welfare programs  either because it hurts his or her
own consumption directly or because he or she sociotropically cares about the income of welfare programs
recipients , the reform entails an electoral risk for the governing party (or parties).
There is ample survey research showing that the median voter prefers the status quo to reform, see
Boeri et al. (2001). Reform of one or more welfare programs is thus politically risky and something one
would theoretically expect vote-seeking parties to steer clear from. The model identies those conditions
under which vote-seeking parties reform nonetheless. The focus on two politicians, who can be seen as two
political parties, means that the model applies directly to two-party systems such as the US, Malta or to
a lesser extent the UK
The two politicians both have a time-additive utility function, Vt, with a felicity function U(xi)
that is concave and positive and where xi represents consumption at time i. The discount rate is . The





non-neutral because the winners from the status quo are assumed to be politically strong, whilst the losers are politically weak.
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) expand the argument, stating that it is the uncertainty about the distribution of gains and losses
that impedes reform. If some of the winners and losers of the reform cannot be identied ex ante, the status quo is likely
to prevail. In principle, reform and its absence are two sides from the same coin. However, a number of important theories
accounting for the absence of reform fail to adequately explain its occurrence. Piersons (2001) argument that political obstacles
impede reform is one of them. Also Fernandez and Rodriks (1991) work helps one to explain better the absence of reform than
its presence, although the latter authors do specify a condition under which reform occurs (certainty over the distribution of
gains and losses).
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At each point of time one and only one politician holds o¢ ce. If a politician is out of o¢ ce, he or
she does not have any decision to make and utility is normalized to 0. If the politician is in o¢ ce he or she
receives a positive endowment w > 0.
The median voter also has a time-additive utility function with a well-behaved felicity function,
denoted W (c). In each period the voter consumes cg in good economic times and cb in bad economic times
with cg > cb > 0. We assume, realistically as we argue above, that the median voter dislikes reform. The
negative e¤ect of a reform equals  of consumption. This cost of reform is strictly positive. We think of this
as the real costs of reform to the median voter -not necessarily all voters-, an example being less generous
unemployment insurance or pension benets. However it can be perfectly be (re)interpreted (partly) as the
psychological costs of any deviation from the status quo. Research on habit formation shows that many
people prefer the status quo (the status quo bias) to change. The costs are positive but consumption in
both economic circumstances remains positive, so cg    > cb    > 0. As the felicity function is increasing
in consumption it follows that W (cg   ) > W (cb   ).
The preferences of the median voter are therefore such that under all circumstances he or she prefers
no reform (the status quo) to reform. It is further necessary to assume that reforms are the only (salient)
issue in elections.
Assumptions
The model hinges on three underlying assumptions. The rst is that reforms are unpopular among (most)
voters and, crucially important, the median voter. It was already argued that public opinion research into
voterspreferences regarding welfare programs and reforms therein o¤ers ample support for the plausibility
of this assumption. Boeri et al. (2002), for example, nd in a survey of the opinions on pension reform in
Germany and Italy that most voters, including the median voter, oppose reform in welfare programs and
instead favor the state quo. Related, Van Groezen et al. (2009) nd that a preference for the status quo
induces voters, again including the median one, to be weary of pension reforms, even if these might improve
their nancial position in the longer term. Other scholars have found similar preferences as well for welfare
programs other than pensions (e.g. Boeri et al., 2001; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Becker, 2005; Brooks
and Manza, 2006; Schumacher et al., 2010).
A second assumption is the imminence of economic voting. There is a widespread consensus in the
literature that economic voting is a generalized phenomenon in industrial democracies(Pacek and Radcli¤,
1995: 44; see Van der Brug et al., 2007), indicating that this is a plausible assumption. This does not mean
that economic voting is equally strong in all electoral systems. In majoritarian systems, which typically
have a one-party government, it is clear who is to blame for the economic failure. This higher clarity of
responsibility makes that voters are more likely to vote retrospectively (that is economically) than in systems
with lower degrees of clarity. Examples of the latter are systems with minority governments or parliamentary
ones (Powell and Whitten, 1993; see also Whitten and Palmer, 1999). Since the game-theoretical model is
closest to a majoritarian system with a one-party government, the lower relevance of economic voting in
other electoral systems is not a problem.
A nal assumption is that governments are rst and foremost vote-seeking (Downs, 1957), but that
they can also be o¢ ce-seeking or policy-seeking. This assumption follows the behavioral literature on political
parties (Strøm, 1990; Müller and Strøm, 1999). In the model, a government faces a trade-o¤ between 1)
remaining in o¢ ce by catering to the wishes of the median voter, which means the government behaves
vote-seeking, and 2) exclusion from o¢ ce by adopting a policy that goes against the wishes of the median
voter, which means that the government acts policy-seeking. In particular, when facing sure electoral defeat
the policy-seeking motive dominates, as winning o¢ ce is no longer possible.
Note that since both the median voter and the politicians are rational and forward-looking in the
model, the argument o¤ers a rationalization of the occurrence and timing of reforms and thereby does not
depend on bounded rationality or irrationality of any actor, which is not to deny that both may be relevant.
The stage-game
For both the politician in o¢ ce and the median voter, the following stage game unrolls:
1. There is a move by nature that determines the economic circumstances. With probability  the
economic circumstances are good, with probability 1   they are bad.
2. Next, the politician in o¢ ce can choose between two actions. The rst is to reform, the second is to
stick to the status quo with no reform. In the case of reform, the politician receives, next to w, a positive
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amount r > 0. This may be interpreted as his or her personal benet of reforming, for instance in the form
of ideological satisfaction.
3. After observing the state of the economy and the action of the politician, the median voter has
the option to either re-elect the politician or not. If the politician is not re-elected, the other politician is
automatically elected. The graph depicts the sequence of the stage game where the (re)instalment of the
new government at t = 4 closes the stage game.
The action space of the politicians consists of two actions, reform and no reform. The action space
of the median voter also consists of two actions, re-election or no re-election. Strategies and equilibria are
restricted in several ways. First, only pure strategies are considered. Second, attention is restricted to
Markov equilibria. In Markov equilibria, actions of players are a function of the current, pay-o¤ relevant
state. Here this state is dened as the state of the economy (either good or bad). This rules out that the
players condition their actions on the entire economic history or the history of others playersactions. Third,
as the two politicians are identical, only symmetric equilibria are considered.
For the politician a strategy maps the state of the economy into the action reform or no reform. A
strategy thus consists of a pair that prescribes the action when the economy is in a bad and good state,
respectively. The voter has a strategy that maps the economic condition and the action of the politician
into the action re-election or no re-election. Therefore the strategy of the voter has to prescribe an action in
four circumstances, conditional on the state of the economy (either good or bad) and on the action of the
politician.
Equilibria with perfect conditioning
First, the situation where the voter can condition re-election perfectly on the occurrence of reform is
considered. This is a special case of the more general version of the model that is presented later. Economic
circumstances are not relevant in this rst model, which means that the voter has the optimal strategy to
re-elect a politician that does not reform and does not re-elect a politician that reforms. Subsequently, there
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are two potential pure strategy equilibria; one with both politicians always reforming and one with both
politicians never reforming.
The equilibrium with both politicians always reforming occurs if the following condition holds4 :
U(w + r)  U(w) > 1 U(w) 
2
1 2U(w + r) (i)
The left-hand side gives the immediate gain of reforming compared to not reforming. The right-hand
side gives the di¤erence of the remaining lifetime utility of never reforming and the lifetime utility of always
reforming (given that the other politician always reforms). In the latter case both politicians are in o¢ ce
every second period and reform when they are. Under condition (i), given that the other politician always
reforms, it is best to do likewise. As the two politicians are similar, this constitutes a Nash-equilibrium.
Note that if  = 0, the condition is always met, as r > 0. In that case, future income is not considered at
all and reforming is more attractive.
Another possible equilibrium is one with both politicians not reforming. A necessary condition for
such an equilibrium is:
U(w + r)  U(w) < 1 U(w) (ii)
Note that if  = 0, the condition is never met. This condition states that given that the other politician
never reforms never reforming and hence holding o¢ ce forever after, leads to higher life-time utility than
reforming once and never being (re)elected again.
Summarizing, there are three possibilities.
1. U(w + r)   U(w) is small and condition (ii) is met and condition (i) is not met. This means that
lifetime utility of always holding o¢ ce is large. Reforming is not attractive, even if the other politician does
likewise. The equilibrium with both politicians never reforming occurs.
2. U(w + r)  U(w) is large and condition (i) is met and condition (ii) is not. Utility of even a onetime
reform is large and there will always be reform. In that case there is no way for the voter to discipline the
government by not re-electing him.
3. U(w+ r) U(w) has an intermediate value and both condition (i) and (ii) are met. In this case both
equilibria are possible. Which one occurs, depends on the ability of the two politicians to coordinate on
the equilibrium of both of them reforming. This latter equilibrium provides both politicians with a higher
lifetime utility than the equilibrium where both never reform.
This third case is arguably the most interesting case as it results in a coordination problem where
both politicians can coordinate on an equilibrium that benets them but is not in the interest of voters.
As indicated such a situation is perfectly reconcilable with a democratic process and vote-seeking parties
because of the commitment problem of voters. The outcome is then that both parties constantly pursue
reforms voters dislike.
If the politicians indeed succeed in coordination, a further strategy of the voter could be to never
re-elect one of the two politicians once he reformed and to always re-elect the other one, irrespective of him
reforming or not. With such a strategy of the voter, the politician who is targeted by the voter, will not
reform. Note that it is not possible that both conditions are not met, as the right-hand side of condition (ii)
is larger than the right-hand side of condition (i).
Equilibria with economic voting
This section considers the more general and more realistic version of the model wherein the voter can only
condition re-election imperfectly on the action of the politician in o¢ ce. As an extreme case of economic
voting, the politician is never re-elected when the economy is slowing down, irrespective of whether he
reformed. This constitutes the commitment problem of the voter who cannot credibly commit to re-electing
a government that does not reform. Consequently, the politician will always reform during a recession. For
the politician reforming does not alter the prospects of being re-elected while there is a positive pay-o¤ r > 0.
During booms, a politician is still never re-elected after a reform, as before.
4Here and in the remainder of the chapter, the familiar convergence result of a geometric series is used.
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Again, two equilibria are possible. The appendix shows the following necessary condition (iii) for an
equilibrium where both politicians will not reform in good times; this is the analogy of condition (ii):
U(w + r)  U(w) < (1 )(U(w)+(1 )U(w+r))1 2 2+22  
2(1 )U(w+r)
1  (1 )2 (iii)
Note that condition (iii) reduces to condition (ii) if  = 1. In this particular case economic circum-
stances are always positive and the voter can perfectly condition re-election on the actions of the politicians.
Note also that if  = 0, the condition never holds; in that case the future is not taken into account by both
politicians and they will therefore always reform.
For the equilibrium with both politicians reforming the necessary condition reads:
U(w + r)  U(w) > (U(w)+(1 )U(w+r))1  (1 )2  
2U(w+r)
1 2 (iv)
Note that, as before, condition (iv) reduces to condition (i) if  = 1. Note also that if  = 0, the condition
always holds.
The appendix shows that the right-hand side of condition (iii) is larger than the right-hand side of
condition (iv). Therefore it is not possible that both conditions are not met and there is always at least one
equilibrium. Generally, there are again three possibilities. A unique equilibrium with both politicians always
reforming; a unique equilibrium with both never reforming during booms; and the possibility that there
are two equilibria. Which one occurs in the latter case depends on which equilibrium the two politicians
coordinates. The equilibrium where both reform has higher life-time utility than the one where neither
reforms. This follows from the observation that condition (iii) is met and it is then better not to reform
than to reform, given that the other politician does not reform. Condition (iv) is also met, implying that it
is better to reform than not to reform, given that the other politician reforms. It holds that not reforming
when the other reforms gives a higher lifetime utility than not reforming when the other does not reform.
In both cases, the politician has the same income when in o¢ ce and is only out of o¢ ce after bad economic
circumstances. In the latter case however the probability of coming back into o¢ ce is smaller, as the other
politician does not reform during booms. Combining these observations, it holds that in the case of multiple
equilibria, the two politicians have higher lifetime utility in the equilibrium of both reforming than of both
not reforming. For the voter the opposite holds; the equilibrium with both not reforming provides higher
lifetime utility.
Comparative statics
This section investigates the comparative statics to assess how the willingness to reform and the ability
of voters to discipline politicians is inuenced by the four di¤erent parameters in the model (see table 1).
Table 1.





It can be shown that, ceteris paribus and for all w, condition (iii) will more likely be met when the
endowment w increases, that is the right-hand side increases more than the left-hand side. If the endowment
increases, reform is less likely to occur. This follows as reform leads to the loss of the endowment w in the
next period and possibly subsequent periods. The higher this loss is, the less likely a government is to reform.
This implies that higher income for government members the endowment w decreases the probability of
reforms during prosperous economic times. The opposite holds for condition (iv); the higher w is, the less
likely the condition is met and the less likely is an equilibrium with both reforming.
Furthermore, ceteris paribus and for all r, condition (iii) will less likely be met when rents r increase;
then the right-hand side decreases more than the left-hand side. The higher r is, the more likely reform is.
This formalizes that higher rents of reform make its undertaking more attractive. The opposite holds for
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condition (iv); the higher is r, the more likely the condition is met and the more likely is an equilibrium with
both reforming.
For both conditions, the comparative statics of  and  are not straightforward. The partial deriv-
ative of the bound can be both positive and negative. This means that a higher value of the probability of
economic hardship and a higher value of the discount rate do not have an unambiguous e¤ect. Consider for
example the equilibrium that both reform during good economic times (and are voted out of o¢ ce because
of that). A higher subjective discount rate probability increases the value of keeping o¢ ce as the expected
future gains that come with it increase. However, it also increases the discounted values of future reforms
during good times. These counteracting e¤ects depend on the discount factor  in a non-linear way. Neither
of the e¤ects dominates and thus the net e¤ect can go both ways. The sign depends on the particular values
of the parameters and the functional form of the utility function, making general predictions of the e¤ect
impossible.
A positive e¤ect of reform on economic conditions
The basic model postulates that reforms do not a¤ect the economy besides a positive endowment for
the reforming politician -interpreted as rents- and a one-time negative impact on the median voter. While
this is enough to capture the mechanism we focus on -the voters commitment problem- this does away
with the possibility that reforms will eventually increase (or decrease) welfare. One could for example argue
that pension reforms -while lowering utility of the median voter- have a positive impact on welfare of future
generations, see for example Browning (1975).
To incorporate such e¤ects fully the probability of the economy being in a good state should be
dependent on all previous reforms. This can be done in numerous and complicated (non-linear) ways. This
section considers the simplest version that one and only one reform leads to a one-time increase in the
probability the economy is in a good state from  to . First we consider preferences and actions of voters,
then strategies of politicians.
Thusfar the interpretation of the median voter was immaterial to the outcomes of the model. When
current actions a¤ect future periods, the interpretation becomes important. Two interpretations of the
median player are possible. If the median voter di¤ers each period with current young and unborn voters
being the median voter of the future, it is clear that at one point future voters want a reform that results
in  while the current median voter might not want a reform. In these cases reform is benecial to future
(median) voters and current politicians but not to the current median voter.
If however the median voter is interpreted as a long-lived player, (s)he may also prefer a one-time
reform (and none thereafter) during economic prosperity to no reforms at all if the following condition is
met:
W (cg   ) + 1  [
W (cg) + (1  )W (cb)] > W (cg) + 1  [W (cg) + (1  )W (cb)] (v)
For the median voter there is now a trade-o¤ between the immediate negative impact, captured by
 and the future benet of the reform, indicated by  > .
However beyond the rst reform the median voter does not want any further reforms due to the assump-
tion that only a one-time increase in . is possible.
A politician facing a reform decision now not only faces the current gain of a reform, given by r, but
also the long-term impact given by . In principle the increase of  is not in the advantage of the politician,
as (for now) it does not raise the probability of being re-elected while it does lower the probability of being
in o¢ ce any time soon. In the extreme case when  = 1., the politician may never be in o¢ ce again. The
paradoxical situation may then result that both politicians never reform (that is neither in bad and good
economic times) if the following condition holds:
U(w)[1 +  (1 )1 2 2+22 ] > U(w + r) + 
(1 )[U(w)+(1 )U(w+r)]
1 2 2+22 (vi)
(This expression is derived under the assumption that the equilibrium with both not reforming results
after one reform, see appendix for the details.) The extension thus leads to a new equilibrium with both
politicians never reforming, expanding the types of equilibria that can be rationalized. It is thus possible
that future median voters do want a one-time reform but this never happens because the reforming party
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thereby not only increases the probability the economy ultimately prospers but also that the other party
remains in o¢ ce.
As indicated above the median voter, when interpreted as a long lived player, may desire a reform
if condition v is met, but does not necessarily do so.
In that case the median voter may consider reelecting a government that reforms during an economic
upswing (during busts the commitment problem hinders this still) if this is the rst reform. After any
subsequent reform voters do not reelect the reforming government. This strategy will induce a party to
reform as it now receives both the rents from reforming and remains in o¢ ce. However, this will also trigger
multiple reforms later on when times are bad and that the median voter dislikes. The median voter will
reward the rst reform nonetheless if the increase in  is large enough. Formally the following condition is
necessary for the median voter to reelect during a boom the rst party that reforms:
W (cg   ) + 1  [
W (cg) + (1  )W (cb   )] > W (cg) + 1  [W (cg) + (1  )W (cb)]
(This expression is again derived under the assumption that the equilibrium with both not reforming
results after one reform. If however the equilibrium with both parties always reforming results the condition
becomes harder to fulll as then the utility during good economic times equals W (cg   ) after a reform.)
The condition describes the situation that voters prefer for example a one time reform to the pension system
but reject incremental cut-backs.
As said, a more complicated relation between the number of reforms and the probability  is both
possible and reasonable. The model can likewise be extended in several other ways. More parties than two
could be considered or more issues or changing preferences of voters (due to heterogeneous preferences). This
adds to plausibility of assumptions and thereby to validness of results. However, it also makes the model
more complex and analytical solutions can quickly become intractable if not non-existent. More important,
the basic arguments of this paper can be formalized and analyzed in the basic set-up put forward here.
6.4 Discussion and conclusion
Under which conditions do vote-seeking governments pursue reforms in welfare programs that are unpopular
among the median voter and that, consequently, likely lead to electoral punishment? Existing work in
comparative welfare state research and the political economy of reforms o¤ers some helpful starting points,
but do not provide a convincing answer to this question. This chapter presented a simple game-theoretical
model to identify under which conditions politicians pursue unpopular reforms and when they do not. It was
shown that parties that primarily seek votes can still opt to reform welfare programs when the very same
voters the parties adhere to do not want that. The model stacks the cards against this outcome by assuming
that parties are rst and foremost vote-seeking and that voters are reform-averse. The model shows that
even in this reform-hostile setting, a reform of welfare programs in a democracy is reconcilable with the
median voter opposing such reforms.
The most interesting outcome is that for a relevant range of parameters the political parties face
a coordination problem. It is in their advantage to coordinate on an equilibrium with both constantly
reforming. This hurts the median voter, but (s)he cannot prevent this due to an inherent and unavoidable
commitment problem caused by economic voting. An extension of the model considers the situation where
the probability of future prosperity is positively inuenced by a rst reform. The paradoxical outcome may
result that an equilibrium with both parties never reforming is possible, although future voters want this
rst reform. When the median voter is interpreted as a long-lived player, it is even possible that the current
median voter wants the reform. In this case the median voter may agree with an initial reform that increases
future welfare while simultaneously disliking the future reforms that are triggered by it.
The result of the model helps solving a theoretical puzzle in the literature on reforms in welfare
programs that are unpopular among the median voter. In line with for example Høj et al. (2006), the
empirical implication of the model is that reforms of welfare programs, if at all, are initiated during recessions.
The contribution lies in presenting the underlying theoretical mechanism that the occurrence and timing
of reforms spring from an intrinsic commitment problem of voters in times of economic recession. Due
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to economic voting, there is a high chance that the incumbent party or parties will not be re-elected,
irrespective of their particular policy. Subsequently, the vote-seeking motive of parties gives way to a policy-
seeking motive of governments. Subsequently, the policy-seeking motive of governments prevails over the
vote-seeking motive which in principle has priority for political parties.
The empirical implication of the model, reform occurring during economic lows, contributes to the
socio-economic account in the comparative literature on the welfare state by identifying the condition under
which an objectivesocio-economic problem matters: socio-economic dire straits. Economic setbacks allow
a government to act against the wishes of the median voter, as the government knows that the poor socio-
economic situation is likely to lead to electoral defeat anyhow. Moreover, and putting theoretical body to
the literature on ideas, a poor socio-economic state enables a government to act on its ideas or interests. As
regards studies focusing on partisanship, the model shows that the color of the government does not matter,
as both leftist and rightist politician face a median voter that opposes reform of welfare programs. The
empirical work of for instance Vis (2010) corroborates this prediction.
The model with two politicians and one voter (the median one) captures advanced democracies with
a two-party system and majority, or plurality, one-party government. The number of such countries is low
since most countries have more than two parties (although when the number of parties is low, single-party
governments still emerge typically). In future work, it would be interesting to see if expanding the number
of parties, and thus politicians, in the model changes the outcome of the game.
References
Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., Glasgow, G. (2004). Understanding change and stability in party
ideologies: Do parties respond to public opinion or to past election results? British Journal of Political
Science, 34(4), 589610.
Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L., Glasgow, G. (2006). Are niche parties fundamentally di¤erent from
mainstream parties? The causes and the electoral consequences of Western European partiespolicy shifts,
1976-1998. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 513529.
Adams, J., Haupt, A.B., Stoll, H. (2009). What moves parties? The role of public opinion and global
economic conditions in Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 42(5), 611639.
Allan, J.P., Scruggs, L.A. (2004). Political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial
democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 496512.
Armingeon, K., Leimgruber, P., Beyeler, M., Menegale, S. (2005).
Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2003. Institute of Political Science: University of Berne.
Becker, J. (2005). De steun voor de verzorgingsstaat in de publieke opinie, 1970-2002: Een analyse van
trends in meningen (The support for the welfare state in public opinion, 1970-2002: An analysis of trends
in opinions). SCP-Publication, No. 2005/3. The Hague: Social and Cultural Planning Agency.
BIS, Bank for International Settlements (2007). Institutional investors, global savings and asset alloca-
tion. CGFS Papers, No.27
Blekesaune, M., Quadagno, J. (2003). Public attitudes toward welfare state policies: A comparative
analysis of 24 nations. European Sociological Review, 19(5), 415427.
Boeri, T., Börsch-Supan, A., Tabellini, G. (2001). Would you like to shrink the welfare state? A survey
of European citizens. Economic Policy, 16(32), 950.
Boeri, T., Boersch-Supan, A., Tabellini, G. (2002). Pension reforms and the opinions of European
Citizens. American Economic Review, 92(2), 396401.
Bonoli, G. (2001). Political institutions, veto points, and the process of welfare state adaptation. In P.
Pierson (Ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (pp.238264). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brooks, C., Manza, J. (2006). Why do welfare states persist? Journal of Politics, 68(4), 816827.
Brooks, C., Manza, J. (2007). Why Welfare States Persist: The Importance of Public Opinion in Democ-
racies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Browning, E. K. [1975], Why the Social Insurance Budget is Too Large in a Democracy, Economic
Inquiry, 13(3), 373-388.
Campbell, J.L. (2002). Ideas, politics, and public policy. Annual Review of Sociology, 28, 2138.
Cox, R.H. (2001). The social construction of an imperative: Why welfare state reform happened in
Denmark and the Netherlands but not in Germany. World Politics, 53(3) 463498.
91
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Ezrow, L., De Vries, C.E., Steenbergen, M., Edwards, E.E. (2010). Mean voter representation versus
partisan constituency representation: Do parties respond to the mean voter position or to their supporters?
Party Politics (forthcoming).
Fernandez, R., Rodrik, D. (1991). Resistance to reform: Status quo bias in the presence of individual-
specic uncertainty American Economic Review, 81(5), 11461155.
Garrett, G., Mitchell, D. (2001). Globalization, government spending and taxation in the OECD,
European Journal of Political Research, 39(2), 145177.
Green-Pedersen, C. (2001). The puzzle of Dutch welfare state retrenchment. West European Politics,
24(3), 135150.
Green-Pedersen, C. (2002). The Politics of Justication: Party Competition and Welfare-State Retrench-
ment in Denmark and the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Hemerijck, A., Schludi, M. (2000). Sequences of policy failures and e¤ective policy responses. In F.W.
Scharpf, Schmidt, V.A. (Eds.), Welfare and Work in the Open Economy: From Vulnerability to Competi-
tiveness, Vol I (pp.125228). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hibbs, D.A. Jr. (1979). The mass public and macroeconomic performance: The dynamics of public
opinion toward unemployment and ination. American Journal of Political Science, 23(4), 705731.
Høj, J., Galasso, V., Nicoletti, G., Dang, T. (2006). The political economy of structural reform: Empirical
evidence from OECD countries. OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No.501.
Huber, E., Stephens, J.D. (2001). Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in
Global Markets. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Iversen, T. (2005). Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jacobs, A.M., Matthews, J.S. (2008). Does timing matter? Intertemporal policy choice and the mass
public. Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
April 3-6, 2008, Chicago, IL
Kemmerling, A., Neugart, M. (2009). Financial market lobbies and pension reform. European Journal
of Political Economy, 25(2), 163173.
Kitschelt, H. (2001). Partisan competition and welfare state retrenchment: When do politicians choose
unpopular policies? In P. Pierson (Ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (pp.265302). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Klitgaard, M.B. (2007). Why are they doing it? Social democracy and market-oriented welfare state
reforms. West European Politics, 30(1), 172194.
Korpi, W. Palme, J. (2003). New politics and class politics in the context of austerity and globalization:
Welfare state regress in 18 countries, 1975-95. American Political Science Review, 97(3), 425446.
Lewis-Beck, M.S., Paldam, M. (2000). Economic voting: An introduction. Electoral Studies, 19(2),
113121.
Lieberman, R.C. (2002). Ideas, institutions, and political order: Explaining political change. American
Political Science Review, 96(4), 697712.
Müller, W.C., Strøm, K. (1999). Policy, O¢ ce or Votes. How Political Parties in Europe make Hard
Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pacek, A., Radcli¤, B. (1995). Economic voting and the welfare state: A cross-national analysis. Journal
of Politics, 57(1), 4461.
Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pierson, P. (2001). Post-industrial pressures on mature welfare states. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The New
Politics of the Welfare State (pp.80104). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pitlik, H., Wirth, S. (2003). Do crises promote the extent of economic liberalization?: An empirical test.
European Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 565-581.
Powell, G.B., Whitten, G.D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: Taking account of the
political context. American Journal of Political Science, 37(2), 391414.
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington D.C.: Intstitute for International
Economics.
Ross, F. (1997). Cutting public expenditures in advanced industrial democracies: The importance of
avoiding blame. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 10(2), 175200.
92
Ross, F. (2000). Beyond left and right: The new partisan politics of welfare. Governance: An Inter-
national Journal of Policy and Administration, 13(2), 155183.
Schmidt, V.A. (2002). Does discourse matter in the politics of welfare state adjustment? Comparative
Political Studies, 35(2), 168193.
Schumacher, G., Vis., B., Van Kersbergen, K. (2010). Party competition, electoral punishment and
welfare state retrenchment. Paper prepared for the workshop The strategic dimension of social policy
reformat the ECPR Joint Sessions, Münster, Germany, 23-27 March.
Selén, J., Ståhlberg, A. (2007). Why Swedens pension reform was able to be successfully implemented.
European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4), 11751184.
Starke, P. (2006). The politics of welfare state retrenchment: A literature review. Social Policy &
Administration, 40(1), 104120.
Stiller, S. (2007). Innovative Agents versus Immovable Objects: The Role of Ideational Leadership in
German Welfare State Reforms. Ph.D. Dissertation, Radboud University Nijmegen.
Strøm, K. (1990). A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Journal of Political
Science, 34: 565-598.
Swank, D. (2001). Political institutions and welfare state restructuring: The impact of institutions on
social policy change in developed democracies. In P. Pierson (Ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State
(pp.197237). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tufte, E.R. (1978). Political Control of the Economy. Princeton and New York: Princeton University
Press: Princeton.
Van der Brug, W., Van der Eijck, C., Franklin, M. (2007). The Economy and the Vote: Economic
Conditions and Elections in Fifteen Countries. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Van Groezen, B., Kiiver, H., Unger, B. (2009). Explaining Europeanspreferences for pension provision.
European Journal of Political Economy, 25(2), 237246.
Vis, B. (2009). Governments and unpopular social policy reform: Biting the bullet or steering clear?
European Journal of Political Research, 48(1), 3157.
Vis, B. (2010). Politics of Risk-Taking: Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press.
Vis, B., Van Kersbergen, K. (2007). Why and how do political actors pursue risky reforms? Journal of
Theoretical Politics, 19(2), 153172.
Weaver, R.K. (1986). The politics of blame avoidance. Journal of Public Policy, 6(4), 371398.
Whitten, G.D., Palmer, H.D. (1999). Cross-national analyses of economic voting. Electoral Studies,
18(1), 4967.
6.5 Appendix
This appendix derives some results given in the main text.
Derivation of equation (iii)
Equation (iii) gives the condition for the equilibrium where both politicians do not reform during booms:
U(w + r)  U(w) < (1 )(U(w)+(1 )U(w+r))1 2 2+22  
2(1 )U(w+r)
1  (1 )2 (iii)
To derive this condition, assume the rst of the two politicians does not reform. It is best for the second
politician to do likewise if, given the rst politiciansstrategy, the life-time utility of no reform is at least as
high as that of always reforming.
If the second politician reforms during good times, he has utility U(w+ r) when in o¢ ce and is then
voted out. When out of o¢ ce he will at one point be back in o¢ ce, so he also has a positive life-time utility
at the beginning of the next period when still out of o¢ ce, denoted here Uout. Uout can be determined in a
recursive manner:
Uout = (1  )[U(w + r) + 2Uout] + Uout
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With probability 1   economic circumstances will be bad, and the other party will be voted out. Then
the politician will be back in o¢ ce within one period. Otherwise, he remains out of o¢ ce which provides
lifetime utility of Uout the next period. Solving this equation:
Uout = (1 )1  (1 )2U(w + r)
This gives life-time utility of reforming of:
U(w + r) + Uout = U(w + r) +  (1 )1  (1 )2U(w + r)
If the second politician does not reform during good times, he has utility U(w) and he stays in o¢ ce.
This gives lifetime utility:
U(w) + U in
It remains to determine U in. This can be determined with the following two equations:
U in = [U(w) + U in] + (1  )[U(w + r) + Uout]
Uout = Uout + (1  )U in
Here U in and Uout are the lifetime utility of entering the stage game while being in and out of o¢ ce
respectively. When a politician is currently in o¢ ce, he faces a probability  that economic times will be
good. If so, he receives both his endowment w and he remains in o¢ ce, which o¤ers again the prospect of
U in the next period, discounted by . With a probability 1    economic times will be gloomy, in which
case he will reform and thus receive w + r. In the next period he will be out of o¢ ce, and has the prospect
of Uout, discounted.
Now consider the latter equation:
Uout = Uout + (1  )U in =) Uout = (1 )1  U
in
This gives an expression for U in in terms of Uout. Using this:




U in   U in   (1 )
22
1  U
in = U(w) + (1   )U(w + r) =) U in[1      (1 )
22
1  ] = U(w) + (1  
)U(w + r) =)
U in[ (1 )
2 (1 )22
1  ] = U(w) + (1  )U(w + r)
Now it remains to working out the brackets:
U in[ (1 )
2 (1 )22
1  ] = U(w)+(1 )U(w+r) =) U
in[ 1 2 
2+22
1  ] = U(w)+(1 )U(w+r) =)
U in = 1 1 2 2+22 [U(w) + (1  )U(w + r)]
Lifetime utility of no reform is:
U(w) + U in = U(w) +  1 1 2 2+22 [U(w) + (1  )U(w + r)]
The politician will not reform if:
U(w) +  1 1 2 2+22 [U(w) + (1  )U(w + r)] > U(w + r) +
(1 )2
1  (1 )2U(w + r)
Derivation of condition (iv)
An equilibrium with both reforming may arise if:
U(w + r)  U(w) > (U(w)+(1 )U(w+r))1  (1 )2  
2U(w+r)
1 2 (iv)
Given that the other politician reforms, it is best to do likewise during a boom if the life-time utility
of reform is at least as high as that of not reforming during booms. If the politician also reforms, he has
U(w + r) immediately and every second period. This leads to life-time utility of:
1
1 2U(w+r) = U(w + r) +
2
1 2U(w + r)
When the politician does not reform he receives utility U(w) and stays in o¢ ce. Denote the lifetime utility
of being in o¢ ce U in and of being out of o¢ ce Uout. These can be determined by solving the following two
equations that recursively dene both:
U in = [U(w) + U in] + (1  )[U(w + r) + Uout]
Uout = U in
Solving these two equations gives:
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U in = U(w)+(1 )U(w+r)1  (1 )2
This gives the condition for both reforming:
U(w + r) + 
2U(w+r)
1 2 < U(w) + 
U(w)+(1 )U(w+r)
1  (1 )2
Right-hand side of condition (iii) larger than that of condition (iv)
Condition (iii) and (iv) are respectively:
U(w + r)  U(w) < (1 )(U(w)+(1 )U(w+r))1 2 2+22  
2(1 )U(w+r)
1  (1 )2 (iii)




















































For  = 0, there is equality with both terms equaling 1+1 2 . The derivative of right-hand side with respect
to  equals zero, whereas the derivative of the left-hand side is proportional to (1   )2 > 0. Therefore
the left-hand side is larger than the right-hand side for all 0 <  < 1. As this holds for all 0 <  < 1, the
inequality follows.
From this inequality the original condition follows if r = 0. When r > 0, it holds that U(w + r) >




1  (1 )2 it follows that the right-hand side decreases faster in
r than the left-hand side. Therefore the condition also holds for any r > 0.
Derivation of condition (vi)
Both politicians may never reform if the following condition holds:
U(w)[1 +  (1 )1 2 2+22 ] > U(w + r) + 
(1 )[U(w)+(1 )U(w+r)]
1 2 2+22
Given that the other politician never reforms, it is best to do likewise if the life-time utility of never
reforming is at least as high as that of reforming (and being ousted). If the politician never reforms, he has
U(w) immediately. If he stays in o¢ ce he has U in the next period, Uout otherwise. It remains to determine
U in and Uout. These follow from the following two conditions:
U in = U(w) + [U in + (1  )Uout]
Uout = [Uout + (1  )U in] =) Uout = (1 )1  U
in
Combining gives:
U in = U(w) + U in + (1 )
22
1  U
in =) U in[1    (1 )
22
1  ] = U(w) =)
U in = 1 1 2 2+22U(w)
Now it follows that:
Uout = (1 )1 2 2+22U(w)
Since U in > Uout, the worst outcome for a politician not reforming is that he is ousted immediately (due
to economic voting) and this results in life-time utility:
U(w) + Uout = U(w) + (1 )
2
1 2 2+22U(w)
This gives life-time utility of never reforming given that the other politician does not reform.
If a politician reforms he receives U(w + r) immediately and subsequently Uout. The latter expression
depends on which equilibrium results, either the equilibrium with both always reforming or both never
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reforming during economic good times. In the latter case and incorporating the higher value , condition





News and consumer condence
7.1 Introduction and related literature
1 The media are now frequently blamed for both deepening the credit-crisis as well as failing to see it coming.2
The argument underlying this somewhat di¤use allegation is that gloomy news weakens consumer condence
beyond the point justied by real economic conditions. During a recession lower consumer condence further
depresses consumption, thereby adding to a negative spiral of declining aggregate demand, contracting
production, and soaring unemployment with a depression cum deation scenario with low condence and
postponed consumption as an ultimate outcome.
This chapter investigates for the Netherlands in 1990-2009 whether there is an empirical link between
media-coverage on the one hand and consumer condence and economic circumstances on the other hand.
This chapter extends existing research in two ways. First it considers more recent data, up to and including
2009; this allows an analysis of the credit-crisis period. Second, it analyses a considerable longer time series
than is commonly done. Twenty years observations allows for testing whether the media-e¤ect di¤ers for
di¤erent business cycles instead of assuming it does not.
The importance of consumer condence for consumer spending and, thereby, for economic growth has
been established by for example Acemoglu and Scott (1994) and is reviewed by Ludvigson (2004). Consumer
condence itself is inuenced by several factors. A rst and important factor of consumer condence is the
real economy itself, which includes unemployment, economic growth, and the stock market. The inuence of
economic developments has been established by many authors, including Vuchelen (2004), Berry and Davin
(2004), Otoo (1999), De Boef and Kellstedt (2004) and Jansen and Nahuis (2001).
A second important factor that is identied by several authors is media coverage (for a theoretical
discussion see Van Raaij (1989)). There are several papers that consider the link between media and consumer
condence empirically. Blood and Philips (1995) nd that recession headlines inuence consumer sentiment
in the USA in 1989-1993. Doms and Morin (2004) show that several media-variables inuence consumer
condence for the US in 1978-2003. Wu et al. (2002) demonstrate that recession news in the New York
Times inuences public perceptions about the state of the economy during the period 1987-1996, especially
during times of economic recession. Wu et al. (2004) however do not nd a similar e¤ect in Japan in
1988-1999 (the Lost Decade). They suggest that occurrence of the media-e¤ect on consumer condence
depends on the type of economic contraction. The e¤ect may be present in relatively short recessions, not
in long periods of stagnation. The paper that speaks most clearly to this study is Alsem et al. (2008). They
nd for the Netherlands in the period 1998-2002 that media-coverage has a short-run e¤ect on consumer
1This chapter was written with Rens Vliegenthart. It is published in The Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(3), pp.
367-373.
2See for example Is the media to blame for the credit-crisis?, Independent, November 17th 2008, D. Crossley-Holland, and
MPs assail journalists on credit crisis, Financial Times, February 5th 2009, B. Fenton. Why didnt the City journalists see the
nancial crisis coming?, J. Robinson, the Observer, October 12th 2008. For a Dutch discussion see Media versterken crisis,
J. van Duin, de Journalist, January 28th 2009 and Crisis ook geen lolletje voor RTL Z, W. Dekker, de Volkskrant, March 12
2009. See also Credit crisis: how did we miss it?, D. Schechter , British Journalism Review, 20(1), 209, pp. 19-26.
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condence. An important di¤erence between their paper and this chapter is that by using a computer
assisted content analysis, a time series that is both longer and more recent can be considered. This o¤ers
the additional advantage that e¤ects of media coverage in times of economic growth and economic decline
can be compared, testing precisely the proposition put forward by Wu et al..
To understand why media coverage matters for consumer condence, even after controlling for real
economic circumstances, insights from the eld of communication science, where causes, content and e¤ects
of media coverage are central topics can be helpful. Communication scientists have proposed di¤erent
mechanisms that account for the e¤ects news coverage has on individualsattitudes and behaviour. The
prevailing ones are agenda setting and framing (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). Agenda setting refers to
the notion that the importance that people attribute to an issue is inuenced to a considerable extent by
the attention that media devote to this issue (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Agenda setting theory asserts
that media might not determine what people think, but where they think about. For example, a lot of
media coverage about the economy makes this an important issue in the eye of the public as well. Framing
assumes that the way mass media report about issues makes a di¤erence. By emphasizing certain aspects
of an issue (e.g. problem denitions, solutions) and not others, mass media can directly inuence peoples
attitudes and evaluations about that issue. In several recent empirical studies especially framing e¤ects have
been established (e.g. Druckman, 2005; De Vreese, 2005). In the case under study, agenda setting and
framing combined predict that the amount of attention devoted to negative aspects of the economy (e.g.
unemployment, recession) results in increased awareness of economic problems among the public and will
consequently lower their condence.
The chapter is organized as follows. The second section discusses the data and the operationalization
of the media-variable whereas the third section presents the model and estimation results, as well as several
robustness checks. The fourth section concludes.
7.2 The data
The data are from publicly available data sources.3 The table in the appendix provides descriptive statistics.
The three variables are discussed in more detail here. For the stock market development the Amsterdam
Exchange Index (AEX) is used. This index gives the weighted average of the 25 most traded shares on the
Dutch stock exchange. The AEX is used as a control variable, considering news-coverage and consumer
condence are both inuenced by economic conditions (following Alsem et al. (2008) and Jansen and Nahuis
(2001)). In theory, the stock market reects current economic circumstances as well as future economic
expectations. In so, it serves as a leading economic indicator with the advantage that it is available on a
monthly basis, in contrast to many quarterly reported economic growth-gures. A drawback of using the
stock market is that it may move irrespective of economic conditions; this is in particular the case when a
bubble forms on the stock market.
Consumer condence gures are derived from a monthly questionnaire. In many European countries
consumer condence is measured in a similar way, see Jansen and Nahuis (2003). In the rst ten days of
each month 1000 randomly selected new people are interviewed by telephone, and asked how they perceive
the state the economy. Individual answers are unfortunately not available, and if so would also not be
exploitable in the present context as media-usage at the individual level is unknown. Thus, several aggregate
level measures are used. When it comes to media e¤ects, aggregate level studies o¤er great opportunities.
To put it in the words of communication scientist Michael Slater (2004: pp. 178) When such [time series]
studies are an option [. . . ] they permit exceptionally robust inference concerning real world e¤ects of media
exposure on national populations.
Consumer condence is based upon ve questions. The ve questions include two questions on the
general state of the economy, one asking how the respondent thinks that the economy evolved the last twelve
months, one asking how (s)he expects it to develop the next twelve months. Next, it includes two questions
on how respondents perceive their own personal nancial position. Again one backward-looking question
3Consumer Condence was taken from Statline of the Dutch Bureau of Statistics (CBS, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek).
The AEX index was downloaded from yahoo.nance, and media-variables were constructed using the digital newspaper archive
LexisNexis.
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asks how that position improved the last twelve months, while one forward looking question asks whether the
interviewed expects this to improve in the next twelve months. A fth question asks whether it is currently
a good time to purchase durable goods.
For each category, the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) calculates the di¤erence between the
percentage of people with a positive or very positive answer and a negative or very negative answer, leaving
aside the intermediate answering-category and the answer I dont know. Consumer condence is the
average of the resulting ve calculations, and thus ranges between -100 (if all people answer negatively on
all questions) and 100.
To assess media content, a computer-assisted content analysis of one of the largest Dutch national
newspapers, NRC Handelsblad, was conducted. This centre-right newspaper is one of the most read Dutch
newspapers and gives much attention to economic issues (Bakker and Scholten 2005). An additional practical
advantage is that the database of this newspaper covers the longest available time-period. Since correlation
between news-coverage for the NRC Handelsblad and the four other national newspapers (Telegraaf, Trouw,
Financieele Dagblad en Volkskrant) was very high results for other newspapers are similar to those of
NRC Handelsblad.4 The monthly number of references to negative aspects of the economy in the latter
newspaper is used. These negative aspects included recession (recessie), economic crisis (economische crisis),
shrinking economy (economische krimp) and economic downturn (economische neergang) or fall (economische
teruggang). References on the front page and in the headline of an article were counted twice to account
for their more prominent position in the newspaper. A total number of 17,455 occurrences in 11,585 articles
were registered. The use of computer assisted content analysis is well-established in social scientic research
and has multiple advantages in terms of e¢ ciency and consistency, especially when it comes to analysing
general characteristics of documents such as newspapers as is done in this case (for an overview see Cardie
and Wilkerson 2008).
7.3 Estimations and results
Figure 1 shows the development of negative news coverage and consumer condence. As can be seen there
is considerable variation in both variables. The gure shows that peaks in negative news coverage coincide
with dips in consumer condence. The overall correlation between the two variables is -0.38, indicating that
the lower consumer condence in a certain month, the more negative newspaper coverage there will be in
that month. Negative economic news peaked at in the last part of the research period. After the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 it became clear and immediate that the banking-crisis would a¤ect the
real economy. Other peaks are 1993, 1998 (the rouble-crisis and the collapse of hedge-fund LTCM), 2001
(9/11), 2003 (accounting fraud at several large companies as Enron, Parmalat and in the Netherlands Ahold
and Shell) and 2007 (start of the credit-crisis).
While economic news coverage and consumer condence tend to move in tandem, this does not prove
that the rst causes the second. Both may be driven by economic conditions or the correlation may result
from a common time trend. To disentangle these di¤erent reasons for the correlation a Vector Autoregression-
model (VAR) is estimated, see Enders (2004). First, the model controls for economic conditions by taking
into account its proxy stock market developments. Second, all variables are tested for the presence of a
time trend (a so called unit root, see below). If it cannot be rejected that the variables are non-stationary,
variables are considered in di¤erences instead of levels. This removes a (common) time trend in the variables
and the spurious relation that may result from it. Third, a system of three regression equations are estimated
simultaneously with the three (possibly di¤erenced) variables subsequently entering once and once only as
the dependent variable and with lags of all three variables as regressors (see also the system of equations
in the appendix). A variable is thus allowed to be jointly determined by both its own past values and
lagged values of the other variables. Causality can subsequently (only) be established in a statistical sense.
A variable x is said to Granger cause another variable y if lagged values of x have statistically signicant
predictive power for y, also after taking lagged values of y into account, see again Enders (2004).
4The correlation for monthly number of references to negative aspects of the economy ranges from .96 to .97 for the individual
outlets and equaling .98 for the four other newspapers taken together.
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A VAR-model allows variables to be determined jointly. This allowance for endogeneity of all vari-
ables is important here as media-coverage and stock markets returns not only inuence consumer condence
but may be inuenced by it as well. A second advantage is that the model does not impose parameter-
restrictions a priori, as the lag length is part of the estimation procedure and no parameter is in advance
restricted to equal zero as some would be under an exogeneity assumption. The estimation of potentially
irrelevant parameters however might decrease e¢ ciency; this is especially relevant as the number of estimated
parameters increases with every additional lag length and every variable.5
The maximum number of lags included is here restricted to four. This means that the direct impact
of the media is assumed to be in e¤ect within four months or less. As the psychological and communication
scientic e¤ects described are short-run, this seems a reasonable long, even conservative cut-o¤ point. The
maximum number of four is also in line with the literature and was not binding in any of the regressions.
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An important assumption underlying the VAR-model is that all variables are stationary. The basic
Dicky-Fuller test could not reject the null hypothesis that consumer condence, media-coverage and the
stock market are non-stationary, see table 1. As the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for di¤erenced
series, all variables are di¤erence stationary or I(1) integrated. Note that logarithms of the AEX are taken.
In this way, the model relates relative changes to each other instead of absolute changes. The di¤erence of
the logarithms is an approximation of the relative change of the stock market.




Negative newspaper coverage -2.256
Negative newspaper coverage -18.709
Ln(AEX) .791
ln(AEX) -13.624
5 In a VAR-model with n variables and p lags, n+pn2 parameters are estimated.
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The estimated VAR-model includes consumer condence (abbreviated CC), negative newspaper
coverage (MEDIA) and the stock market (AEX). The logarithms of these variables enter the model; the
model equations themselves are:
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The number of lags is indicated by k. The lag length is selected by the Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC), following a common approach in the literature. The AIC suggests a model with one lag the
most appropriate. The results are presented in table 2. Using a ve per cent threshold, the e¤ect of the
media-variable in the equation with consumer condence as the dependent variable is negative and signif-
icant, indicating that (changes in) negative news is negatively related to (changes in) condence, in line
with expectations. A referral to negative economic developments knocks of almost 0.02 point of consumer
condence. The media time-series thus Granger causes consumer condence, as it has predictive power for
consumer condence over and beyond the explanatory power of lagged values of consumer condence.




1st lag -.012 (.068) .89 (.58) .0004 (.001)
Granger test, p-value 0.027 .125 .635
MEDIA
1st lag -.017 (.008) -.22 (.064) -.0003 (.0001)
Granger test, p-value .027 0.001 .001
ln(AEX)
1st lag 2.96 (4.97) -100.61 (41.98) .067 (.068)
Granger test, p-value .551 .017 .327
Constant -.11 (.27) 1.36 (2.32) .004 (.004)
R-squared .024 .063 .059
Granger test overall, p-value .053 .042 .004
Number of observations 238 238 238
AIC 12.78
Standard errors in parentheses
As a robustness analysis, several deviations from the baseline model are considered. When the VAR-
model is estimated with AEX itself instead of its logarithm results are similar (not shown here), that is, the
impact of media-coverage on consumer condence is negative, signicant and substantial. The same holds
for a VAR-model that excludes the AEX (not shown here). Including the three variables in levels rather
than di¤erences does not change conclusions either (also not shown here).
While the main focus is on the inuence of media on consumer condence, it is also interesting to
consider the relationship between the AEX index and negative newspaper coverage. As one would expect,
there exists a negative inuence from AEX on coverage: the better the stock market is doing, the less
negative economic coverage. This is in itself not very surprising, as it shows that economic news coverage
(partly) reects the underlying real worldeconomic conditions, indicated by the stock market. Interestingly
enough, negative newspaper coverage is also associated with the AEX index: negative coverage results in
decreasing stock prices. This suggests that investors may partly react to negative news coverage of the
economy and/or particular companies. In that case, newspapers is one of relevant channels through which
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economic information is made publicly available before this information is reected in stock prices. This
hypothesis is testable on new data. This could also show whether an exploitable trading strategy can be
derived from the correlation between news coverage and stock market developments.
Thus far it was tacitly assumed that the e¤ect of media-coverage is constant over time. The sub-
stantial number of observations, 240 in total, allows for testing that assumption. Looking at GDP-growth
gures, the sample period consists of two full business-cycles. The rst full business-cycle is the period
1990-1999. This period starts with a relatively mild recession after the rst Gulf-war, which was turned
around by what is now known as the new economy or the dotcom-bubble. The second cycle runs from 2000
to 2007. It starts with the bursting of the dotcom-bubble, worsened by the 9/11 attacks; from 2003 onwards
the economy recovered, partly due to low interest rates.
The exact same modelling procedure as before is used for the periods 1990-1999 (120 observations)
and 2000-2007 (96 observations). This resulted in a selection of two lags for the rst period. The Granger
causality test for the rst period shows a signicant e¤ect with a p-value of 0.034. The e¤ect is also
substantial, as the coe¢ cients of the two-lags add up to -0.047. In 2000-2007 there is not any evidence that
media-coverage inuences consumer condence: relevant model statistics suggest a model with zero lags.
A third business-cycle started in 2008, when the credit-crisis took hold, culminating in the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in autumn 2008. The period 2008-2009 is analyzed to see whether the e¤ect of media-
coverage is important or not. The e¤ect of media-coverage equals -0.028, whereas the p-value is 0.055. This
means that the e¤ect is signicant at a signicance level of 0.10. It is not signicant at a signicance level
of 0.05, but it has to be borne in mind that samples with few observations (only 24 in this case) typically do
not result in signicant results. With relatively few observations it is di¢ cult to discriminate the null and
the alternative hypothesis. It is therefore remarkable that the e¤ect is already signicant at the 0.10 level.
Also the e¤ect has more impact here, as the volatility of media-coverage is much higher in the period
2008-2009 than before. In 2008-2009 the average value of media-coverage was 258 with a standard error of
168, whereas those numbers were 52 and 37 in the period 1990-2007. This means that a one standard error
deviation in news-coverage decreased consumer condence with 4.7 points, a much larger impact than a one
standard deviation had prior to the credit-crisis.
Last the e¤ect in 2008-2009 is compared with the rst two years in the previous business-cycles
that GDP-growth declined. For 1991-1992 the e¤ect is smaller (-0.015) and insignicant (0.42), whereas the
period 2000-2001 does not show any e¤ect whatsoever with a coe¢ cient of 0.01 and a p-value of 0.72.
Taken together, the analysis of sub-samples provides two interesting insights. First, the e¤ect of
media-coverage does not seem to be constant over time. This cannot be detected when analysing one single
business-cycle as is common in the literature. One possible explanation is that the dotcom-era and the credit-
crisis are more driven by debt-nanced demand and positive expectations with media-coverage stimulating
both. This contrasts with the intermediate period that was more inuenced by real world events as the
accounting fraud and the attack of 9/11 and the subsequent lowering of interest rates worldwide. Together
this leads to the hypothesis that media-attention inuences consumer condence more during a boom-bust
cycle that is internal to the economic system (in particular debt-nanced consumption and inated prices of
assets and houses) than during a period where a shock (partly) comes from outside the economy. This is in
line with the hypothesis of Wu et al. (2004).
A second result is that in the current credit-crisis newspapers seem to have much more impact than
before, both in terms of size and signicance. Although the sample period is too short to draw generalizable
conclusions, the result is nonetheless suggestive, interesting and potentially highly relevant. Media not only
cover the crisis, but may also inuence it considerably.
7.4 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter has investigated the causal relation between media, the economy and consumer condence in the
Netherlands in 1990-2009. The rst nding is that overall the amount of negative news, as operationalized by
the monthly referrals to negative economic developments in one of the Dutch leading newspapers, Granger-
causes consumer condence, controlling for economic circumstances, as proxied by the stock market.
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The main di¤erence with the existing literature is that this chapter takes both a larger and a
more recent period into account. This allows analysis of structural breaks and thereby follows the suggested
extension of Blood and Diamond (1995: pp. 18) who state that it seems worthwhile to extend the statistical
analysis to longer data sets that allow for (..) periods of economic expansion as well as recession.The e¤ect
indeed di¤ers for di¤erent business-cycles, a result that would have gone unnoticed when analysing smaller
samples. The period 1990-1999, representing a full business-cycle, witnessed a substantial, signicant and
sizable e¤ect and the same holds even more so for the two years 2008-2009. In the intermediate period
2000-2007 consumer condence hardly budged when media-reports varied.
This suggests that the claim that news coverage has real economic consequences, via consumer con-
dence, is valid in the current economic episode. This in turn further suggests that journalists should consider
the independent impact their reporting has on consumers. By amplifying negative economic developments,
as the extremely high values of negative newspaper coverage towards the end of the research period indicate,
media contribute to a development of declining consumer condence. In those cases, a more toned down
coverage seems appropriate. The other way round, a more critical stance in the face of up going economic
trends that cannot be but unsustainable might be warranted.
Additionally, the analyses reveal a mutual causal relationship between stock market rates and neg-
ative economic coverage. Especially the result that the AEX index is inuenced by changes in negative
economic newspaper coverage is compelling. Ultimately, this implies that stock market analysts could prot
from considering media coverage as an important variable when understanding and forecasting changes in
stock prices. While further research should point out whether this predictability is really exploitable in trad-
ing strategies, it suggests that media-attention might also have a direct economic e¤ect. Overall, the chapter
demonstrates the value of media coverage as an independent and relevant factor in economic analyses that
consequently deserves more attention, both theoretically and empirically.
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Summary
The main topic of this dissertation is the e¤ect of aging on pension systems. As the population of many
Western-European countries ages, this topic has gained wide attention in both the public debate and the
academic literature. Aging in the Netherlands can be illustrated with the development of the dependency
ratio, dened as 100 times the number of people who are 65 years or older divided by the number of people
between 19 and 65 years of age. In 1960 (three years after the state-pension Algemene Ouderdoms Wetwas
introduced) the dependency ratio equaled 16.8. In 2010 the dependency ratio was 20.1, and it is projected
to increase to 49.3 in 2040 (while decreasing to 46 in 2060).
The rst chapter forms an introduction to the main topic. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis analyze
the e¤ect of aging on intergenerational risk sharing, public pension expenditure, and the asset allocation
of pension funds respectively. Chapter 5 shows how a pension fund can improve participantswelfare by
facilitating nancial transactions between generations. Chapter 6 is more general and focuses on the politics
of reforms of welfare programs, including pension reforms. Finally, the seventh chapter is not related to
pensions; it analyzes the association between media coverage and consumer condence.
Chapter 2 analyzes the political limits to intergenerational risk sharing. Intergenerational risk sharing
can be e¢ cient from an ex-ante perspective. Intergenerational risk sharing cannot generally be implemented
by markets. The reason is that risk sharing may lead to transfers that are disadvantageous for some gen-
erations ex post, in particular young generations might not voluntarily participate in risk sharing if they
have to bail outolder generations. A feasible risk-sharing mechanism requires mandatory participation,
which can only be enforced by the government. The question then is whether e¢ cient intergenerational risk
sharing will arise endogenously in a democratic political process. Chapter 2 uses a probability voting model
with overlapping generations to address this question. The main result is that the political process generally
does not lead to ex-ante e¢ ciency. Source of the ine¢ ciency is that politicians have an electoral incentive
to redistribute ex post to larger cohorts. The political process may however still lead to some risk sharing
which from an ex-ante perspective is preferable to no risk sharing at all.
Chapter 3 estimates how an aging electorate inuences public pension expenditure, using data for
30 OECD-countries between 1980-2005. The rst result is that the dependency ratio has a positive and
signicant e¤ect on expenditure relative to GDP, controlling for several economic and political variables. A
one-unit increase in the dependency ratio is associated with an increase in pension expenditure relative to
GDP of 0.2 percentage points. Such an increase in expenditure is not unexpected as there are more people
on the receiving end of Social Security and an increase in total expenditure could only be avoided by a
relatively large decrease in individual benets. Median voter models predict that aging not only leads to an
increase in total expenditure but also to an increase in benets per retiree. The reason is that the age of
the median voter increases, and politicians therefore have an electoral motive to increase individual benets.
The second result of this chapter is that there is no empirical support for this stronger hypothesis, derived
from median voter models. In fact the opposite is the case: an increase in the age of the median voter has
a negative impact on benets per retiree.
Chapter 4 documents the e¤ect of the demographic structure of Dutch pension funds on their strategic
asset allocation, using a unique data set of pension fund investment plans for 2007. The main result is that
an increase in the average age of active participants by one year is associated with a decrease in the equity
exposure of pension funds equal to 0.5 percentage points. As equity is generally a risky asset class, older
pension funds thus tend to decrease the risk level of their investment portfolio. The negative relation between
age and equity allocation is in line with the theoretical literature on optimal saving and investment over the
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life cycle. Other factors that have a positive e¤ect on the equity exposure of pension funds are pension fund
size, funding ratio, and average pension wealth of participants. Pension plan type and pension fund type
have no signicant impact.
Chapter 5 develops conditions under which a pension fund with mandatory participation can im-
prove the welfare of young, borrowing-constrained participants who want to go short in bonds, that is,
invest borrowed money in stocks. The pension funds may enable young participants to borrow against
their human capital from older participants who want to lend. A pension fund with mandatory participa-
tion may subsequently enforce the promise of the young to repay the old. The pension fund in particular
levies contributions ex post on younger participants to repay older participants in case stock return is low.
Mandatory participation thus acts as a commitment device for the young to repay their debt when they
borrow against human capital. Mandatory participation is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for
optimal intergenerational nancial transactions. The optimal investment policy can only be implemented
by a proper governance structure. In particular, if the board of the pension fund has discretionary power to
decide over contributions, the old will want to be represented on the board to ensure that they are repaid in
full. However, the young want to avoid that the old abuse their position to increase contributions arbitrarily,
so the young will need to be represented adequately as well. This chapter shows that the risk level ex ante
and the contribution policy ex post cannot be separated and that good pension fund governance considers
both simultaneously.
Chapter 6 gives a theoretical explanation for why and when vote-seeking governments pursue un-
popular welfare reforms that are likely to cost them votes. Examples of such reforms are increases in the
pension age or cutbacks of social benets. Using a novel game-theoretical model, it is shown that a govern-
ment enacts reforms that are unpopular with the median voter during bad economic times like recessions,
but generally not during good ones. The key reason is that voters cannot commit to re-elect a government
that does not reform during recessions. This voters commitment problem stems from economic voting,
that is voterstendency to punish the government for poor economic performance. The voterscommitment
problem means that a vote-seeking government will consider reforms only if it will likely be voted out of
o¢ ce anyway because of economic hardship. A recession thus enables a government to act according to its
own economic ideas or interests. The central empirical implication of the model is that unpopular reforms
are generally initiated during recessions, which is consistent with empirical ndings.
The seventh chapter, which is unrelated to pensions, addresses the question whether economic news
coverage a¤ects consumer condence. Using data for the Netherlands during the period 1990-2009, the main
nding is that in this period, more negative news coverage signicantly decreased consumer condence.
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